Executive Summary
This report evaluates the recent armed attack in Makhachkala within the broader context of persistent terrorist activity in the Republic of Dagestan. It assesses the tactical and strategic implications of recent violence targeting security forces and the state’s response capacity.
The report aims to assess Dagestan’s security situation, considering local and Russian broader counterterrorism operations and strategy and the North Caucasian republic’s geostrategic role in Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy.
Key Takeaways
- The recent armed attack in Makhachkala is not an isolate episode but underlines security issues in Dagestan.
- Violence and terrorist threat undermine Moscow’s strategy in Dagestan.
- Socio-economic instability and ideological extremism continue to drive recruitment and violence in the region.
Background Information
On Monday, May 5, 2025, at approximately 14:20 local time, unidentified gunmen opened fire on traffic police in central Makhachkala, capital of the Republic of Dagestan. After the police stopped their vehicle, the attackers engaged the police. On-site, three officers died, and the attack injured four others, including civilians. During the exchange of fire, security forces killed two assailants. Regional authorities confirmed a wider search is ongoing for additional perpetrators who fled in a separate vehicle.
This marks the third shootout in Dagestan this year, following similar incidents on 5 March and 23 April. Between 2022 and 2025, there have been seven documented shootouts involving law enforcement personnel. The June 2024 attacks in Derbent and Makhachkala stand out as particularly deadly incidents, causing at least 22 deaths. Counter-terrorism operations have successfully thwarted multiple planned attacks in the recent period, specifically during March and April 2025.
Federal surveillance of Dagestan persists because of its legacy of instability associated with militants or terrorist groups. Regional responses typically involve counter-terrorism operations under Federal Security Service (FSB) oversight.
Geopolitical Scenario
Dagestan continues to present a high-risk operational environment within the Russian Federation. The frequency of attacks, especially in Makhachkala and Derbent, highlights this republic’s strategic importance to militants and its susceptibility to operational disruption. Analysis of 2024 data reveals that Dagestan, alongside Ingushetia, accounted for roughly 65% of all terrorism-related incidents in the North Caucasus. The 93 recorded incidents in 2024 marked a tenfold increase from the previous year, showing a sharp rise in violence.
The recent armed attack in the streets of Makhachkala aligns with this escalation trend. The attack in the city centre, involving small arms, points to localised planning and potential links to outside groups. While local authorities have partially verified the identities of the attackers, the operational pattern suggests a possible existence of a network of militants or terrorists in the North Caucasian republic.
Over the past two years, Russia has experienced multiple acts of terrorism and violence, including attacks in Moscow (March 2024) and Derbent and Makhachkala (June 2024), highlighting the persistent threat of terrorism within the nation.
Dagestan’s socio-political structure remains fragile. Ethnic divisions, rising Islamic extremism, and the increasing power of hard-line religious leaders like Mufti Ahmed Abdullaev hinder effective local governance. While Moscow’s centralised control through appointed regional leaders has prevented outright separatism, it has not stemmed the tide of ideological radicalisation or armed violence.
Persistent poverty, unemployment, and corruption continue to fuel grievances. Jihadist groups or local militants exploit these conditions for recruitment, particularly among disenfranchised youth. Because of its place within Russia’s wider security framework, Dagestan, and in general the North Caucasus, serves as both a symbol and a source of conflict, where militant groups challenge central control and seek to extend their power or retaliate.
The role of the FSB and other federal security agencies has increased, particularly in the wake of coordinated threats in April 2025. Their actions have resulted in the arrest or killing of several individuals plotting attacks on civilian, religious, and infrastructure sites in Moscow. Despite these tactical wins, they have not achieved strategic deterrence.
Conclusion
Recent armed attack in Makhachkala highlighted that militant violence in Dagestan continues to escalate. Despite counter-terrorism efforts and Moscow’s financial support to local authorities and economic projects, militants and terrorist groups can still attack. Recurring urban attacks suggest a local support base. Federal operations neutralise threats but have not suppressed militants long-term. The state’s reliance on reactive force, rather than preventive disruption of radicalisation pipelines, has left underlying vulnerabilities unaddressed.
Attacks on law enforcement and state targets are likely in Makhachkala, Derbent, and nearby areas. Lone or small-cell operations will continue to dominate the threat profile, with potential use of improvised explosives or drones. In the medium term, the operational environment may worsen if socio-economic conditions persist or deteriorate further.
Extremist and local militant groups might continue recruiting disenfranchised populations, using both local grievances and transnational jihadist narratives. Dagestan’s high risk of insurgency, with potential spillover into neighbouring areas and southern Russian cities, will persist without a shift to integrated civil-military engagement and improved local governance.
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