Executive Intelligence Snapshot

China has become the leading foreign investor in Central Asia, expanding its economic influence through infrastructure, energy and connectivity projects, while Russia continues to retain significant influence in the political, security and strategic domains.

The two powers are increasingly engaged in managed strategic competition over influence in the region, although their rivalry remains constrained by shared interests in maintaining regional stability.

Central Asian republics continue to pursue multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to maximise economic and political opportunities by engaging China, Russia, Western actors, including the European Union and the United States, as well as Gulf monarchies and other regional partners.

In the longer term, the growing asymmetry between China’s economic dominance and Russia’s security role could cause friction between Moscow and Beijing as both seek to preserve their respective positions in Central Asia.

Context

Central Asia has become an increasingly contested strategic environment for Russian and Chinese influence. While Moscow has historically maintained a dominant regional position through political, security and cultural ties, Beijing has significantly expanded its economic presence and has emerged as the principal external investor in the region.

According to Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) data, China has overtaken Russia as the largest foreign direct investor in Central Asia, with Chinese foreign direct investments (FDIs) exceeding USD 35 billion compared with approximately USD 20 billion from Russia. Chinese investment has primarily focused on strategic infrastructure, logistics networks, energy projects and industrial development, largely under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan represent the primary destinations for Chinese investment, accounting for the majority of Beijing’s regional economic engagement.

China’s growing economic footprint has increased its strategic relevance across Central Asia by strengthening transport connectivity between China and European markets while expanding Beijing’s role as a key provider of infrastructure financing and economic development. This has increased the region’s economic dependence on Chinese capital, technology and expertise.

Russia continues to maintain significant influence (in a region that the Kremlin consider as part of its blizhnee zarubezhe – near abroad) through established political, security and institutional mechanisms. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which promotes economic integration among participating states, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which provides a framework for defence and security cooperation, promote Moscow’s engagement in the region. Russia also maintains strategic influence through military cooperation, energy partnerships, industrial links, migration networks and longstanding cultural ties.

Both Moscow and Beijing are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which provides a platform for political dialogue and security cooperation, particularly regarding terrorism, extremism and regional stability.

Despite increasing competition, Central Asian governments have avoided alignment with a single external power. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan continue to pursue diversified foreign policies aimed at attracting investment and political engagement from multiple partners, including China, Russia, the European Union, the United States, Gulf monarchies and other regional actors.

Why Does It Matter?

The progressing distribution of Russian and Chinese influence is transforming Central Asia from a traditional Russian sphere of influence into a competitive geopolitical environment where multiple external powers seek to expand their strategic footprint.

Russia continues to view Central Asia as a critical component of its regional security architecture. Moscow’s influence is primarily based on political relationships, military cooperation, security partnerships and cultural connections. Through the CSTO and bilateral security arrangements, Russia remains the principal external security actor in the region. Moscow’s formal recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in July 2025 further demonstrates the importance Russia assigns to regional security dynamics and the management of potential instability originating from Afghanistan.

China’s influence is primarily driven by economic engagement. Through sustained investment under the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has expanded its role in transport infrastructure, energy, logistics and industrial development. The scale of Chinese investment, as reflected in EDB data, indicates that China has established a significant economic advantage over Russia in Central Asia.

This divergence has created a functional division of influence: Russia remains the dominant security and political actor, while China increasingly occupies the leading economic role. However, this division may become increasingly difficult to maintain as economic influence generates broader strategic leverage.

Growing Beijing’s financial involvement creates potential vulnerabilities for Central Asian states by increasing dependence on Chinese investment, infrastructure and technology. While Chinese economic engagement provides significant development opportunities, excessive reliance on Beijing could reduce the strategic autonomy of regional governments over time.

At present, Sino-Russian competition remains limited rather than confrontational. Both countries continue to cooperate on regional stability and share concerns regarding terrorism, extremism and instability. However, as China’s economic interests deepen and Moscow seeks to preserve its traditional influence, competition between the two powers is likely to intensify.

The Central Asian republics are therefore positioned between competing strategic pressures. Their multi-vector foreign policies provide opportunities to diversify partnerships, but maintaining equilibrium between China, Russia and Western actors will become increasingly complex.

Outlook

Short Term (6–18 months) – Russia and China will continue to pursue their current strategies in Central Asia, maintaining separate but overlapping spheres of influence. Russia is expected to continue prioritising political influence, security cooperation and military engagement. Moscow will likely seek to reinforce its regional position through CSTO mechanisms, bilateral defence cooperation and cultural diplomacy initiatives, including efforts to preserve Russian-language influence and maintain links with political, administrative and economic elites. China is highly likely to continue expanding its economic engagement through the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing is expected to prioritise infrastructure development, transport connectivity, energy cooperation and industrial investment, further consolidating its position as Central Asia’s principal economic partner.

Medium Term (18 months–5 years) – The Ukraine conflict’s outcome will significantly affect Russian influence in Central Asia and Moscow’s ability to increase its presence and pressure on local government. A reduction in pressure on Russian resources could provide Moscow with greater capacity to increase political, economic and security engagement with Central Asia. However, China is likely to maintain its economic advantage because of the scale of its investment commitments and its ability to finance large infrastructure projects. Beijing’s expanding economic role may gradually translate into greater political influence, increasing competition with Russia in areas traditionally dominated by Moscow. Central Asian governments are expected to continue pursuing multi-vector foreign policies, balancing relations with Russia and China while seeking greater engagement with the European Union, the United States, Gulf states and other external actors.

Long Term (5+ years) – The current balance between Chinese economic dominance and Russian security influence may become increasingly unstable. As China’s economic interests expand, Beijing may seek greater political influence to protect investments, infrastructure networks and strategic interests. This could generate increased overlap with Russia’s traditional political and security sphere, creating greater strategic friction between the two powers. The possibility of direct confrontation remains low because of shared interests in regional stability and continued cooperation through multilateral mechanisms such as the SCO. However, competition over influence, access and strategic positioning is likely to intensify. For Central Asian republics, increasing reliance on Chinese economic resources while maintaining Russian security partnerships will create complex strategic challenges. Regional governments are likely to continue pursuing diversification strategies, seeking to avoid excessive dependence on any single external actor.