Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 51 Issue 7
Author: Matteo Meloni

Executive Summary

In the last years, and especially now during Trump Administration, both the United States and the People’s Republic of China have competed in Central Asia because of the region’s strategic role in the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard. This area has undeniably drawn the attention of global powers for centuries, with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Ankara, and Tehran now vying for influence through economic partnerships, investments, and diplomatic efforts.

Since the Western countries’ disengagement from Afghanistan, and following the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, Washington has focused its policies on Eastern Europe, leaving spaces for other nations to acquire influence in Central Asia. For instance, Beijing has implemented several projects involving Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, often using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an instrument to promote its long-term policies and diplomatic actions.

This report analyses the shifting geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia, highlighting the complex interplay of U.S., Chinese, and also Russian interests within this strategically vital region. The investigation also explores how intensifying competition between global powers in Central Asia, through economic, diplomatic, and military actions, is influencing the region’s future.

Background Information

Following Trump’s tariff announcements affecting both partners and adversaries, China, heavily reliant on the U.S. market for its exports, is pursuing diverse strategies, finding fertile ground in Central Asia.

Beijing has recently sent to Kazakhstan a delegation led by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT); among the officials, a group of oil and gas executives intended to explore new trade opportunities in the country, alongside with representatives of companies working in the fields of energy, petrochemicals and industrial machinery.

A series of agreements over time, signed by Chinese and Central Asian government officials, facilitated Beijing’s substantial influence in Central Asia. One of the most significant activities is the Central Asia-China Gas pipeline, which connects the northwest Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Thanks to the pipeline, Ashgabat diversified its export routes, reducing its dependence on Russia but sending a substantial portion of its gas to Beijing: in 2022, China imported 35 billion cubic meters (bcm), Russia 16.

Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been the dominant power in Central Asia. The Kremlin has considered the region as part of its blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad) and lebensraum (vital space) and has promoted among the local governments the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

In the last years, especially after Beijing’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative BRI), the People’s Republic of China has increased its presence and cooperation with Central Asian republics, particularly in the investments and transport sectors.

From the outset of the new Republican administration, growing United States interest in the region has become apparent. During his Senate confirmation hearing, now Secretary of State Marco Rubio agreed on the need for a repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a provision that restricts formal trade relations with countries labelled as non-market economies.

The purpose of the amendment was to pressure the Soviet Union for its restrictions on Jewish and other minority emigration in order to allow the free movement of those intended to leave the socialist republics. The amendment still applies to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, although the U.S. Department of Commerce does not consider Astana a “nonmarket economy”.

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have adopted distinct strategies for the region aimed at strengthening Washington’s regional presence and influence. For example, in 2018 the President of the United States Donald Trump hosted his Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Washington, while in 2023 the Biden administration organised a meeting on the sideline of the U.N. General Assembly between Central Asia countries and the U.S. In 2024, the Department of State hosted the inaugural C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue.

Why Does It Matter?

Central Asia is once again at the center of a shifting geopolitical landscape, with major global players vying for influence in a region rich in resources and strategic importance.

While China’s economic expansion through infrastructure investments and energy agreements is reshaping regional dynamics, Russia maintains its military presence, ensuring its continued relevance despite economic setbacks. The United States’ renewed diplomatic engagement and potential shifts in trade policy signal Washington’s intention to counterbalance Chinese and Russian dominance, following a different approach from past administrations.

Trump Administration and the ongoing U.S.-China economic competition pose distinct risks to Central Asia. A renewed tariff war between Washington and Beijing could severely disrupt the Central Asian economies, heavily reliant on trade with both powers. Increased tariffs on Chinese goods entering the U.S. market might reward Beijing to further exploit Central Asian resources and markets, potentially exacerbating concerns over debt traps and loss of economic sovereignty. Conversely, American tariffs on Central Asian imports might cause considerable economic distress in those nations, diminishing their bargaining power against both China and Russia.

A Trump Administration’s potential scepticism towards international aid and development, as showed by past actions like shutting down USAID, could erode U.S. influence in the region. This vacuum could inadvertently push Central Asian actors closer to Russia, particularly if they perceive U.S. commitment to the region as unreliable. China’s persistent approach to financing projects for land or political influence might also become more attractive to Central Asian governments facing economic hardship and uncertainty regarding U.S. support.

This scenario could lead to a situation where Central Asian nations are increasingly beholden to either China or Russia, diminishing their ability to pursue independent foreign policies and potentially increasing regional instability.

*Picture: Map of Central Asia (Credits: Afrogindahood, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

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