Executive Summary

This report analyses the sixth meeting of the Foreign Ministers of China and the Central Asian republics, held in Almaty, and situates it within the broader geopolitical contest unfolding across Eurasia.

The forum highlighted Beijing’s growing influence in Central Asia, a region traditionally under Russia’s sway but now attracting competition from the EU, Turkey, Iran, Gulf Arab monarchies, and the United States.

China’s aim to solidify its regional power through planned dialogue, economic ties, and infrastructure projects demonstrates a long-term strategy. Understanding these developments is critical as Central Asia becomes a theatre for a “New Great Game”, balancing traditional hegemonies with emergent actors.

Background Information

Held in Almaty on April 26, 2025, the sixth China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting preceded the second “Central Asia-China” summit, planned for Kazakhstan later in 2025. Chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the meeting convened the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The agenda encompassed high-level political dialogue, economic integration, transport and logistics, environmental challenges, and the digital economy.

The People’s Republic of China reaffirmed its commitment to building a “community of common destiny” with Central Asia, a key element of President Xi Jinping’s geopolitical strategy. The discussion underscored the goal of boosting trade and economic ties, with China-Central Asia trade hitting a record $95 billion in 2024. Although China and Kazakhstan target $66.4 billion in bilateral trade, inconsistencies remain in trade measurement methods.

More than just financial investment, Beijing’s strategy elevates the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan transport corridor to megaproject status within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Simultaneously, digital advancements, AI collaboration, and increased consular presence, particularly the planned Kazakh consulate in Guangzhou and a potential one in Urumqi, confirm a multifaceted approach to strengthening government and citizen relationships between the two countries.

In bilateral discussions, China reaffirmed support for Uzbekistan’s digital economy, Tajikistan’s environmental priorities, and Kyrgyzstan’s infrastructural integration. Beijing clearly designed these engagements to build both individual and collective reliance on itself as an economic patron and political partner.

Geopolitical Scenario

The timing of the VI China–Central Asia ministerial meeting is not coincidental. It comes after a series of regional diplomatic initiatives, clearly indicating a growing geopolitical struggle for influence in Central Asia.

In early April 2025, Samarkand hosted the first-ever EU–Central Asia summit, confirming Brussels’s strategy to enhance its influence in a region where its footprint is historically limited. The EU aims to diversify its energy sources, reduce reliance on China and Russia, and bolster stability in its east.

Russia, viewing Central Asia as part of its blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad), convened its own ministerial meeting with Central Asian states in March 2025 in Almay. Moscow views the region as a crucial buffer, part of its lebensraum (vital space) and economic resource, especially via the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The Ukraine conflict and global economic slowdown, however, have weakened its influence, creating opportunities for other players.

Turkey, invoking linguistic, cultural, and historical affinities, continues its institutional and symbolic engagement via the Organisation of Turkic States. Despite fewer resources than Beijing, Ankara showed its commitment to cultivating pan-Turkic sentiment at the recent Tashkent conference.

Despite strategic distractions and commercial rivalry with China, the United States maintains a significant presence in Central Asia via soft power, private investment, and educational programs. Although diminished, Washington still influences, particularly in governance reform and counterterrorism.

Strategic Outlook

In the short term, China might merge its economic and political presence in Central Asia through high-level summits, bilateral economic targets, and flagship projects such as the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan transport corridor.

In the medium term, Beijing might institutionalise its influence in the region by creating permanent regional forums, strengthening the BRI architecture, and promoting governance models that favour its interests. This could strengthen the Chinese influence on regional decisions, limiting the ability of others to act independently.

China’s ascendancy will not go unchallenged. The EU’s re-entry, Turkey’s cultural diplomacy, Russia’s residual dominance, and the enduring appeal of U.S. soft power together form a geopolitical mosaic. Central Asian nations will remain committed to a multi-faceted foreign policy, using international engagement to strengthen their independence.

Beijing’s major challenge is to grow without upsetting its neighbours or overstretching its economy. For the international community, understanding the recalibration of power in Central Asia is essential to anticipating future alignments and contestations in this pivotal Eurasian corridor.

*Cover image: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Wang Yi (Credits: Palácio do Planalto from Brasilia, Brasil, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

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