Executive Summary

This report assesses Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s official visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in May 2025 and its participation in the first “Central Asia + Italy” summit.

This study will analyse how Italy is boosting its political, economic, and security influence in Central Asia. Indeed, Rome’s support for regional stability, trade links, and European strategic interests in a multipolar geopolitical landscape confirms the regional “New Great Game”.

This investigation also highlights potential obstacles, both internal and external, that could hinder future cooperation between Rome and the Central Asian republics.

Key Takeaways

1. The First “Central Asia + Italy” summit confirms Rome’s influence in Central Asia through diplomatic, economic, and academic engagement.
2. Giorgia Meloni’s trip to Central Asia underscores the region’s efforts to strengthen ties with the EU and reduce reliance on China and Russia.
3. Structural limits and regional insecurity remain persistent barriers to full integration with European markets.

Latest Regional Developments

• 29 May 2024 – Italy hosted the Third Ministerial Conference “Central Asia + Italy” in Rome, reaffirming its commitment to increased cooperation with Central Asian republics.
• 17 September 2024 – Astana hosted the first “Central Asia + Germany” summit focusing on strategic economic, infrastructure, and security agreements reached between the parties.
• 13 March 2025 – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a landmark agreement on border issues, signifying a major step forward in resolving their long history of violent disputes.
• 31 March 2025 – The presidents of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration, demarcating the tri-state border and establishing a formal declaration of friendship.
• 4 April 2025 – The inaugural EU-Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand, highlighted Europe’s growing strategic interest in the region.
• 11 April 2025 – Almaty hosted the Eighth Central Asia – Russia Ministerial Meeting, which stressed Moscow’s efforts to consolidate its strategic influence in the area.
• 26 April 2025 – In Almaty was organised the Sixth China – Central Asia Foreign Ministers Meeting where Beijing reaffirmed its commitment to building a “community of common destiny” with regional players.
• 28/30 May 2025 – Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan marked a diplomatic high point, culminating in the inaugural “Central Asia + Italy” summit and underscoring Rome’s strategic interest in Eurasia.
• Throughout 2025, European countries, including Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Italy, have increased engagements with Central Asian governments, focusing on trade, investment, cultural diplomacy, and diplomatic presence.

Geopolitical Scenario

In the last years, and especially after the beginning of the Ukraine conflict and the affirmation of the multipolar world, Central Asia has faced a dual challenge: internal stabilisation and attracting investment, while also handling shifting geopolitical strategies from external players.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which included the first “Central Asia + Italy” summit, emphasised Rome’s commitment to being a key player in Eurasian affairs. The summit confirmed a growing European presence in Central Asia, particularly Italy, which intends to use its strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea to make Central Asian goods more accessible to European and African markets.

For Central Asian republics, the imperative remains to reduce overdependence on Russia and China. Therefore, expanding their relationships with foreign partners, particularly EU member states, will diversify their diplomatic and economic connections.

Regional stability is another goal for these republics, as evidenced by the important March 2025 border agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, a breakthrough in resolving long-standing border disputes and violence, and the Khujand Declaration. Stability is key to attracting foreign investment and gaining international respect. Moreover, the rising number of European delegations visiting the region shows a common interest in building on the current progress toward reform and cooperation.

However, significant constraints remain. Being landlocked, the region lacks direct access to international maritime commerce. In this regard, local governments are facing these opportunities/challenges:

1. International sanctions limit the use of Iranian ports; thus, increased Central Asian activity in Iranian ports and markets could cause pressure from the EU and the United States.
2. Although Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan offer alternative access routes, significant domestic security threats, particularly from Baluch insurgents and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), diminish their effectiveness.
3. Besides access via India is, in principle, workable, it hinges on a stable New Delhi-Islamabad agreement, a difficult scenario given ongoing military tensions and unresolved conflicts which might involve also the People’s Republic of China.
4. Afghanistan remains another critical variable. Even though trade routes through the Afghan territory could reach the Indian Ocean, the volatile security situation, worsened by groups like Islamic State Khorasan Wilayat (ISKP), makes them extremely dangerous.

Because of these constraints, Central Asian nations increasingly depend on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to improve East-West land connections, while some of these nations became part of the Eurasian Economic Union. Concurrently, they are collaborating with European entities to curb Chinese and Russian power, attempting to establish themselves as autonomous collaborators within a multipolar global system.

Since Moscow and Beijing see Italy as less aggressive than states such as Germany, France, or the United Kingdom, Rome might have a unique diplomatic advantage in the regional dynamics. This factor, combined with the Italian academic and cultural diplomacy to build soft power, aims to strengthen political and economic ties. However, the same geopolitical barriers affecting Central Asia also limit Italy’s ability to expand its role.

The European Union, including Italy, must navigate these internal conditions carefully considering they are increasing their involvement in a region where they face not only geopolitical competition but also the deterioration of freedom and democracy registered in the last years. The current strategy seems to be engagement focused on gradual modernisation and stability, while avoiding direct challenges to the existing power structure. However, concerns about democracy and human rights could again cause tension in the future.

Strategic Outlook

The “Central Asia + Italy” Summit confirms the geostrategic importance of Central Asia within the broader Eurasian theatre. Europe’s increasing involvement highlights a growing interest in closer political, economic, and cultural ties with the region, amidst a fierce competition between Russia, China, the EU, Turkey, and Iran.

Italy’s recent actions seem a strategic play to increase its presence in a competitive market, quietly expanding its influence compared to other European nations. The following section details the imperatives, constraints, and resultant positive or negative outcomes of Italy’s Central Asian engagement, analysed within the current geopolitical context.

• Imperatives
  • Italy needs to expand bilateral cooperation, as done with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, through trade, infrastructure, academic exchange, and diplomatic coordination.
  • To lessen reliance on Russia and China, Central Asian nations must strengthen ties with Europe, boosting investment and broadening their international partnerships.
  • Regional actors must work to solidify their recent achievements in security and diplomatic collaboration, exemplified by the Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreement.
• Constraints
  • Persistent instability in Afghanistan, unresolved tensions between India and Pakistan, and Iran’s international isolation may hinder reliable access to maritime trade routes.
  • Without coordination through broader EU structures, Italy’s limited economic and security presence compared to other EU states could limit its influence.
  • Internal repression and fragile governance in countries like Kyrgyzstan pose risks to long-term institutional partnerships and European norms-based diplomacy.
• Favourable Result in a Positive Scenario
  • Continued Italian engagement could solidify its position as a crucial link between Central Asia and the Mediterranean, offering logistical access through Southern Europe to the EU, North Africa, and the Middle East.
  • A stable region could attract more European private investment, particularly in energy, logistics, and infrastructure.
  • Rome’s success in cultural and academic diplomacy could significantly boost its soft power over the long term.
• Challenges in a Negative Scenario
  • Rising tensions with Russia, China, and Iran could constrain Europe’s ability to act.
  • Deteriorating security, because of terrorism in Afghanistan, instability in Pakistan or regional confrontation because of water resources, could hinder investment and the development of transit corridors.
  • Strained relations with EU institutions promoting governance reforms and human rights could hinder the relations between Central Asia and European governments.