Executive Summary

On 23 July 2025, Belarus and Tajikistan held the first session of their intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation in Minsk.

The meeting showed that both countries want to improve their military relationship as members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Although the partnership seems to support Belarus and Tajik strategic goals and bolster regional security, its effectiveness is hampered by economic, logistical, and institutional challenges.

This development has geopolitical implications for Central Asia; as both countries are CSTO members, their growing defence cooperation could bolster Moscow’s strategy of using proxies to maintain its influence amid regional shifts.

Key Takeaways

1. Belarus and Tajikistan seek to reaffirm CSTO solidarity and increase military coordination under Russian auspices, using bilateral cooperation as a tool to sustain defence ties.
2. Sanctions against Belarus, Tajikistan’s limited military, and economic/logistical problems hinder this cooperation.
3. While the partnership has geopolitical significance, it seems more symbolic, benefiting Russia strategically more than Tajikistan and Belarus military.

Background Information

Dmitry Pantus, Chairman of Belarus’s State Military-Industrial Committee, and Sherali Kabir, Tajikistan’s Minister of Industry and New Technologies, co-chaired the intergovernmental commission’s meeting onJuly 23, 2025.

The parties discussed current projects and discussed technological collaboration and future military-technical cooperation. The commission signed a protocol establishing commitments to deepen cooperation and outlining next steps for joint development.

Both governments presented the initiative to bolster bilateral relations and improve joint defence within theCollective Security Treaty Organisation(CSTO).

Geopolitical Scenario

Belarus and Tajikistan operate within the framework of the CSTO in regional security. Their CSTO membership legitimises bilateral military engagement but masks divergent national priorities and external pressures.

Belarus seeks this collaboration to bolster its military-industrial complex,facing Western sanctions, and to strengthen its regional influence in Eurasia. Security challenges alongTajikistan’s border with Afghanistan are considerable, making the countryreliant on Russia for military support, largely provided by the 201^stMilitary Base, andCSTO coordination.

Belarus-Tajik cooperation can also help Russia maintain its influence in Central Asia by encouraging bilateral cooperation among CSTO members, lessening Moscow’s direct financial and logistical responsibilities. By providing military exports and technical assistance, Minsk can also support Moscow’s military presence and reinforces their unified front.

However,the partnership confronts significant constraints. Because ofsanctions, Belarus’s military-technical cooperation depends on Russia for transit and logistics, as its access to global supply chains is limited. Although Dushanbe’s adopted amilitary modernisation strategy,Tajikistan’s limited defence budgetand underdeveloped infrastructure hinder its ability to adopt advanced technologies and participate extensively in collaborative projects.

The recent intensification ofEuropean Union engagement in Central Asia, exemplified by the firstEU-Central Asia summit, adds another layer of complexity.

Tajikistan faces the challenge of balancing its security reliance on Russia against increasing political and economic engagement from Europe, which aims to foster more diverse regional partnerships. This balancing act limits Dushanbe’s ability to strengthen its military relationship with Minsk beyond the level of politically expedient agreements.

Belarus’s close alignment with Russia under Lukashenko can transform the country into an extension of Russian power, not an independent entity. Tajikistan’s efforts to diversify its foreign relations, especially with the European Union, further limit the partnership’s scope.

Indicators to Monitor

• Progress or delay of joint military-technical projects, encompassing training programs, equipment deliveries, and technology transfers.
• Changes in Tajikistan’s military budget or procurement patterns that reflect increased Belarusian equipment acquisition or cooperation.
• Shifts in CSTO policy or Moscow’s directives encouraging deeper multilateral or bilateral defence coordination.
• Recent EU diplomatic and economic initiatives in Central Asia, with a focus on Dushanbe’s military and security sectors.
• Infrastructure and logistical improvements or disruptions affecting military exports and transit routes through Russia.
• Public statements or diplomatic engagements from Belarus, Tajikistan, or Russia signalling shifts in defence cooperation priorities.

Conclusion

The Belarus–Tajikistan military-technical cooperation reaffirms their political alignment within the CSTO security framework and seeks to strengthen the organisation’s cohesion under the direction of Moscow.

Financial difficulties, logistical issues, and outside forces are hindering the partnership’s progress. This cooperation helps Belarus maintain its military exports and regional power in Eurasia; meanwhile, Tajikistan navigates its security ties with Russia while pursuing a broader range of international relationships amidst rising European influence.

This cooperation remains a more formal expression of geopolitical loyalty than a vehicle for substantial military enhancement.