Executive Summary

This report examines the recent arrests of ethnic Tajik Taliban commanders in northern Afghanistan, highlighting emerging internal rifts within the movement, particularly between the Kandahar leadership and the Haqqani Network.

The report explores how these developments may trigger renewed instability in historically restive regions, such as Takhar and Badakhshan. The geopolitical context of this analysis includes increasing Russian and Chinese engagement with the Taliban, and the possibility of a clandestine return of US intelligence assets, which sheds further light on internal conflicts.

By assessing both domestic power struggles and external strategic competition, the report provides a forward-looking appraisal of Afghanistan’s short- to medium-term trajectory.

Key Takeaways

• The Taliban leadership in Kandahar is conducting a systematic purge of non-Pashtun elements, primarily Tajiks linked to the Haqqani Network, reflecting rising mistrust and internal fractures.
• Internal confrontation and fractures among the Taliban might provide a fertile ground for external actors and local terrorist groups such as the ISKP.
• Russia, China, and the United States have intensified their interest in the Afghan dynamics putting pressure on the Taliban.

Background Information

In early April 2025, according to the Russian Telegram Channel Afganskiy Insaider, the Taliban’s Ministry of Defence launched a series of operations across northern Afghanistan, resulting in the arrest of prominent ethnic Tajik field commanders. One such individual was Hossein Jundi, a veteran leader from Takhar province who had repeatedly evaded capture. The detention seems to have started a broader crackdown, affecting others such as Bashir Kanat, Arbab Rukhollah Raufi, and Nik Mohammad Hakimi. Authorities have reportedly moved many of the arrested, linked to the Haqqani Network, to detention centres in Kandahar, far from their traditional strongholds.

The Haqqani Network, while formally integrated into the Taliban structure, has long operated with autonomy. With roots in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, the group has strong ties to the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) and has traditionally been the Taliban’s most powerful military faction. It is also more ethnically diverse than the Kandahari Taliban core. The network’s decentralised command structure and battlefield experience have given it power across many provinces, especially in the north, which has a substantial Tajik population.

These arrests follow weeks of growing tension within Taliban ranks, with suspicions mounting in Kandahar that elements within the Haqqani-linked northern commanders might establish back-channel contacts with anti-Taliban opposition groups. These fears, as the information shared by the Telegram channel, whether substantiated, have stressed an internal struggle among the Taliban, which might increase the country’s destabilisation and affect local security.

Geopolitical Scenario

The Taliban’s internal command structure remains less monolithic than publicly portrayed. While the Kandahar faction, centred around Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and the Defence Ministry—is ethnically Pashtun and ideologically rigid, the Haqqani Network offers a more pragmatic and operationally flexible approach. Including Tajik commanders helped the Taliban strengthen their control in areas with non-Pashtun populations after 2021, but it also brought about some internal tension.

The current wave of arrests is not merely punitive; it reflects a strategic calculus. By removing potential dissenters, the Kandahar leadership aims to prevent a future rebellion akin to the Northern Alliance’s resurgence in the early 2000s. However, such actions may prove counterproductive. The north has historically served as fertile ground for opposition movements.

Dismissing local leaders might inflame Tajik resentment and embolden dormant anti-Taliban groups, especially those focused on ethnic identity or justice.

As the Taliban contends with internal challenges, it is also the object of recalibrated strategies by regional and global powers.

• Russia is nearing a formal delisting of the Taliban as a terrorist organisation, a move intended to normalise diplomatic and economic engagement. Moscow seeks to position Afghanistan as a buffer against the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) and as a conduit for Central Asian energy and trade, as evidenced by this.
• China, concerned about Uyghur militant transit through the Wakhan Corridor, has intensified its military and intelligence coordination with the Taliban. Between 8 and 12 January 2025, a high-level PLA delegation visited the region to complete joint security mechanisms. This indicates Beijing’s aim is to transform Afghanistan from a strategic burden into a controllable region, achieved through economic inducements and collaborative counterterrorism efforts.
• The United States, though officially disengaged, may shift towards a shadow posture. Reports of a C-17A aircraft landing at Bagram Air Base, possibly carrying senior CIA personnel, hint at reconnaissance or preparatory steps for renewed intelligence operations. Priorities could include counterterrorism, containing rival powers, or rebuilding the region’s human networks.

These developments reveal a complex and escalating competition, shifting the view of Afghanistan from a counterinsurgency issue to a stage for strategic manoeuvring by major global and regional players.

Conclusion

Afghanistan’s immediate future hinges on a volatile confluence of internal repression and external manoeuvring. The Taliban leadership in Kandahar is apparently merging power by marginalising non-Pashtuns within their organization. While tactically expedient, this may sow the seeds of renewed resistance, particularly in ethnically diverse northern regions where the Taliban’s legitimacy is already tenuous.

The immediate consequence of apprehending significant Tajik Taliban leaders is the potential for backlash in northern Afghanistan, where ethnic disputes and longstanding opposition to Pashtun supremacy persist. By taking these measures, there is a possibility of hastening the reorganisation of anti-Taliban militias in Takhar and Badakhshan, which could lead to a renewed low-level insurgency.

ISKP may exploit these internal fractures to expand its operational footprint, especially if Taliban control appears weakened.

Increased cooperation between Russia and China with the Taliban could, in the coming years, lead to proxy conflicts, with regional and international groups backing opposing factions. Renewed US intelligence activity, if confirmed and intensified, may provoke a direct conflict with the Taliban and undermine already tenuous external engagement.

Over time, ongoing purges, economic stagnation, and ethnic marginalisation could cause the Taliban’s authority to break apart, turning Afghanistan into a collection of local power hubs and reigniting regional instability.

Author: Giuliano Bifolchi

*Cover image: A picture of Hussain Jundi (Credits: X account Bilal Sarwary)

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