Executive Summary
This report evaluates the developing strategic relationship between Beijing and the Central Asian republics in the context of the Second China–Central Asia Summit in June 2025.
It outlines the intensifying geostrategic competition in the region, particularly involving China, Russia, the European Union and a diminished US presence.
The analysis incorporates recent high‑level interactions, shifting economic frameworks including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and emerging European engagement, concluding with implications for regional stability and influence considering the latest trends in Eurasia such as the Israeli-Iranian conflict.
Key Takeaways
- China merges strategic influence in Central Asia through infrastructure-led economic engagement under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
- The Second China-Central Asia Summit stresses Beijing’s regional foreign policy considering also the current Israeli-Iranian conflict.
- Central Asia’s developing geopolitical landscape will see a rise in summits and economic forums driven by the interests of foreign powers.
Background Information
In June 16-18, 2025, leaders from China and the five Central Asian republics will meet in Astana for the Second China–Central Asia Summit, an event that underscores Beijing’s commitment to deepening its presence in the region.
This summit follows a steady cadence of high-level engagements, including multiple foreign ministers’ meetings and the December 2024 session in Chengdu, where infrastructure, trade, and security dominated the agenda.
Over the past two years, China has taken significant steps to institutionalise its regional role, not least through the creation of the China–Central Asia Secretariat in early 2024, a move intended to streamline cooperation and provide continuity between summits.
Considering the current trends in the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard, especially the Israeli-Iranian conflict, the summit will provide also information on how China and the Central Asian republics might cooperate to navigate the current crisis.
Geopolitical Scenario
The Central Asian republics are emerging as geopolitical fulcrums. China projects economic influence through the BRI’s infrastructure footprint.
A pillar is the newly launched “Tianfu” cross‑border transport route connecting Sichuan to Central Asia, accelerating logistical times to 12–18 days. The CKU Railway linking China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, scheduled for groundbreaking in July 2025, will deepen connectivity and resource export potential.
Trade between China and the region expanded rapidly: from US$460 million at diplomatic inception to US$89 billion in 2023, strengthening further in 2025.
China also cultivates soft‑power, with cultural initiatives spotlighting cooperation stories and media tours like the CGTN–UzA Central Asia Expedition highlighting joint ventures in Uzbekistan.
At the regional level, considering recent developments in the Central Asian dynamics, a tremendous competition between local and international powers has crafted a “new geopolitical game”.
The EU’s strategic outreach aims to balance Chinese and Russian influence. The Samarkand summit’s joint declaration reaffirmed commitments on international law, regional security (notably Afghanistan), connectivity, and energy. Significant European investment flows, and EPCA trade agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, illustrate deepening EU engagement. Yet, Western observers emphasise the inclusion of human rights and rule of law in the strategic agenda.
Meanwhile, China and Russia maintain a complex dynamic. The two countries cooperate within multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but also increasingly compete for regional influence and intelligence superiority. Russia’s security apparatus, notably the FSB, has authorised joint intelligence exercises with China in Central Asia, underscoring both cooperation and rivalry.
Crucially, the US influence is under stress. Successive budget cuts, including slashed USAID funding under the Trump Administration, demonstrate US disengagement. With limited overt US presence, China gains scope to define the economic and security agenda in the region.
Conclusion
In 2025, Central Asia becomes a theatre of intensifying strategic competition. China secures its position through economic integration, institutional embedding and soft‑power expansion.
Outcomes from the Second China‑Central Asia Summit will determine whether Beijing merges its ascent and institutional dominance or if Central Asia evolves into a contested multipolar pivot balancing EU values, Chinese infrastructure and Russian influence.
Against the backdrop of the intensifying Israel–Iran conflict, which threatens stability across global energy routes and elevates regional tensions, the Second China–Central Asia Summit in Astana is poised not only to deepen Beijing’s economic and infrastructural foothold in Eurasia, but also to address broader security spill-over effects from the Middle Eastern crisis within the evolving geostrategic chessboard
