In the context of the Ukraine conflict and the changing geopolitical scenario in Eurasia, Islamabad denied the ammunition supply to Ukraine to avoid any possible deterioration of the relations with the Russian Federation, which is actively involved in promoting the Pakistani energy and logistic markets.
La presenza di foreign fighters e battaglioni di volontari in Ucraina accresce il rischio geopolitico dello scacchiere strategico eurasiatico essendo questi attori non statali impegnati attualmente nel combattere le forze armate russe e al contempo collegati direttamente o indirettamente con membri della diaspora o della militanza armata-jihadista che negli ultimi anni hanno operato nello spazio post-sovietico e in Medio Oriente.
The Kremlin’s project to evaluate the opportunity to implement Islamic banking in Russia might support the national economy, attract foreign investors from the Arab-Muslim world, and counter the consequences of Western sanctions imposed against Moscow due to the Ukraine conflict.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked economic sanctions, which are meant to cripple the economy while detracting from Russia’s ability to wage war. This paper will analyse the sanctions’ impact, the war on the Russian economy and possible future implications.
The commercial and political partnership between Dagestan and Azerbaijan might support the increasing relations between Moscow and Baku and implement the Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.
The Russian State Duma’s official visit to Abkhazia confirms the Kremlin’s presence in the South Caucasus and the Abkhaz territory’s strategic role in Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow-Sukhum improving relations stress the Russian desire to confirm its influence in the Caucasus in a challenging time characterised by the Ukraine conflict and the confrontation with the West.
The beginning of the Ukraine conflict drew a line under the development of the geopolitical situation on the Eurasian continent over the past three decades since the beginning of the 1990s.
Stavropol authorities’ desire to open trade offices abroad might underline Russia’s strategic economic goal in the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard, especially in Azerbaijan, Iran, China, and the United Arab Emirates.
The creation of the Turan Battalion confirmed that the Ukraine conflict had become the perfect battleground for international fighters and contractors united by the desire to fight against the Russian Federation and promote their ideologies and goals.
The establishment of an IT Park in Ingushetia named after Adam Khamkhoev, killed in May 2022 in Ukraine, underlined local and central authorities’ desire to promote economic development and support Kremlin’s narrative related to heroism and national unity.
The Stavropol territory welcomed representatives from the Middle East and Africa in the event “North Caucasus in the Changing World”, whose goal was to create a link between the region and potential foreign investors and markets.
The first “Central Asia-Russia” summit in Astana confirmed the Russian importance in the region and the Kremlin’s strategy to increase economic cooperation with Central Asian republics.
Tokayev’s suggestion to create an organisation in the framework of the CIS to promote the Russian language might be interpreted as Kazakhstan’s attempt to normalise relations with Russia, which were downgraded due to the Ukraine conflict and the Western sanctions.
Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has played a decisive and influential role in assisting the Russian military operations on the ground with his kadyrovtsy and Chechen troops and supporting the Kremlin’s ideological confrontation with the West.
Recent arrests of Russian citizens in the Stavropol territory linked with the Islamic State confirmed that jihadist propaganda penetrated the Russian territory by exploiting local problems and influencing the Muslim communities disseminated in the country, especially in the North Caucasus, where the Kremlin has contrasted local militancy and religious extremism.
Due to the Ukraine conflict and the following Western sanctions, Russia and Belarus have increased their economic and trade cooperation by increasing joint projects in different fields.
Russia and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) signed the most significant deal since the Taliban movement came to power last year, confirming Kremlin’s interests in the country and Moscow’s will to become a key regional actor.
The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the Russian Federation organised an event in the city of Makhachkala to promote the national culture and create a link with Dagestan, a strategic North Caucasian republic located on the Caspian Sea.
The possibility that Donbas will soon hold a referendum to join the Russian Federation might significantly influence the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard by exacerbating the confrontation between Moscow and the West and, therefore, impacting regional and international political and socioeconomic dynamics.
In a video message, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the partial military mobilisation, confirming the difficult situation that the Russian troops are experiencing in the Ukraine conflict due to Kyiv’s counter-offensive to reconquer Donbas and Crimea.
Kremlin’s promotion of Dagestan culture and society in Sochi underlines Moscow’s goal to contrast Kavkazophobia and, simultaneously, improve the link between ethnic Russians and local ethnic Dagestani groups since this North Caucasian republic has a strategic role in the Caspian Sea region.
The Russian Federation’s humanitarian help to Pakistan might strengthen the political and economic relations between Moscow and Islamabad and support the Russian desire to expand its influence and presence in Central and South-East Asia.
Georgian authorities denied that Tbilisi would hold a referendum to open a “second front” against the Russian Federation, destabilising the South Caucasus and threatening the Georgian economy, which is heavily dependent on the Russian market.
In the framework of the Eastern Economic Forum 2022, we met Dr Shoaib Khan to analyse the current state of relations between Russia and India, key areas of cooperation and expectations from the Forum.
The recent phone conversation between the President of Russia and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia might be interpreted as the Kremlin’s move to counter the recent U.S. President Joe Biden’s official visit to Riyadh.
In a world of growing polarity, Kazakhstan has been attempting to portray itself as a bridge connecting the East and the West. However, the so-called Russian “special operation” in Ukraine has forced the Central Asian nation to distance itself gradually from Moscow.
Although Russian – Iranian ties date back to the Islamic Revolution, Moscow’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine (or special military operation as the Kremlin has always declared) and Tehran’s nuclear ambitions have strengthened the cooperation and pushed these Western adversaries together.