Kavkaz Files ISSN 2975-0474 Volume 32 Issue 1
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi
The North Caucasus, a region of strategic and socio-economic importance for the Russian Federation, continues to exhibit a dual trajectory of progress and persistent security risks. As it marked 15 years since the establishment of the North Caucasian Federal District (NCFD), the region has experienced notable economic and infrastructural development, while simultaneously grappling with terrorism, ethnic tensions, and geopolitical challenges.
SpecialEurasia met with Mark Youngman to discuss his recent report “Terrorism and counterterrorism in the North Caucasus: 2024 trends” considering his vast experience as an open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst and independent researcher, who has been working on Russia and Eurasia for more than 15 years – first as an OSINT analyst for the US Government, then as a senior lecturer at a UK university, and now as the founder of Threatologist. (The text has been edited and abridged for clarity).
In your recent report on terrorism and counterterrorism in the North Caucasus in 2024, what key regional trends did you identify concerning the evolution of terrorist activities and counter-insurgency measures? How do these trends compare with previous years?
“There are five key trends that stand out from the data:
- There was a significant increase in the volume of incidents in 2024. Over the year, a total of 93 incidents were recorded, resulting in between 82 and 122 casualties, depending on the sources used. In contrast, 2023 saw only nine incidents and 27 casualties. This stark increase suggests a substantial uptick in violence.
- The largest terrorist attack in years took place in Mahachkala and Derbent in June. This event alone accounted for between 55% and 60% of the overall casualties in 2024. While it distorts the figures somewhat, it cannot be excluded from the analysis—much like one cannot analyse U.S. terrorism statistics without considering 9/11.
- The primary driver of violence in the region is not terrorist groups but security services. Around 90% of the recorded incidents were initiated by security forces, highlighting the dual role of counterterrorism efforts in shaping the overall security landscape.
- Violence is geographically concentrated, with Dagestan and Ingushetia accounting for about 65% of total incidents. While incidents occur across the North Caucasus, these republics remain the focal points.
- The emergence of drone attacks is a new factor. From October onwards, the region saw multiple drone strikes, primarily targeting security facilities. While these are likely linked to the Ukrainian armed forces, the phenomenon raises concerns about potential replication by other actors.”
In your report, you highlighted two significant terrorist attacks concerning the Russian Federation in the past year—one in Dagestan in June and another in Moscow in March 2024. Could you elaborate on the strategic implications of these attacks? What do these incidents reveal about the current capabilities and intentions of terrorist groups operating in the region?
“First, these attacks are significant in their own right, irrespective of their broader implications. Large-scale attacks like these have become increasingly rare in Russia in recent years. They were the most significant attacks since the decline of the Caucasus Emirate and Vilayat Caucasus.
What stands out about these incidents is the number of attackers involved. The Dagestani attack, in particular, featured coordinated assaults across multiple locations in Mahachkala and Derbent, targeting security forces, churches, and synagogues. Even during the peak of the North Caucasian insurgency in the 2010s, attacks of this scale and coordination were rare.
The response of security services was also concerning. In the Dagestani case, police officers were stationed specifically to guard religious sites due to heightened security concerns, yet they were caught off guard. This raises questions about the effectiveness of Russia’s counterterrorism strategies. It suggests that the issue may not be an increase in the terrorist threat itself, but rather a decline in the capabilities of Russian security services. The war in Ukraine has likely contributed to this, both by diverting resources and by weakening intelligence-gathering efforts.”
While there have been some claims regarding the presence of Islamic State operatives in the North Caucasus, the Wilayat Kavkaz appears to be largely a symbolic entity rather than a fully operational group. In your analysis, how would you characterise the actual presence and activity of terrorist organisations in the region, including any shifts in group dynamics or alliances?
“When discussing the Islamic State (IS) in the North Caucasus, we need to distinguish between the broader Islamic State and its former affiliate, Vilayat Caucasus (Caucasus Province). The latter, in my assessment, no longer exists as an organised insurgency.
The Caucasus Emirate formally transformed into a jihadist movement in 2007, and in 2015, a large segment of its leadership pledged allegiance to IS, forming Vilayat Caucasus. However, by December 2017, the group had largely been dismantled, with key leaders killed. Since then, there has been no real organisational structure—just sporadic violence carried out by individuals inspired by jihadist ideology.
This means that terrorism in the North Caucasus today resembles what we see in Western countries. Attacks occur, but they are primarily conducted by self-radicalised individuals or small cells rather than a structured insurgency. Some limited digital communication exists between extremists in Russia and IS elements abroad, but there is no operational infrastructure in place.
The Crocus City Hall attack, for example, was traced to IS-Khorasan rather than any North Caucasian group. And in the case of the Dagestan attack, IS praised the incident but did not claim responsibility. This further supports the idea that the North Caucasus is no longer a stronghold for IS in an organisational sense, even if its ideology continues to inspire attacks.”
What motivated you to focus on the specific issue of terrorism and counterterrorism in the North Caucasus in 2024? How do you assess its strategic importance in the broader context of Russian and regional security?
“The North Caucasus has long been Russia’s most pressing internal security challenge. While Ukraine now dominates the security discourse, the terrorist threat in Russia remains significant. It is not just about the attacks themselves, but also the persistent arrests and suppression of dissent under the guise of counterterrorism.
Furthermore, the North Caucasus is strategically important. It serves as a bridge between Europe and Asia, a frontier between Russia and the Muslim world, and a key area for Russian influence in the MENA region and Central Asia. Russia has heavily invested in the region since the early 2010s, and it continues to leverage it in diplomatic and economic engagements.
Additionally, the region plays a role in Russia’s foreign conflicts. Several North Caucasian groups are fighting against Russia in Ukraine, while Chechen security forces are actively engaged on Moscow’s behalf. This dynamic mirrors what we saw in Syria, where North Caucasian fighters played roles on both sides of the conflict.
More broadly, instability in the North Caucasus can have political implications. For instance, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s legitimacy is built on his claim to have defeated terrorism in the region. A resurgence of violence undermines this narrative and, by extension, Moscow’s control over the region.”
Could you provide an overview of the methodology employed in your report, particularly in exploiting open-source intelligence (OSINT)? How do you assess the reliability and relevance of these sources when constructing your assessments?
“The media environment has changed dramatically. During the Chechen Wars, there was extensive Western coverage. Today, English-language reporting is minimal, and even Russian national outlets have scaled back their independent coverage in favour of security service narratives.
For my report, I systematically used five main sources: two national newspapers (Kommersant and Izvestia), two independent local sources (Kavkaz.Realii and Caucasian Knot), and official statements from the National Anti-Terrorism Committee. I also cross-referenced other sources, including Telegram channels linked to security services.
Rather than attempting to verify every incident independently, I focus on tracking patterns and inconsistencies across sources. This transparency allows for a more realistic analysis of security trends, rather than relying solely on official narratives.”
*Picture: The map of the North Caucasus (Credits: Peter Fitzgerald, Pmx, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)
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