Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 52 Issue 6
Author: Matteo Meloni

Executive Summary

The recent visit of Italian President Sergio Mattarella to Kazakhstan reinforces the developing relationship between Italy and Central Asia. His meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana follows a series of bilateral agreements signed in 2024, strengthening economic, energy, and diplomatic cooperation between the two nations. This visit underscores Italy’s broader strategic interest in the Central Asian region, where it has been fostering deeper economic and diplomatic ties with multiple states.

In a wider context, the upcoming first EU-Central Asia summit, scheduled for April 2025 in Samarkand, will redefine European engagement in the region. The summit signals the European Union’s growing interest in strengthening its presence in Central Asia, positioning itself as a major external player alongside traditional powers like Russia, China, and Turkey.

This shift comes as the United States scales back its involvement, with significant budgetary cuts to USAID, which has historically played a critical role in Washington’s engagement with Central Asia. As a result, the EU might increase its influence, filling the void left by the US and redefining the region’s geopolitical landscape.

Geopolitical Scenario

Over the past decade, Italy has steadily increased its engagement with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, recognising the region’s strategic significance as an energy supplier, a market for Italian exports, and a key transit hub in Eurasia.

During President Tokayev’s visit to Italy in January 2024, the two countries signed multiple agreements aimed at enhancing cooperation in vital sectors, including energy diversification, infrastructure, digital transformation, and agriculture. One of the most significant deals involved a joint venture between Eni and KazMunayGas to develop a hybrid power plant, highlighting Italy’s focus on sustainable energy projects in Kazakhstan.

Italy has been Kazakhstan’s primary European trade partner, ranking third in 2024 in overall trade volume after Russia and China. Trade between the two countries has been robust, largely driven by Italy’s dependence on Kazakh oil and gas imports. Italian companies, particularly in the energy sector, have been expanding their footprint in the Central Asian republic, leveraging the country’s strategic position and abundant natural resources.

Beyond Kazakhstan, Italy has also been strengthening ties with other Central Asian nations. In 2022, Italy pursued new trade and economic cooperation agreements with Uzbekistan, highlighting mutual interests in infrastructure development, technology transfer, and cultural exchanges. Similarly, Italy has been exploring investment opportunities in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the textile industry, aiming to create joint ventures that can access regional markets, including Kazakhstan and Russia.

We must understand the geopolitical significance of Italy’s growing presence in Central Asia within the broader context of the European Union’s increasing engagement in the region. On April 3-4, 2025, Samarkand will host the first-ever EU-Central Asia summit, bringing together leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, alongside European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

This summit represents a historic moment, reflecting the EU’s ambition to strengthen its political and economic partnerships with Central Asian countries. Key topics on the agenda include:

• Energy Cooperation: Given Central Asia’s vast reserves of natural resources, Brussels is keen to develop alternative energy supply routes to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. Astana, in particular, is a crucial partner in this regard, as it is one of the world’s largest uranium producers and an essential oil and gas supplier.
• Trade and Investment: The EU is looking to boost its trade ties with the region, with a focus on infrastructure development and digital transformation.
• Security and Stability: With growing concerns over regional security, particularly following the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan, Brussels aims at fostering stability through cooperation on counterterrorism and border security.
• Connectivity and the Middle Corridor: Central Asia plays a key role in the Middle Corridor, a crucial trade route that connects Europe with China via the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia. The EU’s engagement in this initiative could strengthen its economic influence in the region.
• Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR): A critical component of the Middle Corridor, the TITR — also known as the Trans-Caspian Corridor — facilitates trade between Europe and Asia via Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Brussels’ interest in this corridor highlights its strategic goal of reducing dependence on Russian transit routes and enhancing connectivity with Central Asian markets.

Scenario Analysis

For decades, Central Asia has witnessed the confrontation between Russia, China, and the United States. In the last years, regional actors such as Turkey, Gulf Arab monarchies, India, and Iran, has emerged in the Central Asian geopolitical chessboard in a multipolar era. In this context, the EU’s growing engagement presents a shift in the geopolitical balance, offering Central Asian nations an alternative to traditional partnerships.

• Russia: Historically, Moscow has maintained strong political, economic, and military ties with the region, viewing it as part of its traditional sphere of influence known as blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad). However, the Ukraine conflict has reduced Moscow’ s efforts and sources in Central Asia, creating an opportunity for other powers to expand their presence.
• China: Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested heavily in Central Asia’s infrastructure, securing access to key natural resources and trade routes. However, many Central Asian nations are wary of growing economic dependence on Beijing and are seeking to diversify their partnerships.
• Turkey: Ankara has leveraged cultural and linguistic ties with Turkic-speaking nations such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan to expand its influence, particularly through the Organization of Turkic States and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO).

The EU’s increased presence in Central Asia offers an alternative for regional actors, balancing existing power structures and potentially reshaping the geopolitical order.
A key factor driving the EU’s increased involvement in Central Asia is the gradual disengagement of the United States. The Trump administration’s decision to cut USAID funding in the region signals a retreat from Washington’s traditional role as a Western presence in Central Asia. USAID has played a crucial role in promoting economic development, democratic governance, and regional stability. Its reduction in funding creates a vacuum that the EU is well-positioned to fill.

With the US stepping back, Brussels has a unique opportunity to emerge as the primary Western actor in Central Asia, strengthening its economic and political influence while nominally promoting European values of democracy, human rights, and sustainable development.

Conclusions

Italy’s growing partnership with Kazakhstan, exemplified by President Mattarella’s visit and recent bilateral agreements, reflects a broader trend of increased European engagement in Central Asia. This shift aligns with the EU’s strategic objectives, particularly in securing energy resources, enhancing trade relations, and promoting regional stability.

*Cover image: Italian President Sergio Mattarella during a meeting with Kazakh President Kaddym-Jomart Tokayev (Credits: Quirinale.it, Attribution, via Wikimedia Commons)

Contact us at info@specialeurasia.com and request information about our tailored reports and consulting services about Kazakhstan and Central Asia.