Executive Summary

The Central Asia Economic Forum (CAEF), held in Dushanbe in July 2025, confirmed Russia’s desire to preserve and expand its regional influence through business and cultural diplomacy.

The event underscores Moscow’s strategic use of economic diplomacy, cultural outreach, and security cooperation to counterbalance rising influence from China, the European Union, Turkey, and other actors.

Tajikistan’s economic reliance on Russia, its strategic position bordering Afghanistan, and the Russian 201st military base make it central to Moscow’s activities in the area.

Apart from its economic significance, the forum served as a platform to reaffirm Russia’s relevance in the post-Soviet space under mounting geopolitical pressure.

Key Takeaways

1. CAEF conveys Moscow’s determination to preserve its regional foothold through economic, cultural, and security instruments.
2. Tajikistan’s strategic position and close political alignment with Russia make it a significant platform for Russian influence in Central Asia.
3. The event serves as a message to competing powers that Russia remains an active and invested actor in Central Asian affairs.

Background Information

On July 22, 2025, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, hosted the Central Asian Economic Forum (CAEF). The Roscongress Foundation and the Russian-Tajik Business Council under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation organised the event together with Tajik institutions, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Centre for Regional Integration.

The forum gathered over 500 participants from Central Asia and Russia, including officials, business representatives, academics, and media. The event concluded a regional expedition called “Journey into the Heart of Eurasia,” which started on June 6 and travelled through Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

The forum’s program highlighted boosting economic cooperation, infrastructure connectivity, scientific collaboration, and cultural exchange, with a focus on promoting the Russian language and education.

Discussions emphasised the role of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking Russia, Iran, and India via Central Asia, as well as digital entrepreneurship, energy efficiency, and youth training. Delegations signed multiple memoranda of understanding to deepen ties in small and medium enterprise development, environmental protection, and Russian language instruction.

The organisers scheduled the forum shortly after two major summits in the region: the EU-Central Asia Summit in Tashkent in April 2025 and the second China-Central Asia Summit in June 2025. Both Brussels and Beijing have increased their regional presence through diplomacy, investment and infrastructure projects. Considering these changes, the CAEF worked to reinforce Moscow’s importance in the changing geopolitical and economic dynamics of Central Asia.

Geopolitical Scenario

The CAEF highlights competing visions of Central Asia’s future. Russia grounds its strategy in preserving established links through cultural diplomacy, economic partnership, and security presence. Tajikistan emerges as a lynchpin in this effort because of its political alignment with Moscow, economic dependence on Russian remittances, and strategic border with Afghanistan.

Indeed, the Central Asian republic hosts the 201^st Russian military base near Dushanbe and relies heavily on remittances from its diaspora in Russia. The Russian language continues to serve as the region’s principal lingua franca, reinforced by Russian-language schools, the Rossotrudnichestvo agency, and programmes like Russian Teacher Abroad. The Tajik government openly promotes Russian for education, economic advancement, and regional collaboration.

The Kremlin promotes the Russian language and education in Tajikistan to preserve a common culture and supply workers for Russian jobs. This initiative aims to counteract the growing influence of Chinese and Western soft power, especially given the increasing adoption of English or Chinese among younger generations for international advancement.

Tajikistan’s geographic proximity to Afghanistan adds a security dimension to Russian strategy. In July 2025, Moscow’s recognition of the Taliban-led Islamic Emirat of Afghanistan suggests a practical focus on regional stability. Russia’s military base and security ties with Tajikistan establish it as a major force on Afghanistan’s northern border, an area facing persistent issues with drug trafficking, militant actions, and migration.

Several scenarios present themselves for Russia’s role in the region:

1. Sustained Russian Dominance in Tajikistan. Continued military presence and cultural influence are how Russia holds onto its advantageous position. The CAEF develops into a regular platform, merging economic cooperation and reinforcing Russian soft power. Tajikistan remains a reliable outpost for projecting power southwards, especially regarding Afghanistan.
2. Incremental Erosion of Influence because of External Competition. Despite efforts like the CAEF, the Kremlin faces a gradual erosion of influence as China’s Belt and Road Initiative delivers tangible infrastructure and trade advantages. The EU’s engagement in governance and education expands Western footholds. Turkey promotes pan-Turkic cooperation with other Central Asian republics. Russia retains influence in Tajikistan but faces challenges to extend it region-wide.
3. Russian Influence Under Strain from Domestic and External Pressures. Because of Western economic sanctions and demographic problems, Moscow has less capacity to support cultural and economic programs. Central Asian states, including Tajikistan, are diversifying partnerships to reduce dependence. The CAEF has more diplomatic value than economic significance, considering also the small number of participants.
4. Unexpected Recalibration or Realignment by Tajikistan. If Tajikistan changes its foreign policy because of internal issues or regional shifts, Russia might have less access. China or Iran could gain influence as alternative partners, particularly if Moscow’s economic support weakens.

Indicators to Monitor

• Expansion or reduction of Russian-language education programmes and associated budget allocations.
• New bilateral agreements involving infrastructure, trade, or security between Russia and Tajikistan.
• Follow-up CAEF sessions or similar forums in other Central Asian republics.
• Shifts in Tajikistan’s official stance regarding regional partners, particularly China and the European Union.
• Russian media narratives and government statements concerning Central Asian policy.

Conclusion

The Central Asian Economic Forum strategically reaffirms Russian influence in a contested region.

Tajikistan’s political loyalty, economic dependence, and strategic location underpin Moscow’s preference for the country as a centrepiece of its Central Asian policy. Economic benefits from the forum may be modest, but its symbolic and diplomatic significance is substantial.

Moscow faces growing competition from China, the EU, and Turkey, each advancing alternative models of engagement.

Monitoring of language policy developments, security cooperation, and bilateral economic agreements will explain whether Moscow’s current approach through forums such as CAEF yields sustained influence or remains primarily performative.