Executive Summary
Uzbekistan concluded a week-long joint military exercise with the Russian Federation, named Hamkorlik-2025, from 15 to 21 July 2025 in Surxondaryo Region.
The exercise simulated coordinated responses to cross-border threats in counterinsurgency operations. Hamkorlik-2025 signals Tashkent’s intent to strengthen tactical capabilities, secure its southern border with Afghanistan, and engage in military-technical cooperation with Moscow.
However, Uzbekistan’s increasing dependence on Russian military equipment and strategies could limit its strategic options and challenge its multi-faceted foreign policy.
Key Takeaways
- Uzbekistan deepened its defence cooperation with Russia through high-intensity tactical exercises near the Afghan border.
- Hamkorlik-2025 featured advanced weaponry and platforms, underlining Tashkent’s interest in modernising its armed forces through foreign partnerships.
- Increased defence engagement with Moscow may lead to strategic overdependence and renewed CSTO pressure.
Background Information
From 15 to 21 July 2025, Uzbekistan hosted the Hamkorlik-2025 joint military exercise with the Russian Federation at the Termez training ground.
The exercise simulated the identification and neutralisation of illegal armed groups that had infiltrated across the border. Among the Russian units were mountain troops, electronic warfare teams, UAV operators, and helicopter crews from the 201st Military Base.
Uzbek and Russian troops conducted a joint military exercise involving live fire, drone strikes, FPV reconnaissance, anti-armour techniques, and urban warfare drills. Mi-24 and Mi-35 helicopters, D-30 howitzers, BTR-82A vehicles, and Typhoon armoured cars were deployed, along with T-72 tanks and portable missile systems.
The exercises ended with an awards ceremony where commanders praised the excellent coordination. Despite not rejoining the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Uzbekistan keeps working relationships with Russia’s military.
Geopolitical Scenario
Uzbekistan remains outside formal Russian-led security structures but has continued selective bilateral engagement with Moscow.
Given security concerns, especially the risk of jihadist groups entering from Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Russia are cooperating on defence. Russia maintains a military presence in Central Asia via the 201st Military Base, bolstering its influence through operational support and arms sales.
Russia’s defence exports and technical expertise can support Tashkent’s military modernisation program, which began in 2025. Increased cooperation, however, may restrict future procurement diversification and diplomatic flexibility. Tashkent has also engaged Turkey and China in defence relations, but Russia keeps the most significant combat-ready assets and regional logistics.
Through initiatives such as the Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian House), Moscow’s cultural diplomacy significantly increases its societal influence, embedding itself within the fabric of the community and fostering deeper ties.
Tashkent is diversifying its foreign partners and expanding military cooperation, but increased collaboration with Moscow on border and counterterrorism issues might invite pressure to re-enter the CSTO should security operations escalate.
Indicators to Monitor
- Uzbekistan’s statements or formal moves regarding a membership or engagement with CSTO.
- Increasing Russian military exports to Uzbekistan by official meeting and activities of Rosoboronexport.
- Russian and/or Uzbek official announcements detailing plans for permanent joint military training facilities.
- Reduction in security cooperation with other actors, including Turkey and China.
- Expansion of Russia-led cultural or military education programmes in Uzbekistan.
Strategic Outlook
Hamkorlik-2025 reinforces the positive trajectory of bilateral defence cooperation between Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation. The exercise showed improved coordination, reflecting a growing level of trust and military alignment.
While this does not mean Uzbekistan is fully reliant on Moscow strategically and militarily, it shows their practical approach to military modernisation, which can become heavily reliant on Russia for weapons, training, and tactics.
For Tashkent, engaging with Moscow offers short- and medium-term capabilities that support its 2025 defence doctrine, particularly in drone warfare, mobile tactics, and counterinsurgency planning.
Russia sees this cooperation as a strategic way to strengthen its influence in Central Asia. Moscow’s military deployments in Tajikistan and military training and cooperation with Uzbekistan bolster its control over the Afghan border, creating a buffer zone consistent with its Blizhnee Zarubezhe (Near Abroad) strategy and wider regional doctrine.
The evolving bilateral relationship has implications for third parties. The European Union has intensified its engagement with Central Asia in recent years, focusing on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Brussels has aimed to build platforms for economic connectivity, energy diversification, and regional resilience. However, closer military ties between Tashkent and Moscow could undermine these efforts, strengthening the idea that Russia is the region’s ultimate security provider. Such a development may complicate the EU’s broader strategic calculus and its attempt to promote multipolar balancing mechanisms in Central Asia.
Growing cooperation with Moscow and reliance on Russian military might and influence in Uzbekistan may reshape domestic viewpoints. Moscow’s effective contribution to national defence and counterterrorism could boost its international image and soft power, especially with military groups and pro-Russia populations. This could gradually lead to acceptance of a new membership in the CSTO and normalise closer ties to Russia’s strategic goals.
