Armenia is currently navigating a significant geopolitical challenge, as its government is shifting away from the Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh narrative to actively pursue and encourage peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, facilitated by Western intermediaries.
In a recent meeting with SpecialEurasia, professor and author Vicken Cheterian provided an expert analysis of the structural failures and geopolitical shifts that led to Armenia’s current predicament, drawing from his latest editorial work in 44-Day War: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh and his interview-based research discussed in a chapter of the book Defeat: Documenting the Karabagh War of 2020.
Through his analysis of 35 first-hand interviews with key political and military figures—including Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan—Cheterian explores the “triple challenge” of a war with Azerbaijan, historical conflict with Turkey, and an increasingly untenable dependency on Russia.
Our discussion focused on the profound “double-standard” currently permeating the country: a government that often maintains a policy of “political amnesia” or silence regarding the 2020 defeat and the 2023 fall of Artsakh, contrasted with a society and a Diaspora still grappling with collective trauma and the collapse of the political ideas upon which Armenian independence was first constructed. By identifying the causes of this systemic failure, Cheterian offers critical insights into whether Armenia can modernise its institutions and revitalise its foreign policy to ensure its long-term survival as a sovereign state.
How would you describe the geopolitical context in which Armenia currently finds itself, particularly after the 2020 war and the fall of Artsakh in 2023? Could you explain the concept of “triple challenge” expressed in your book The 44-Day War?
“Armenia today is navigating a profoundly altered geopolitical landscape. The collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh and the subsequent displacement of its population have forced the Armenian state to reconsider its strategic assumptions. For three decades, Armenian foreign and security policy was built around the Karabakh question, the conflict with Azerbaijan, the closed border with Turkey, and a deep—yet increasingly fragile—dependence on Russia. The 2020 war exposed the structural weaknesses of this model. Armenia faced what I call a ‘triple challenge’: a direct military confrontation with Azerbaijan; a historical and unresolved conflict with Turkey; and a dependency on Russia that proved untenable when Moscow chose not to intervene. These three pressures converged, leaving Armenia isolated at a critical moment. The result is a state now attempting to redefine its foreign policy while simultaneously managing internal trauma and political fragmentation.
The triple challenge was decisive. Armenia entered the war with Azerbaijan while simultaneously facing Turkey’s full political and military support for Baku. Turkish officers, drones, and Syrian mercenaries were deployed to the battlefield. This meant that the conflict was no longer a localised post-Soviet dispute but part of a broader Middle Eastern and Eurasian geopolitical arena. At the same time, Armenia’s reliance on Russia proved to be a strategic miscalculation. Moscow tolerated Turkish involvement and allowed the war to continue for forty-four days. When Russia finally intervened, it did so not to save Armenia but to impose its own terms. The Armenian leadership had neither the alliances nor the institutional capacity to manage such a complex confrontation.”
Your chapter in Defeat: Documenting the Karabagh War of 2020 is based on 35 interviews with political and military leaders. What did these interviews reveal about Armenia’s internal weaknesses?
“They revealed a profound leadership gap. After the 2018 revolution, a new political elite came to power—energetic and reformist, but inexperienced in matters of statecraft and national security. The previous leadership, for all its flaws, had decades of experience and strong informal control over the military and security institutions. When the new government replaced them, the institutions remained weak, but the informal networks that had previously compensated for this weakness disappeared. The result was a state apparatus unprepared for war. The interviews also exposed deep political polarisation. Instead of a sober, fact-based debate on national security, Armenia descended into mutual accusations of treason, foreign allegiance, and betrayal. This toxic environment prevented the formation of a coherent strategy.”
Some analysts argue that Armenia’s academic and political elites failed to understand the region’s broader geopolitical shifts. Do you agree?
“For decades, the South Caucasus was treated as part of the post-Soviet space, as if its history and dynamics were exclusively tied to Moscow. This was intellectually convenient but historically inaccurate. Armenia is deeply connected to the Middle East—culturally, historically, and geopolitically. The 2020 war demonstrated this clearly: Turkey and Israel were major actors, and Syrian fighters were deployed on the ground. Academia, policymakers, and even the public were unprepared for a conflict shaped by Middle Eastern and global power politics rather than by the familiar post-Soviet framework.”
How would you characterise the current domestic political climate in Armenia?
“It remains highly polarised. The government promotes what I call a policy of ‘political amnesia’, attempting to move past the defeat by focusing exclusively on the sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia. Meanwhile, the opposition—particularly groups aligned with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation—continues to frame national identity around Artsakh and the legacy of the Armenian Genocide. The result is a double-standard: the state seeks to silence or minimise discussion of the defeat, while society and the Diaspora continue to process trauma and loss. This polarisation prevents the country from conducting the honest, evidence-based assessment it desperately needs.”
You mentioned the government’s concept of “Real Armenia”. What is your assessment of this idea?
“‘Real Armenia’ is essentially an admission of defeat. It argues that Armenia must focus solely on its internationally recognised borders and abandon the political legacy of the Karabakh movement. However, it does not offer a genuine strategic vision. It does not explain why Armenia lost, what institutional reforms are necessary, or how the country can rebuild its security architecture. Armenia does not need a new ideology. It needs a clear-eyed analysis of its failures and a pragmatic plan for institutional modernisation.”
How has the Diaspora reacted to these developments?
“The Diaspora is diverse, but many communities—especially those influenced by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation—are in open conflict with the current government. They view the loss of Artsakh as a betrayal of the Armenian national cause. However, the Diaspora also faces a dilemma: how to advocate for Armenian interests without worsening the country’s already fragile geopolitical position. At present, neither the Diaspora nor the political elite in Yerevan has articulated a realistic strategy for the future.”
Given Armenia’s attempts to diversify its foreign policy, has the “triple challenge” now expanded to include Western actors as well?
“In a sense, yes. Armenia is attempting to reduce its dependence on Russia by engaging with the United States and the European Union. But this diversification introduces new complexities. The so‑called ‘Middle Corridor’—linking Europe to Asia through the South Caucasus—makes Armenia strategically relevant, but only as long as the war in Ukraine continues and Iran remains under sanctions. These conditions may change. Moreover, Russia may not remain the same Russia after the war in Ukraine. Its future orientation—expansionist or isolationist—is unknown. Armenia is therefore operating in a highly fluid environment, and it is dangerous to build strategy on a single scenario.”
What, in your view, must Armenia do to ensure its long-term survival as a sovereign state?
“Armenia must first understand what happened. Without a rigorous assessment of the causes of defeat—military, diplomatic, institutional—there can be no meaningful reform. Second, the state must modernise its institutions, especially in defence, diplomacy, and governance. Third, Armenia must pursue a balanced foreign policy, avoiding overdependence on any single actor. Finally, the political class must abandon ideological battles and focus on pragmatic solutions. Armenia’s survival depends not on rhetoric but on competence.”
This is the summary of the interview recorded via YouTube Live Streaming on 21 April 2026.
