Executive Summary
The eighth ministerial meeting between Russia and the five Central Asian states, held in Almaty on April 11, 2025, highlights Moscow’s ongoing efforts to consolidate strategic influence across its southern periphery.
Since 2022, the increasingly formalised format serves dual symbolic and practical purposes: bolstering the Kremlin’s regional influence and harmonising key policy agendas in security, migration, and economic integration.
This report wants to assess the status of Russia-Central Asia relations and Moscow’s strategy to exploit multilateralism and security cooperation to influence Central Asian republics and counter the recent first EU-Central Asia summit.
Key Takeaways
- Russia seeks to institutionalise regional alignment through structured multilateralism, despite diverging national priorities among Central Asian states.
- Russia’s domestic agenda increasingly affects security cooperation, while economic initiatives lack funding and third-party investment.
- The ministerial meeting stressed Moscow’s strategy to counter foreign influence the region, especially after the first EU-Central Asia summit.
Background Information
The Russia-Central Asia multilateral forum emerged as Moscow’s relations with the West soured because of the Ukraine conflict and China and Turkey increased their regional diplomatic activity. Initially convened at the summit level in 2022 (Astana), the forum has developed into a regularised six-party format, combining high-level summits with ministerial and working-level meetings.
The April 2025 ministerial meeting, hosted in Almaty, included participation from foreign ministers or deputy ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, alongside Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
The participants discussed security collaboration focusing on terrorism, extremism, and narcotics, working together on migration, and joint efforts in green energy, industrial trade, and transportation infrastructure. This meeting prepared the groundwork for a future 2025 summit of heads of state, where they will formally approve a joint-project package.
Geopolitical Scenario
Russia’s engagement reflects a deliberate strategy to entrench regional dependencies and prevent erosion of influence in Central Asia. The Kremlin still considers the region as part of its blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad) and lebensraum (vital space) where, recently, several actors such as the European Union, China, Turkey, and the Gulf Arab monarchies have increased their activities.
Against the backdrop of the Western sanctions because of the Ukraine conflict, Moscow is prioritising “friendly peripheries” to maintain strategic depth and reinforce internal narratives of resilience. The Almaty meeting functioned as both a diplomatic performance and a forum for policy alignment.
Russia seeks to show unity and shared strategic goals by emphasising common security interests and promoting regional growth. However, public statements and joint communiques omit reference to any tangible mechanisms of enforcement or monitoring, suggesting that alignment remains primarily declarative.
Security concerns remain a unifying theme across the six countries, particularly regarding terrorism, extremism, and narcotics trafficking, geopolitical risks compounded by instability in neighbouring Afghanistan. However, Moscow’s focus on legal changes targeting illegal migration, and the need to align regional partners with its domestic policy, introduces asymmetry into the agenda. Although Central Asian nations recognise these dangers, their assessments of the threats and priorities vary, especially considering their reliance on Russian remittances.
Including the Ukraine conflict in Lavrov’s briefing illustrates Russia’s attempt to secure narrative alignment or at least passive support from regional allies. This dynamic further underscores the geopolitical conditioning of what is ostensibly a technical and security-focused forum.
Ministers stressed the importance of economic growth, focusing on collaboration in green energy, water resources, and transportation. However, despite rhetorical commitments, the viability of these initiatives remains uncertain. While Central Asian nations strive for better infrastructure and a more diverse economy, its own economic struggles and global sanctions hampered Russia’s ability to fund major projects.
The region is subject to overlapping economic interests from other major powers, notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Turkey’s growing infrastructural diplomacy, which further complicate the implementation of Russian-backed projects. In addition, the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand (April 4, 2025) challenged the Kremlin’s regional power, prompting a Russian counter-strategy.
While the regularity of Russia-Central Asian ministerial meetings suggests a degree of institutional maturity, the multilateral format lacks legal codification or binding commitments. It operates more as a political coordination mechanism than a formal alliance. The participation of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan at the deputy-ministerial level may show either scheduling constraints or differing levels of engagement.
Risk Assessment
Short-Term Risks:
- Differing threat perceptions may weaken security coordination, especially if states prioritise Russia’s agenda over their interests.
- Delays in economic projects may undermine multilateral confidence.
Medium-Term Risks:
- Afghan spill over or internal unrest could challenge this tool’s crisis management utility.
- Competition from various global powers (China, Turkey, Gulf Arab monarchies, Western nations) may disrupt Russian influence in Central Asia.
Long-Term Risks:
- Unchecked dependency may cause a Central Asian backlash against Russia.
- Erosion of institutional credibility the upcoming summit should deliver tangible results.
Conclusion
The Almaty ministerial meeting marks a continuation of Russia’s structured diplomatic engagement in Central Asia, reflecting both strategic necessity and geopolitical ambition. Although this format allows for cooperation and discussion of shared issues, its success hinges on Russia’s ability to follow through and on Central Asian countries’ willingness to cooperate more closely with Moscow in this uncertain global climate.
While symbolically important, the multilateral format must face distinct challenges to become a strong regional bloc without deeper institutional reforms, more funding, and a rebalancing of power dynamics.
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi
*Cover image: A moment during the 8th Russia-Central Asia ministerial meeting in Almaty (Source: Ispolnitel’nogo komiteta SNG)
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