Kavkaz Files ISSN 2975-0474 Volume 32 Issue 2
Author: Silvia Boltuc
Executive Summary
This report examines Turkey’s increasing influence in Abkhazia, especially in the context of the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for February 2025. The analysis explores Ankara’s broader geopolitical ambitions in the South Caucasus, where its growing presence challenges Russia’s traditional dominance and exhibits a significant anti-Armenian stance.
The potential shift in Abkhazia’s political alignment, particularly with the support of certain candidates for closer ties with Turkey, has raised concerns over the region’s stability. This is especially true for the ethnic Armenian community in Abkhazia, which fears that Turkish influence could jeopardise their position and security. Recently leaked documents have prompted the Armenian community in Abkhazia to seek assistance due to security concerns.
Information Context
Ankara’s political, economic, and cultural ties with Sukhum, particularly its backing of certain presidential candidates, are part of a larger pattern of influence-building across the post-Soviet space. This growing influence comes at a time when Abkhazia’s political situation is unstable. Following a political crisis in November 2024, which saw the resignation of the President, the February 2025 presidential elections are set to determine the future direction of the region.
The two main candidates, Badra Gumba and Adgur Ardzinba, represent opposing geopolitical visions. Gumba, as a former Vice President and interim leader, is expected to maintain the status quo and maintain Abkhazia’s ties with Russia, while Ardzinba, leader of the People’s Movement for Renewal, represents a potential pivot toward Turkey. Despite a majority of Abkhazians supporting strong ties with Russia, with recent surveys indicating 91% in favour of continued cooperation, Ardzinba’s candidacy has fuelled concerns about a shift in alliances.
The growing Turkish influence has sparked concern, particularly among Abkhazia’s Armenian community, many of whom are descendants of survivors of the Armenian Genocide and have historically relied on Russian protection. The rise of pro-Turkish sentiment in Abkhazia is seen by some as a direct threat to the security of ethnic Armenians in the region. This has led to a growing political divide within Abkhazia, with Armenian leaders urging Abkhazians to support Gumba to safeguard the region’s ethnic minorities.
At the same time, Turkey’s strategic moves in Abkhazia are in line with its broader regional strategy to influence the Black Sea, the North Caucasus, and Central Asia. Its cultural and economic outreach to Turkic-speaking nations, combined with its long-standing ties to Azerbaijan and Georgia, adds another layer of complexity.
The controversial law adopted by the Abkhazian parliament in November 2024, which favoured Russian investments, has also brought foreign interventions into the equation, with some experts suggesting that Turkey may have been involved in fuelling recent protests in Abkhazia. This unrest, coupled with the strategic infrastructure projects Turkey is pursuing in the region, highlights Ankara’s long-term vision for expanding its influence in Abkhazia.
Targeting Armenians: Leaked Documents and Turkey’s Covert Agenda in Abkhazia
During the electoral campaign in Abkhazia, leaked documents revealed a troubling plan allegedly led by Devlet Bahçeli, head of Turkey’s ultranationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and a close Erdogan ally, targeting Armenians in the region. In an official letter to Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Bahçeli stated that he held an informal meeting with the Turkish President in Ankara on January 9th, 2025, during which they discussed strategies to advance Turkey’s interests in Abkhazia.
He noted that the Armenian community in Abkhazia holds significant political influence, enjoys cultural autonomy, has a designated parliamentary quota, and maintains a strong presence in the business sector. He accused Armenians of advancing an anti-Turkey agenda by “manipulating” the local population through the issue of the Armenian Genocide.
Furthermore, he claimed that local Armenians had actively supported Nagorno-Karabakh separatists by sending fighters to the region. According to Bahçeli, Ankara should factor this into the formulation of Turkey’s Caucasus policy. This underscores how Azerbaijan’s offensives against Artsakh and Armenia are not only backed by Turkey but also align with Ankara’s broader strategic agenda.
According to the plan proposed by the Foreign Policy Working Group of the MHP Parliamentary Group and endorsed by the President, the initiative aims to assess the situation on the ground and compile a list of Abkhazian Armenians allegedly involved in actions against Azerbaijani and Turkish volunteers in Karabakh.
The document states:
“Within the framework of the above information:
- We request you to encourage the Nationalist Movement Party to send trained experts to the territory of Abkhazia in coordination with the relevant institutions and civil society organisations to identify separatists and their sponsors in Abkhazia, to create detailed biographical profiles and maps of their departure from Abkhazia, with the aim of reducing the threat posed by this factor.
- We request your approval to transfer the database to the Azerbaijani side, through the mediation of the MHP, to be created in order to counter the threat posed by the Abkhazian Armenians in third countries.
- We request your approval to contact a number of Abkhaz politicians, including the Chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Abkhazian Sovereignty Levan Mikaa, the Chairman of the People’s Movement of Abkhazia and the Presidential Candidate of Abkhazia Adgur Ardzınba, the Chairman of the Public Organisation Akhyatsa Akhra Bjania, who have connections with the Abkhazian Diaspora, and to include them in our activities.
- We request your organisational and other assistance in the plan’s implementation put forward by the Foreign Policy Working Group of the MHP Parliamentary Group”.
After Germany’s Bundestag approved a resolution recognising the World War I-era killings of Anatolian Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Empire as Genocide, Devlet Bahçeli said that the forced deportation of Armenians in 1915 and 1916 by the Ottomans was the right decision, adding that the same deportation decision should be given again if the circumstances were the same.
The plan to collect information and biographies of Armenians in Abkhazia and compile lists to be shared with Azerbaijan—a “twin state,” as repeatedly emphasised by the Turkish President—is merely the latest step in a broader pattern of Armenophobia. Bahçeli’s political stance is characterised by far-right, ultranationalist positions. The leader of the MHP party is a founder of the Grey Wolves, a pan-Turkic organisation commonly described as ultranationalist, neo-fascist, Islamo-nationalist and racist.
The concerning part is that allegedly the document was realised after a meeting with Erdogan, therefore it would be a state-backed campaign of Armenophobia. With Abkhazia’s growing strategic importance and the political crisis within the country—compounded by Russia’s distraction because of the war in Ukraine—Turkish representatives may see this as an opportune moment to advance their interests. Therefore, the Armenian community in Abkhazia, descendants of those who fled the Ottoman Empire during the genocide, is increasingly viewed as a threat.
In response, Abkhazia’s Armenian community has appealed to the Armenian government through Diaspora Commissioner Zareh Sinanyan, urging Yerevan to pressure Abkhaz authorities—however temporary—to adopt measures ensuring their protection. They claim that the local opposition is closely linked to Turkish nationalists and intelligence services and is compiling “blacklists” and preparing provocations against Armenians, potentially leading to pogroms and violence.
The report highlights growing fears among Abkhazian Armenians, yet any intervention from Pashinyan government remains improbable, as Yerevan seeks to maintain stable relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan amid the fragile peace negotiations with Baku.
The Central Electoral Headquarters of Adgur Ardzinba, although not referring directly to these documents in particular, has recently issued a statement condemning what it describes as a coordinated smear campaign. According to the statement, false and provocative information has been widely circulated online and on anonymous social media channels in an attempt to discredit Ardzinba and his team.
Geopolitical Scenario
Turkey
Under the leadership of President Erdogan, particularly following the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, Turkey has demonstrated considerable flexibility in its foreign alliances. While being a NATO member, Ankara has skilfully navigated between forging agreements with Moscow and making concessions to its Western allies, taking advantage of Russia’s strategic distractions. Ankara’s recent actions, such as supporting militias that helped overthrow the Assad regime in Syria, occupying northern Iraqi territories, providing military and political backing to Azerbaijan during its offensives against Armenian-led Nagorno-Karabakh, and unilaterally managing Northern Cyprus, underscore its readiness to pursue policies outside established international norms when aligned with its national interests.
Turkey’s advantageous position within Eurasia, coupled with its crucial role in managing migration flows to Europe and the strategic importance of NATO military bases on its territory, bestows significant leverage in global negotiations. Consequently, both the European Union and the United States have frequently turned a blind eye to Turkey’s more assertive and at times aggressive actions.
Ankara is threatening Moscow’s interests in several areas of Russia’s Lebensraum (vital space), within the post-Soviet space. The country closely links its long-term vision to unite Turkic-speaking nations under its influence with its broader geopolitical strategy. Through state-controlled agencies like the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, known as “Diyanet”, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS), Ankara continues to expand its cultural and economic footprint in Central Asia and the Caucasus, extending beyond infrastructural projects to include religious and humanitarian outreach. Pan-Turkism, revived through the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) and Ankara’s broader regional strategy, further threatens Moscow’s and Beijing’s interests.
Georgia
An important factor to consider is the potential reaction of both Europe and Georgia if Ankara were to strengthen its influence over Abkhazia. Georgia maintains close ties with Azerbaijan and, by extension, with Turkey. This relationship is reinforced by key energy infrastructure, such as the Southern Gas Corridor, which transports natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field in the Caspian Sea to Italy’s southern coast via Georgia. Turkey is Georgia’s first trading partner and despite cultural and religious differences, Ankara and Tbilisi have historically cooperated when it aligned with their strategic interests.
However, it is unlikely that Turkey’s growing influence in Abkhazia would be directed toward facilitating the region’s reintegration into Georgia, despite President Erdogan’s past statements advocating for such a development. Moreover, Tbilisi already faces challenges in managing Turkish influence in Adjara, where over 30% of the population is Muslim. Ankara exerts its soft power in the region through investments, religious outreach, and political engagement, leveraging historically rooted cultural ties. Adjara was once part of the Ottoman Empire, during which many local inhabitants converted to Islam, providing Ankara with a foundation to strengthen its presence through economic and ideological means. Diyanet is particularly active in this area.
Europe
From a European perspective, a NATO-aligned presence in Abkhazia might seem preferable to continued Russian dominance. However, Turkey’s history of acting independently from Western alliances complicates this assumption, as Ankara’s strategic priorities often diverge from those of Brussels and Washington. Furthermore, the increasing alignment of Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party with Russia has significantly weakened the European Union’s leverage over the broader Georgian-Abkhaz issue, further diminishing Brussels’ ability to shape the region’s geopolitical trajectory.
North Caucasus
Another important factor to consider is the influence Turkey could exert over the North Caucasus through Abkhazia, particularly in Karachay-Cherkessia. This region is home to the Abaza people, who share strong historical and cultural ties with the Abkhazians, as well as the Circassians, who maintain deep connections with Turkey through their extensive diaspora. The Circassian diaspora in Turkey, numbering several hundred thousand people, plays a key role in fostering Ankara’s engagement with the North Caucasus. Many Circassian organisations in Turkey advocate for stronger ties between Ankara and their ancestral homeland, promoting cultural exchanges, economic investments, and educational programs that reinforce Turkey’s presence in the region.
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) enjoys popularity among a significant portion of the Circassian population in Turkey, particularly in regions such as Sakarya, Düzce and Kayseri, where substantial Circassian communities live. On August 5th, 2023, Turkey hosted the inaugural conference on an “independent Circassia”, with the event facilitated by the local government of Istanbul’s Üsküdar district, which is controlled by the AKP. This conference, organised by the Council of United Circassia (CUC), known as Birleşik Çerkesya Konseyi in Turkish, marks a significant milestone. The green light for the conference by the Istanbul Governor’s Office signals an implicit endorsement from the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The CUC consider a large part of the Southern and North Caucasian Federal Districts — the territory of Russia from the Black Sea coast to the borders of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia — to be occupied and advocates for its independence as a Circassian state.
Interestingly, on June 6th, 2022, the CUC appealed to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine with a request to recognise the Circassian genocide. In January 2025, MP Yaroslav Yurchyshyn announced that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognised the genocide of the Circassian people by the Russian Empire. In particular, Ukrainian deputies acknowledge the right of the Circassians to “repatriation and self-determination”. This development might further serve Ankara’s goal of undermining Russian authorities in its territories in the North Caucasus. It is worth noting that Ukrainians also fought alongside Baku during the First Karabakh War. In return, some Azerbaijanis have shown reciprocity, with approximately 500 ethnic Azerbaijanis currently serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine against Russia. Overall, North Caucasian volunteer fighters constitute a significant presence within Ukraine’s international legion. From this perspective, Ukrainian policies can serve Ankara’s interests in the North Caucasus.
Ankara has actively pursued cultural diplomacy and religious outreach in the North Caucasus, utilising institutions such as TİKA and the Diyanet. These organisations have funded the restoration of mosques, provided scholarships for North Caucasian students to study in Turkey, and supported Turkish-language education initiatives. Additionally, Turkey has expanded economic cooperation with North Caucasian republics, particularly in trade and infrastructure projects, further solidifying its influence.
Given the North Caucasus’ strategic significance for Russia, Ankara’s growing engagement in the region poses a challenge to Moscow’s traditional dominance. Turkey’s ability to leverage ethnic, religious, and historical ties allows it to establish a foothold in a region where dissatisfaction with Russian policies, economic struggles, and historical grievances still persist.
Abkhazia
Some experts suggest that the unrest in Abkhazia on November 11th, 2024, sparked by the adoption of the law On the Regulation of the Legal Status of Multifunctional Complexes, was financially backed by influential Turkish figure or descendants of Abkhaz migrants in Turkey, some of whom perceive Abkhazia as intrinsically linked to Ankara. Ankara’s suspected opposition to the law is driven by its goal of preventing Russian investments in the region while advancing its own economic interests. This concern is reinforced by President Erdogan’s recent announcement of the Samsun-Trabzon-Sarpi high-speed rail project, designed to connect Ankara with the Black Sea and Georgia, further consolidating Turkey’s influence over key coastal territories in the Black Sea.
Sarpi is located 104 kilometres in a straight line from the village of Pichora in the Gali District, on Abkhazia’s southern border. The Gali district is a strategically sensitive area for Abkhazia. Following 1998, many Mingrelians who had fled during the Abkhaz-Georgian (1992-1993) conflict returned. Ankara’s growing economic influence over Tbilisi, combined with the development of this new infrastructure linking Georgia to Turkey, may raise some concerns in Sukhum.
The agreement that sparked protests in 2024 would have merely obliged Abkhaz authorities to grant Russian investors most-favoured-nation status—offering land, labour quotas, and tax benefits—while also ensuring compensation for Russian companies should Sukhum fail to meet its commitments. However, Abkhazia’s resistance to the deal reflects its broader struggle for sovereignty. The historical trauma of forced displacement and land colonisation, coupled with concerns over Georgian oligarchs holding Russian passports who could exploit the law for strategic gains, heightens fears that Abkhazia’s independence could be further undermined.
The risks associated with Turkish investments are even more pronounced, given Ankara’s expansionist stance. Despite not officially recognising Abkhazia as an independent state, Turkey actively engages in maritime trade both with Abkhazia and through its territory. Moreover, Ankara effectively circumvents Abkhazian restrictions by leveraging its Abkhaz diaspora, which provides a legal pathway for Turkey to acquire Abkhazian land and real estate, further entrenching its presence in the country.
As per the upcoming presidential elections, the two leading candidates, Gumba and Ardzinba, embody contrasting geopolitical positions. Gumba, representing continuity with the past and good relations to Russia, is expected to secure the support of those who view Sukhum’s relationship with Moscow as vital for the region’s security and sovereignty. Ardzinba, on the other hand, represents a more radical shift, advocating for stronger relations with Turkey, which poses a direct challenge to Russia’s long-standing dominance in the region.
Conclusions
Turkey sees Abkhazia as one of its key node in its broader strategy to challenge Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space and expand its influence on the Caucasus, reviving the old competition between the Ottoman and the Russian empires.
Strengthening ties with Sukhum, potentially serving as a gateway to the broader North Caucasus, aligns with Turkey’s long-term goal of integrating Turkic and Muslim communities across Eurasia, using its soft power institutions (TIKA, Diyanet, and the OTS).
Ankara wants to present itself as a regional leader independent of Western dictates while maintaining NATO membership, allowing it to operate within a geopolitical grey zone.
Turkish nationalist groups, particularly the MHP and Grey Wolves, see Abkhazia’s Armenian community as an obstacle to their influence, and Ankara may tolerate or tacitly support actions that weaken Armenian influence in the region.
Moscow considers Abkhazia a vital buffer state and strategic ally in the Black Sea, and any Turkish encroachment could trigger economic or security reprisals. Russia may respond by limiting Abkhazia’s energy imports or reducing economic assistance. On the other side, Moscow’s hesitance to provoke Ankara, especially in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, constrains its ability to curb Turkish actions.
Turkey’s non-recognition of Abkhazia’s independence creates a paradox in its engagement with the region. While Ankara maintains strong unofficial ties with Sukhum—primarily through trade, cultural diplomacy, and its large Abkhaz diaspora—it has never formally recognised Abkhazia as an independent state.
Ankara’s official stance aligns with Tbilisi. If Turkey deepens its involvement in Abkhazia, it could later pivot toward supporting Georgia’s claims as a bargaining chip in its broader regional diplomacy. This means that any Abkhazian faction currently aligning with Turkey could be left exposed in the future.
Because Turkey operates unofficially in Abkhazia, its activities are hard to track. Much of this commerce flows through Turkish-Abkhaz diaspora networks, making it difficult to monitor who is funding whom or whether Ankara is actively supporting pro-Turkish candidates like Adgur Ardzinba.
As per the Armenian community in Abkhazia, which comprises around 20% of the country’s population, it has historically enjoyed political representation, cultural autonomy, and economic influence. Now they find itself in an increasingly precarious position, caught between Turkey’s expanding influence and Abkhazia’s internal power struggles. The leaked MHP document, which allegedly outlines plans to target Abkhazian Armenians, underscores a broader pattern of Turkish nationalist hostility toward this ethnic group—one that extends beyond Abkhazia into Ankara’s wider geopolitical ambitions in the Caucasus.
The MHP document, allegedly backed by Turkish President Erdoğan, reveals a clear intent to identify and target Armenian individuals in Abkhazia. The plan to create a database of Abkhazian Armenians with alleged ties to Nagorno-Karabakh suggests intelligence gathering for potential future repression. The proposal to share this list with Azerbaijan reinforces the idea that Ankara and Baku are coordinating policies to marginalise Armenians in the South Caucasus. If implemented, such measures could destabilise Abkhazian society by deepening ethnic divisions and creating conditions for targeted attacks on Armenians.
Abkhazia represents a strategic testing ground for Turkey’s anti-Armenian policies. Unlike Armenia, where Turkish influence is limited, and unlike Georgia, where Armenians are a small minority, Abkhazia is a region where Armenians hold considerable political and economic power. If Turkey can successfully weaken the Armenian presence in Abkhazia, it could use this as a precedent to push for similar policies elsewhere—particularly in Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti region, home to another large Armenian community.
Many Armenians in Abkhazia view Russian military presence as a guarantee of their safety, this is why Armenian leaders in Abkhazia have been vocal in their support for Badra Gumba. Once again, as it often has been throughout history, protecting Armenians might align with Russia’s interests in Abkhazia.
Picture: Ethnolinguistic map of Turkey and the Caucasus (Credits: Ercwlff, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)
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