Executive Summary

This report evaluates recent Central Asian fighters’ jihadist mobilisation efforts in Syria and the dissemination of related propaganda targeting Russian Muslims. Drawing on open-source information, including Telegram content in Russian, the report outlines the security risks posed to Syria, Russia, and Central Asia.

The analysis, based on previous SpecialEurasia reports and local sources (some of them still not completely confirmed), highlights that internal strife, jihadist propaganda, and the ready availability of weapons and propaganda to some fighters and battalions pose significant threats to Syrian stability and regional security.

Key findings

1. Central Asian militants released a Russian-language propaganda video urging “Russian-speaking brothers” to join their jihad against Russian and Iranian forces in Syria.
2. Multiple Russian-language Telegram channels circulated the video, identifying the fighters as members of HTS and Syria’s interim government.
3. Syria remains militarily vulnerable, with Russian forces keeping strategic presence along the coast and Islamic State propaganda undermining the interim leadership’s legitimacy.

Situation Overview and Video Narrative

Central Asian militants, allegedly affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, released a video from Syria in Russian, encouraging “Russian-speaking brothers” to travel and fight in what they described as a religious war against Moscow and Tehran.

The video shows foreign fighters training for combat, claiming to represent a larger coalition of international jihadists in Syria. The message highlights a plan to mobilise Russian-speaking Muslims across borders.

Indeed, in the video the speaker stated:

“In the name of God, and upon you be peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah, the Most Merciful, All Russian-speaking brothers send greetings from the land of al-Sham (Syria), by the will of Allah. As you can see, Muslims from all over the world have gathered in these lands, fighting on the path of Allah, training, preparing, and we are also waiting for your participation in this path, in this battle against the enemies — the occupiers from Iran, Russia, and others. If you were true Muslims, you would not have forgotten the Muslims in al-Sham.”

Multiple Russian Telegram channels specialising in Middle Eastern conflicts shared the video, claiming the fighters belonged to HTS and Syria’s provisional government. Officials have not yet corroborated these claims, and they remain under review.

The appeal coincides with the information, shared in the last months, that a Central Asian fighter, Sayfiddin Tajibayev, has been appointed in the newly formed Syrian Ministry of Defence. Sayfiddin Tajibayev, a Tajik national with a history of recruiting extremists, now holds a command position within the transitional defence force. His role could establish foreign fighter training centres for Central Asian citizens aimed at fighting against the Russian military forces still deployed in the Syrian coast..

Besides internal conflict and foreign jihadists, Syria confronts the ideological threat of the Islamic State, which continues to undermine the transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) through propaganda.

While Iran’s direct military presence has diminished, Russian forces remain embedded on the Syrian coast, maintaining strategic depth in the area. The combined threat of the Islamic State and anti-Russian jihadists underscores the chaotic and disputed security situation in post-Assad Syria.

Risk Assessment

To Syria

• State Infiltration by Extremists. The presence of Central Asian and other foreign jihadists within official government structures or connected with members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham compromises military integrity and raises the likelihood of internal disruption or competing agendas.
• Foreign Recruitment Hubs. Former HTS-linked facilities could develop into training grounds for Central Asian fighters, reinforcing the group’s long-term operational capabilities within and beyond Syria.
• Islamic State Propaganda. Islamic State’s continued ideological struggle weakens the transitional leadership’s ability to merge power, raising the spectre of further terrorist attacks and factional fighting.
• Diplomatic Friction. Syria’s connections to known extremists within its official structures create difficulties in its relationships with regional partners and could reduce future international engagement.

To Central Asia and Russia

• Returning Combatants. Combat-experienced Central Asian fighters returning from Syria could destabilise their home countries by spreading their operational skills and extremist ideology.
• Online Radicalisation. Russian-language jihadist content disseminated via Telegram facilitates radicalisation among diasporic and domestic populations, bypassing traditional monitoring structures.
• Regional Spillover. Tajikistan, particularly vulnerable because of the neighbouring Afghanistan, may face increased recruitment, propaganda penetration, and logistical support to extremist networks currently involved in Syria.
• Security Strain. Russia’s prolonged military involvement in Syria could become a protracted and problematic counterinsurgency effort, especially if transnational jihadist or fighters belonging in the past to HTS will start to attack Moscow’s military facilities and personnel in the country.

Indicators and Warning Signs

• Proliferation of propaganda in Russian or Central Asian languages, especially on Telegram and encrypted platforms, promoting jihad in Syria.
• Reports of new Central Asian arrivals in the Syrian territory.
• Increased visibility or appointments of other non-Syrian figures in the interim government’s security structure.
• Islamic State messaging directly contesting al-Sharaa’s leadership legitimacy or calling for defections.
• Arrests or disruptions linked to foreign fighter returnees in Tajikistan or neighbouring Central Asian states.

Conclusion

In the short term, Syria could see a surge in instability, as increased foreign jihadist recruitment and propaganda draw more fighters and weaken the transitional government through ideological and institutional infiltration. Simultaneously, Russia can face potential security threats from the online radicalisation of its Muslim citizens and the return of battle-hardened fighters from Syria.

The possible presence of figures like Sayfiddin Tajibayev in the Syrian military could strengthen transnational jihadist networks in the coming years, turning parts of north-western Syria into bases for attacks on regional and Central Asian targets.

For further reports and risk assessment about Syria and jihadist propaganda, contact us at info@specialeurasia.com and request our monitoring and consulting services.