Executive Summary
This report examines recent Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Dushanbe’s efforts to bolster security on the Tajik-Afghan border, as the situation in northern Afghanistan worsens. Regional concerns about rising terrorism and illicit activity in Afghanistan’s border provinces pushed CSTO to start the first phase of its longstanding program.
Tajikistan’s geographic and strategic significance places it at the forefront of regional counter-terrorism efforts, with Russia playing a pivotal supporting role.
Considering Russian recent decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist organisations’ list, CSTO’s support to Tajikistan in contrasting terrorism might have broader implications for regional stability, counter-narcotics cooperation, and potential shifts in diplomatic approaches towards the Taliban.
Key Takeaways
- The CSTO started the first phase of a border reinforcement programme to address escalating security threats emanating from Afghanistan.
- Tajikistan, sharing a 1,300 km border with Afghanistan, is central to regional counter-terrorism efforts and hosts Russia’s largest overseas military base.
- The CSTO’s approach reflects a cautious recalibration of regional attitudes towards the Taliban, driven by security imperatives and geopolitical pragmatism.
Background Information
On April 11, 2025, CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov met with senior defence and security officials in Dushanbe to discuss the operationalisation of the first phase of the CSTO’s Targeted Interstate Programme to reinforce the Tajik-Afghan border. Approved in November 2024, this initiative, first proposed in 2013, aims to combat the growing security threats, terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking, originating in Afghanistan.
The three-phase programme begins with Tajikistan evaluating member states’ capacities to supply weaponry and technical systems for border protection. Subsequent phases, scheduled for 2026–2027 and 2027–2029, include procurement and full-scale deployment.
The CSTO continues to view Afghanistan as a persistent source of regional instability, especially considering terrorist group activity along its northern frontier and Kabul’s limited counter-terrorism capacity under Taliban rule.
During the same week, on Thursday, April 17, 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court lifted a ban on the Taliban, marking a diplomatic victory for the movement and underlying Moscow’s efforts to play a more decisive role in Afghanistan.
Geopolitical Scenario
The deteriorating security environment along Afghanistan’s northern periphery has heightened concerns across Central Asia, particularly within the CSTO. The region has witnessed a resurgence of transnational militant groups such as the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP), Jundallah, and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), many of which maintain a presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan. Militants previously incarcerated in Syria have reinforced these groups and recently moved to northern Afghanistan following instability in the Levant.
Because of its long and porous border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is crucial to any regional response. The country hosts the 201st Russian military base, which serves as a principal outpost for Russian security engagement in Central Asia. Despite the absence of evidence showing a Russian military buildup, Moscow’s considerable technical and logistical resources suggest a significant future role in CSTO programs.
The capacity of the Taliban administration to address terrorism remains questionable. Recently, especially in North Afghanistan, the Taliban started a strategy aimed at targeting Tajik Taliban commanders, stressing how the Taliban leadership in Kandahar is conducting a systematic purge of non-Pashtun elements, primarily Tajiks linked to the Haqqani Network, reflecting rising mistrust and internal fractures.
International sanctions remain in place against the Taliban, and the freezing of roughly $9.4 billion in Afghan reserves since the 2021 US withdrawal has severely hampered economic recovery and counterterrorism efforts. Lack of financial support and the Taliban’s rule create conditions that allow militant groups to thrive, weakening the region’s stability.
Several CSTO members have adjusted their diplomatic posture towards the Taliban. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have de-listed the group from their terrorist organisation registries, citing economic and security rationales. While Tajikistan has not officially commented, its subdued criticism of the Taliban, following Russia’s delisting of the group, suggests a potential policy shift. These actions seem intended to promote discussion with the de facto rulers in Kabul and encourage collaboration on mutual threats.
Uzbekistan, while no longer a member of the CSTO, remains engaged in regional security discussions and has publicly advocated for the release of Afghan reserves. Despite Tashkent’s abrupt border with Afghanistan (144 km), the region’s stability remains strategically important, especially considering the threat of cross-border militancy and its impact on regional cooperation and trade.
The CSTO’s increased activity along the Tajik-Afghan border reveals a shift in how Central Asia views threats and forms alliances since 2021. This also suggests a growing agreement that pragmatic engagement with the Taliban is necessary to prevent worse security problems.
Conclusion
CSTO’s increasing presence and activity in Central Asia, particularly along the Tajik-Afghan border, confirms Moscow’s interest in the region and Afghanistan. Recent regional dynamics have highlighted a “new geopolitical game” in Afghanistan which opposes Russia, China, and the United States’ interests.
Three risk scenarios merit close monitoring in the future.
- Continued or increased terrorism on the Afghan-Tajik border might strain the CSTO’s collective security agreements, possibly leading to deeper Russian military involvement.
- Regional opinions of the Taliban are changing, leading to diplomatic divisions or a collaborative strategy of cautious engagement and conditional recognition.
- Insufficient funding and implementation support for the CSTO program could compromise its effectiveness, leaving Tajikistan vulnerable and regional weaknesses unaddressed.
Should the CSTO programme proceed as planned, the organisation may emerge as a more credible regional security actor. However, the success of this effort will depend on the balance between external support, political will, and the capacity of local partners to manage a volatile and fluid security environment.
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi
*Cover image: A meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (Credits: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)
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