Executive Summary

This report evaluates the escalating systemic rivalry between Turkey and Israel, examining the potential for direct military or diplomatic confrontation within the context of shifting global alliances. It assesses how narrative construction, military capabilities, and emerging economic corridors are positioning Ankara as a primary existential adversary for the Israeli state.

Key Takeaways

1. The rhetorical shift by Israeli and European leadership suggests an active process of “threat-construction”, possibly aimed at diplomatically isolating Turkey.
2. Turkey’s membership in NATO and its deep military-strategic ties with Pakistan present a unique escalatory risk that differs significantly from Israel’s previous regional conflicts.
3. The Hexagon Alliance and IMEC corridor represent a strategic effort to bypass Turkish influence, potentially forcing a zero-sum geopolitical confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Information Background

• On 28 July 2024, President Erdogan explicitly referenced Turkey’s past military interventions in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, suggesting similar actions could be taken against Israel to protect Palestine.
• On 17 February 2026, former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett defined Turkey as “the new Iran” during a high-profile address to American Jewish organisations in Jerusalem.
• On 20 April 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the European continent must be completed to exclude the influence of Russia, China, and Turkey (Ankara has tried to be an EU member for years).
• Prime Minister Netanyahu has unveiled the “Hexagon Alliance” (Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus, “moderate” Arab states, and select African/Asian partners), positioning India at the centre of a new regional architecture.
• On 9 September 2023, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an ambitious logistics and economic connectivity project, was presented during the G20 summit in New Delhi.
• Israel’s population (approx. 9.9 million) is positioned against a combined Arab world of 450–470 million and non-Arab Muslim powers—Iran (90m), Turkey (85m), and Pakistan (259m)—all three of which are currently viewed by Tel Aviv as systemic threats.
• Israel receives annual US assistance under a ten-year Memorandum of Understanding (2019–2028) amounting to USD 3.8 billion per year. Of this amount, $3.3 billion is allocated to Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which consists of funds for the procurement of US military equipment. The remaining $500 million is specifically earmarked for missile defence (including the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems). Since October 2023, additional emergency funding has significantly increased this baseline: in April 2024, USD 14.3 billion was approved; by October 2025, total aid since October 2023 reached USD 21.7 billion; and in March 2025, an additional USD 4 billion was expedited through emergency procedures.
• Donald Trump is strongly considering pulling out of NATO. The US President described the Alliance as a “paper tiger”, stressing that a US withdrawal is “beyond reconsideration” unless allies reach a 5% GDP defence spending threshold.
• Turkey suspended all trade with Israel in May 2024 over Tel Aviv’s crimes in Gaza, further tightening restrictions in February 2026 by removing customs exemptions for Turkish goods routed through Europe.
• Joe Kent, who served as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), has stated that Donald Trump’s desire to withdraw from NATO is not solely motivated by financial concerns. Rather, it stems from a strategic intent to dissolve the constraints of Article 5, thereby enabling the United States to intervene in support of Israel in the event of a military confrontation with Turkey.

Analysis

Following Iran and Hezbollah, Israel appears to be identifying Turkey as its next existential adversary. Historically, such transitions have been preceded by the gradual construction of a media and political narrative aimed at framing a specific actor as an imminent and systemic threat.

This process serves to prepare domestic and allied audiences to accept the possibility of confrontation. A key indicator will therefore be the frequency and consistency with which Israeli leadership and aligned Western political figures characterise Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a destabilising force. Crucially, this strategy requires not just the identification of a foe, but the constant reiteration of the urgency of that threat.

The remarks by Ursula von der Leyen are highly significant in this context. Despite her comments being ostensibly about the Balkans, for a high-ranking German-influenced politician to group Turkey with Russia and China is an aggressive stance. This is particularly sensitive given the massive Turkish diaspora in Germany and the presence of Turkish individuals within the German political apparatus. It suggests a policy of containment that disregards traditional NATO solidarity and signals a shift in the European zeitgeist that views Ankara no longer as a candidate for integration, but as a force to be contained.

However, applying the same containment model used against Iran to Turkey risks significant miscalculation. While Iranian influence has largely been exercised through proxy networks, Turkey has demonstrated direct military engagement, including territorial presence in northern Iraq, northern Syria, Libya, and northern Cyprus, as well as the deployment of Syrian mercenaries in Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite this assertiveness, Turkey is neither diplomatically nor militarily isolated. It maintains extensive ties with Central Asian Turkic states and, critically, with Pakistan—a nuclear power.

The strategic depth provided by the steel alliance with Pakistan (a nuclear power) is the most volatile element of this equation. The collaboration between Ankara and Islamabad spans land, sea, and air, characterised by regular high-level exercises such as “Atatürk,” the “Three Brothers” framework with Azerbaijan, “Anatolian Eagle”, and “Indus Shield.” Pakistan is a primary consumer of Turkish military technology, including MILGEM-class vessels and Bayraktar UAVs. The reciprocity, Turkey supporting Pakistan on Kashmir, and Pakistan supporting Turkey on Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh, was reaffirmed as recently as December 2025 during the “Eastern Mediterranean-2025” naval drills.

The most structurally destabilising element remains Turkey’s NATO membership. Should tensions escalate into open conflict between Israel and Turkey, Article 5 obligations would theoretically bind the United States to Ankara’s defence. Testimonies from former US counterterrorism officials suggest that Donald Trump’s rhetoric regarding NATO withdrawal may partially reflect a desire for strategic flexibility in such a scenario. This would place Europe in an untenable position, caught between its primary security guarantor (the US) and its legal obligations to a NATO ally (Ankara). Within this context, Von der Leyen’s remarks may also be interpreted as preliminary signalling towards a policy of strategic distancing from Turkey. The Turkish diaspora in Europe, particularly in Germany, would represent a significant internal vulnerability in the event of escalation.

Nevertheless, this scenario might be averted if the conflict manifests as a proxy war in Syria rather than a direct military confrontation between the two countries.

Energy considerations further complicate the landscape. With Russian supplies constrained by sanctions and the Gulf region destabilised by the war on Iran, the Southern Gas Corridor, transporting Azerbaijani gas through Turkey into Europe, has become strategically indispensable.

Ankara also retains leverage over migration flows and corridors, which it has previously utilised as a coercive instrument to threat Brussels.

Militarily, Turkey represents a fundamentally different category of adversary, compared to Iran, Lebanon and Yemen. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) comprise approximately 550,000 active personnel, 380,000 reserves, and 150,000 paramilitary forces, with a total mobilisation potential exceeding one million. The army fields around 2,200 tanks and over 90,000 armoured vehicles. The Air Force is integrating the domestically produced KAAN fighter alongside approximately 240 F-16s, while the navy is expanding its Mediterranean presence with assets such as the TCG Anadolu drone carrier-amphibious assault ship. Turkish forces are also actively deployed abroad, including in Northern Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Qatar. This constitutes a modern, operationally experienced military, far removed from Israel’s previous adversaries.

At the geopolitical level, several reinforcing dynamics are observable. The partial US withdrawal from Syria creates a potential confrontation zone between Turkish forces in the north and an Israeli presence in the south.

Simultaneously, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Hexagon Alliance appears designed to structurally bypass Turkey. The inclusion of India, historically opposed to Pakistan and increasingly aligned with Israel, combined with initiatives such as the IMEC, suggests an attempt to marginalise Turkish transit routes and areas of influence. The IMEC was proposed by New Delhi and Washington, but also received strong EU backing, which is concerning for Ankara since in the aftermath of the Ukrainian war it has been one of the main European transit partners.

The inclusion of Greece and Cyprus in the Hexagon alliance further underscores this approach, particularly given Turkey’s de facto control of Northern Cyprus and reports of increased Israeli property acquisitions in the southern part of the country.

In addition, while the Abraham Accords have strengthened Israel’s ties with Gulf states such as the UAE and Bahrain, Turkey maintains a long-standing strategic alliance with Qatar and has recently elevated relations with Saudi Arabia. Notably, internal Israeli investigations have shown that Netanyahu previously facilitated financial flows to Hamas via Qatar—highlighting the complexity and fluidity of regional alignments.

A further critical dimension concerns the embedded NATO and US military infrastructure within Turkey itself. The presence of allied bases introduces an additional layer of strategic risk, as any escalation involving Ankara would directly implicate Western military assets on Turkish soil.

Incirlik Air Base remains the most significant installation, hosting the USAF 39th Air Base Wing and functioning as a logistical and operational hub for Middle Eastern operations. Critically, it reportedly stores approximately 50 B61 tactical nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements.

Kürecik Radar Station plays a central role in NATO’s ballistic missile defence architecture through its AN/TPY-2 radar system, providing early warning capabilities particularly oriented towards threats from Iran. Meanwhile, NATO Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), based in Izmir, serves as the Alliance’s primary command for coordinating land forces.

Additional facilities in Ankara, Batman, and Konya provide support functions, including defence coordination, drone operations, and AWACS deployments. Despite political tensions between Ankara and Washington, technical military cooperation has remained operational. Notably, in March 2026, NATO expanded the temporary deployment of Patriot missile batteries, provided by the United States and Spain, across Turkish bases following heightened tensions with Iran. This underscores the paradox of a NATO member increasingly positioned within adversarial narratives, while simultaneously hosting critical elements of the Alliance’s defensive architecture.

Lastly, should negotiations with Iran lead to a normalisation of relations with Washington, Israel would require a new adversary to sustain its militarised state apparatus and justify the continued Western military subsidies essential to its security architecture. Concurrently, the US defence industry relies on Israel’s role as a primary consumer of US-manufactured munitions and hardware, a multi-billion dollar revenue stream that would be jeopardised if Israel were no longer perceived to be under imminent threat.

Conclusions

The identification of Turkey as a potential primary adversary marks a significant escalation in Israel’s strategic posture. Unlike previous opponents, Turkey’s alliance networks, military capabilities, and geopolitical positioning introduce systemic risks extending far beyond a bilateral confrontation. Any escalation involving Ankara would likely trigger a broader reconfiguration of alliances, with profound implications for NATO cohesion and Eurasian stability.

From a strategic intelligence perspective, the current trajectory suggests rising systemic competition rather than imminent direct confrontation between Turkey and Israel. The most plausible pathway for escalation, if it materialises, remains a proxy dynamic in Syria, where overlapping zones of operation, reduced US presence, and the absence of robust deconfliction mechanisms create a permissive environment for indirect conflict.

Syria can serve as a geographic buffer that allows for escalation without necessitating a total state-to-state war. This scenario forces a critical assessment of the NATO-Israel-Turkey triangle: a clash on Syrian soil would test the limits of Article 5 in a grey zone conflict and could see Turkey leveraging its air defence and drone superiority to challenge Israeli air freedom. Ultimately, Syria acts as the pressure valve for this systemic rivalry, where a tactical miscalculation by either side could rapidly expand into a broader regional conflagration involving Iranian and Russian interests.