Executive Summary
This report analyses the Israeli-Iranian conflict’s potential impact on Central Asian nations and their reactions. Central Asian governments express concern and advocate for de-escalation, while public opinion largely rejects military support for Iran.
The conflict risks regional destabilisation, economic disruptions, and increased migration pressures on Central Asia.
Key Takeaways
- Central Asian governments call for restraint since a prolonged Israeli-Iranian conflict might severely hit regional economies.
- A regional telephone survey shows Central Asian populations largely oppose military support for Iran, showing limited regional alignment with Tehran.
- The conflict threatens to disrupt energy markets and may increase migration, security concerns, and geopolitical tensions in Central Asia.
Background Information
Israel launched a large-scale attack on Iran on June 13, 2025, targeting nuclear and military sites. The strikes resulted in significant damage, civilian casualties, and the deaths of high-ranking Iranian officials.
Iran retaliated by launching a massive barrage of ballistic missiles at Israeli military and government facilities, overwhelming air defences and hitting key targets, such as the Ministry of Defence and air defence systems.
The Israeli-Iranian conflict raised concerns across Central Asia. Regional governments responded with official statements, emphasising restraint and diplomatic resolution.
The Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained about the military escalation and called for the immediate cessation of hostilities. While reaffirming Uzbekistan’s dedication to regional stability and willingness to help de-escalate tensions, the statement cautioned against a wider conflict.
The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs also voiced serious concern, urging both sides to de-escalate. Bishkek’s authorities also highlighted the importance of pursuing peaceful solutions.
Central Asian embassies advised their citizens in conflict zones to follow safety protocols, such as sheltering during air raids, getting updates from official sources, and staying in touch with their embassies.
Public sentiment across Central Asia reflects limited support for Iran. A May 11 to June 10, 2025 telephone survey showed that most regional respondents opposed giving military aid to Iran.
In Tajikistan, 13% supported military involvement, while Kazakhstan recorded the lowest support level at 5%. Kyrgyzstan displayed the highest indecision rate, with 25% of respondents uncertain. Regarding political backing, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan exhibited higher levels of sympathy towards Iran, with 42.6% and 42.1% respectively supporting political alignment. Conversely, in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, opposition to political support stood at 55% and 39%, respectively.
Given its investment in the Belt and Road Initiative, China is closely monitoring any potential disruptions to routes that traverse Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Russia could use this situation to strengthen the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and present itself as a stabilising force in Central Asia.
Risk and Constraints
- Escalation Risk. Iran’s limited retaliation might accidentally spark a wider conflict, thus jeopardising stability in Central Asia.
- Energy Market Volatility. If disruptions continue at crucial transit points such as the Strait of Hormuz, global oil prices may fluctuate consistently, affecting Central Asian economies.
- Migration Pressures. Increased conflict could trigger mass migration, overwhelming Central Asian social services and creating security risks.
- External Power Influence. Russia and China’s growing influence could force Central Asian governments into difficult diplomatic tightropes, reducing their strategic independence.
- Security Vulnerabilities. If instability continues in southern Central Asia, extremist groups, smuggling, and organised crime could flourish.
Conclusion
The Israeli-Iranian conflict exposes Central Asia to indirect but serious geopolitical, economic, and security risks.
Although Central Asian governments emphasises neutrality and de-escalation, prolonged conflict could overtax the region’s ability to handle potential migration and volatile energy prices. Because the public resists military involvement in Iran, governments have domestic backing to remain neutral.
Central Asian republics should fortify their border security, upgrade their intelligence sharing, and create contingency plans to manage potential influxes of refugees. Strategic autonomy requires cautious diplomatic coordination, particularly with major global players such as Russia and China.
Regional cooperation structures, such as the CSTO and SCO, might exploit the situation to reinforce collective stability and mitigate emerging security threats and, therefore, increase Moscow and Beijing’s influence and pressure on Central Asian republics.
Last Update Saturday, June 14, 2025 – Time 08.00 am CET
