Russia FSB eliminated 2 Islamic State supporters in Dagestan

Executive Summary

The Russian Federal Security Service’s neutralisation of two Islamic State supporters in Dagestan underscored the persistent security threats within the North Caucasian region and the capacity of extremist propaganda and recruitment networks to infiltrate local communities.

Moscow necessitates to support its narrative of stability and success in the region. Consequently, Russian and local authorities might tighten their grip on the region by establishing more checkpoints and by monitoring social media and messaging applications like Telegram.

Key Findings

Russian security forces killed two Islamic State supporters in Dagestan. The suspects were involved in organising violent attacks against a synagogue and a railway station.
Despite enhanced security measures by Moscow and local authorities, jihadist propaganda and recruiters are succeeding in infiltrating the population of Dagestan.
Russia needs to increase local control to support its narrative of stability in the North Caucasus and avoid local disappointment.

Background Information

On January 29, 2026, Russian FSB eliminated Islamic State supporters organising a terrorist attack in Dagestan against a synagogue and railway tracks near the Ullubiyevo railway station in the Karabudakhkent district. According to Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee (NAC), two individuals from Dagestan had been communicating with an Islamic State operative via Telegram and indicated their intent to commit terrorist acts. They manufactured an improvised explosive device (IED) and filmed a video pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi.

Analysis

FSB operations confirm Russia’s high alert regarding terrorism activities and jihadist propaganda in the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan. Despite the increasing securitisation of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), violent attacks and terrorism still threaten regional stability and local authorities. Following the violent attacks in Derbent and Makhachkala in 2024, Dagestan faced other violent incidents in 2025 that compromised regional security. The elimination of the two Islamic State supporters in the North Caucasus republic confirms a pattern and the terrorist organisation’s capacity to infiltrate the local community.

By targeting a synagogue, the Islamic State supporters wanted to undermine the security of the Jewish minority in the North Caucasus. In past years, due to events in the Gaza Strip, the indigenous Jewish population and foreign nationals from Israel have faced problems and threats from the regional Muslim community. Indeed, in October 2023, a Dagestani crowd stormed the Makhachkala airport to protest against the land of an Israeli airplane.

The attempted assault on the Ullubiyevo railway station highlights the terrorists’ approach of targeting logistical infrastructure with the potential for mass casualties.

Outlook

Dagestan, alongside the entire North Caucasian Federal District, holds significant strategic importance for Russia’s economic objectives, its foreign policy in the Caspian Sea and adjacent territories, and its internal narrative of accomplishment. Acts of violence or terrorism contradict Moscow’s narrative of a successful strategy in combating regional militancy and terrorism in the North Caucasus and enhancing local living standards and security.

The neutralisation of these two individuals supporting the Islamic State is consistent with a 2025 that has witnessed multiple terrorist attacks in Dagestan, signifying an escalating problem in the Republic and troubling local and Russian officials.

Authorities in Russia and locally might heighten security surveillance and counterterrorism operations to pre-deter the dissemination of violence or the recruitment efforts of the Islamic State. Stability and security are fundamental to Moscow’s strategy for attracting foreign investment to Dagestan and the North Caucasus, thereby supporting regional socioeconomic initiatives and fostering connections with adjacent markets. In addition to KTO and escalating control, it is highly probable that Russian authorities will augment their oversight of Telegram and other internet social media and portals to counter online jihadist propaganda.

*Cover image: An image of the Russian security forces operations against the two Islamic State supporters in Dagestan (Source: Russia National Antiterrorist Committee)

Written by

Giuliano Bifolchi

SpecialEurasia Co-Founder & Research Manager. He has vast experience in Intelligence analysis, geopolitics, security, conflict management, and ethnic minorities. He holds a PhD in Islamic history from the University of Rome Tor Vergata, a master’s degree in Peacebuilding Management and International Relations from Pontifical University San Bonaventura, and a master’s degree in History from the University of Rome Tor Vergata. As an Intelligence analyst and political risk advisor, he has organised working visits and official missions in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, and the post-Soviet space and has supported the decision-making process of private and public institutions writing reports and risk assessments. Previously, he founded and directed ASRIE Analytica. He has written several academic papers on geopolitics, conflicts, and jihadist propaganda. He is the author of the books Geopolitical del Caucaso russo. Gli interessi del Cremlino e degli attori stranieri nelle dinamiche locali nordcaucasiche (Sandro Teti Editore 2020) and Storia del Caucaso del Nord tra presenza russa, Islam e terrorismo (Anteo Edizioni 2022). He was also the co-author of the book Conflitto in Ucraina: rischio geopolitico, propaganda jihadista e minaccia per l’Europa (Enigma Edizioni). He speaks Italian, English, Russian, Spanish and Arabic.

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