Executive Summary

After more than one year, the evidence indicates that the new Syrianad interimgovernment held by Ahmad Al-Sharaa is adapting revolutionary changes for the country. One of these radical shifts is the official recognition of the Syrian Kurds as Syrian citizens and the inclusion of SDF within the Syrian regular army.

The main consequence of this new decree is the loss of control of the North-East regions of the country by Kurdish forces. This region hosts what is considered one of the most dangerous refugee camps in the world, Al-Hawl. Due to this new law, responsibility for the camp’s security has shifted from the Kurdish forces to theSyrian army.

However, due to the high presence of silent jihadists and high levels of violence, this place has been described as a new centre of radicalisation. Therefore, the purpose of this report is to underscore how the change of power in this very specific section of Syria may connect Islamic State militias from the Middle East to the Khorasan.

Background Information

During the critical moments of the fight against the Islamic State,al-Hawl camp refugee camp, which is located at the proximity with the Iraqi border, used to host only refugees who had fled from the Islamic State in both Syria and Iraq. In 2016 its population was around 10.000 people, however after the fall of the seductive Islamic State that number had dramatically skyrocketed reaching 64.000 people. Besides the overcrowding, what makes this place so dangerous is that the majority of the new displaced arewomenthat were married with jihadists who used to belong to the caliphate.

Furthermore, these women had introducedwithin the refugee camp the jihadist violence and its ideology, deepening the already tough conditions of life in this place. Several sources highlight how those women, due to their intimidations and murders, may have created the fertile ground for anew generationof fighters loyal to the caliphate.

This possibility is not a potential threat anymore due to two main factors: the internalisation of Syrian jihadist spectrum, i.e. new group of fighters that have found in the country their new operational central system. The second element is thepresence of the Islamist fighters within the new Syrian administration, as it was proven by the integration of3500 Uyghurmembers of the Turkestan Islamist Party within the Syrian army.

The new administration of the camp from the Syrian army is the last element that could transform this refugee camp as the new hub of the international jihadist organisations: since the weakened and the fragile regional socio-political framework and its strategic location, the risk of a re-birth of a stronger version of the Islamic State and its consequential expansion has become a concrete threat.

Analysis

The resurgence of the Islamic State on the international stage could pose a heightened global threat, owing to its established connections across a vast geographical expanse spanning the Middle East to the Hindu Kush mountains and the Afghan-Pakistan border adjacent to China. During the former caliphate’s sway between Iraq and Syria, affiliated groups primarily engaged local adversaries, operating independently of unified global command.

In the current geopolitical context, it is possible theLevantine and the Khorasan branches of the Islamic State could join their forcesand hence developing a massive global agenda which purpose is to eradicate local governments and to build a global Islamic caliphate. Moreover, Syria currently accommodates various jihadist and Islamist organisations affiliated with the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State, asevidencedbyCentral Asian jihadistswho previously instigated rebellion against the Russian government.

In addition to that, the Levantine Islamic State has launcheda new campaign of recruitment through its platformAl Naba, exploiting the anti-Kurdish sentiments among the Arab tribes who are living in the North-East side of the country after the official inclusion within of the Kurdish population as Syrian citizens. Damascus’s recent release of inmates creates potential newrecruits. This is a collateral consequence of their new political approach towards the Kurdish community.

The consequence on this scenario would be therise of Kurdish militiasthat will become the main opposition local force against the Islamic State. This catalyst could potentially fostersecessionist sentiments within the Kurdistan region, thereby exerting pressure on various states for regional autonomy. This would mean the re-apparition of themain Turkish source of internal stabilityand, going towards East, it would represent another element of instability of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The ongoing unrest within the nation presents an opportunity forKurdish separatist regions in Iranto exert pressure on the clerical government, potentially advancing their pursuit of independence from Tehran. TheBalochiones could follow these movements, in this way opening crisis fractures beyond the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, it is in those fractures, like it is proven by theBLA, jihadist groups like the Taliban try to enhance their power and their political agenda.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this potential scenario would question Donald Trump’s trust towards Al-Sharaa as the main guaranteeing of the containment strategy of the Islamic State within the region. Therefore, the control of the camp by the Syrian regular army must insist on de-radicalization perspective and a good strategy could be the implementation of the camp with educational and medical structures, in order to make available the primary needs for the population.

Arab and Kurdish forces of the campcould jointly administer the area to promote genuine inclusion of the Kurdish population within Syrian society. Consequently,the al-Hawl camp serves as a microcosm illustrating how marginalisation can engender religious-ethnic polarisation. Therefore, its stabilisation offers valuable insights for future de-escalation and radicalisation policies in a region whose primary strength has historically been the coexistence of diverse ethnicities and religions. In essence, the milestone of a Western Asia emptied by Islamic terrorism is the elevation of inter-coexistence as their main element for regional policies.

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