Executive Summary

In 2026, the Eurasian maritime environment is experiencing significant instability because of the breakdown of emerging local tensions and disputes and the US-Israel conflict with Iran, affecting the Persian Gulf.

This report examines how hybrid warfare, rapid technological advancements, and geoeconomic competition intersect in six key maritime zones, offering strategic insights for those involved in sea-based activities.

While traditional naval strength continues to be vital in statecraft, asymmetric strategies, autonomous technologies, and “naval guerrilla warfare” have changed the risk profile of Eurasian maritime routes, demanding a move from institutional trust to transactional flexibility.

Key Takeaways

1. The Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz shows how non-state and middle-power actors can use maritime war-risk insurance to disrupt global energy markets, moving from grey-zone harassment to direct state-on-state conflict in the Persian Gulf.
2. The US withdrawal from its global maritime security role, adopting a unilateral “Donroe Doctrine,” has left a security void in Eurasia.
3. Drone swarms, AI maritime denial, and weaponized undersea infrastructure reduce naval deterrence, creating constant hybrid warfare.

Eurasia Maritime Geopolitical Risk

The Eurasian maritime region has shifted from a state of geopolitical disorder to one of overt conflict, driven by the breakdown of international standards and the US “Donroe Doctrine,” (or Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine) which favoured Western Hemisphere dominance over Eurasian stability.

The escalating conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran, which started on Saturday, 28 February 2026, caused the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and resulted in Tehran’s decision to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Despite Washington’s efforts to ensure regional maritime trade security, the conflict and Iranian strategy within the Persian Gulf significantly disrupted energy and logistics markets and affected the global economy and financial markets.

Reports can reclassify the risk assessment for critical chokepoints from “high” to “very high,” with some categorising it as “catastrophic.” This is because of the convergence of energy, military, and digital security concerns, which is precipitating a systemic breakdown in conventional maritime insurance markets and the extensive application of force majeure clauses.

The current energy crisis marks a critical turning point in technological divergence, with China’s dominance as an “electro-state” providing substantial leverage, while Western “petrostates” confront an energy shortfall.

The utilisation of Beijing’s advanced “electric stack” capabilities, encompassing autonomous UUVs and drone swarms, by regional players enables them to achieve maritime denial more affordably than conventional naval engagement, rendering the Persian Gulf a high-risk zone for conventional tanker transit.

Within this context, maritime stakeholders must manage a condition of persistent exigency, wherein the discernment of nuanced alterations in Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions and war risk surcharges serves as the sole defence against irreparable financial detriment amid a disintegrating international framework.

Black Sea

The Black Sea’s role has shifted from a supplementary transit route to a central point of contention within European security, now serving as a theatre for intense hybrid conflict between Russia and NATO-aligned interests.

In the wake of escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, Russia has amplified its “second front” activities by utilising drone strikes and the weaponisation of energy infrastructure. The intention is to weaken European resolve.

In reaction, NATO has assumed a considerably more risk-embracing stance, which includes the proactive interception of loitering munitions and performing high-intensity drills near disputed maritime zones. The spread of Russia’s “shadow fleet” (old, uninsured oil tankers that bypass price limits and pose severe environmental dangers) exacerbates this instability. These vessels have become prime targets for Ukrainian naval drones, even within proximity to Turkish-controlled waters, effectively turning commercial logistics into a legitimate theatre of irregular maritime conflict.

Turkey continues to exert its “Mavi Vatan” (Blue Homeland) doctrine, leveraging the 1936 Montreux Convention as a non-negotiable safeguard to prevent external naval dominance while balancing its NATO obligations with a pragmatic Russian partnership. Despite this, the significant value of the Sakarya gas field, holding over 700 billion cubic meters of reserves, has positioned Turkey’s underwater assets as a key focus for hybrid attacks and “infrastructure lawfare.”

During the rest of 2026, regional stability will depend on the successful execution of trilateral mine countermeasures and the security of new subsea green energy cables that link the Caucasus with mainland Europe. Within this fragmented structure, the continuous negotiation of autonomous strategic decisions supersedes institutional designs in a “contested strategic environment” where naval deterrence and disinformation hold equivalent importance.

Caspian Sea

By 2026, the Caspian Sea region has experienced a critical geopolitical pivot, characterised by the breakdown of historical Soviet-era reliance, leading to a multipolar contest for transcontinental trade routes.

Azerbaijan has solidified its role as a logistics hub, utilising its integrated production and transit infrastructure to establish the South Caucasus as a vital conduit connecting Europe and Central Asia. The Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), which has attracted significant Western capital seeking redundancy from sanctioned Russian routes, epitomises this shift.

Conversely, this westward reorientation has provoked considerable antagonism from Russia and Iran, entities striving to sustain regional preeminence through a “Gas Union” and the instrumentalisation of maintenance schedules for critical infrastructure to obstruct energy transit. Central to this new architecture is the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a US-led initiative signed that grants Washington a 74% majority ownership in a tolled transit zone through Armenia, signalling a direct challenge to the Russian-Iranian “Security Siloviki”.

Besides geopolitical and economic tensions, a severe environmental crisis that exacerbates maritime risks confronts the Caspian Sea. The sea level is currently declining by approximately 20 centimetres annually, a rate that has accelerated to record minimums in 2026, severely limiting ferry and tanker capacity and requiring constant, costly dredging at key ports like Kuryk and Anzali. The diminishing water levels pose a significant risk to the cooling infrastructure of essential thermal power facilities, including Iran’s Shahid Salimi plant, increasing the likelihood of widespread regional power outages to 65% annually.

In parallel, AIS tracking data validates an increase in “Dark Fleet” engagements between Turkmen, Russian and Iranian ports, implying that Tehran and Moscow are effectively leveraging covert gas-swap mechanisms to evade the disintegrating international sanctions regime.

Red Sea

By 2026, the Red Sea has become a model of “Transactional Maritime Security,” with the Houthi movement, Ansar Allah, progressing from a localised insurgency to a regional gatekeeper. Despite the fragile ceasefire of late 2025, Iranian allies might reactivate the blockade as part of their broader response to the 2026 conflict with Israel and the United States.

This “conditional truce” framework has collapsed, replaced by a regime of asymmetric maritime denial where safety is no longer a legal right under international norms, but a commodity negotiated through semi-state entities.

The economic toll remains devastating. The Suez Canal’s transit numbers have remained below their 2025 troughs, incurring losses of over $6 billion for Egypt’s treasury and causing that international shipping companies, including Maersk and the Gemini Cooperation, maintain the Cape of Good Hope route as their default operational path.

Technological proliferation has further eroded the efficacy of traditional naval deterrence. The Houthis are employing generative artificial intelligence and loitering munitions to enhance their drone swarm strategies, specifically targeting vessels with even slight past connections to Western interests, utilising antiquated public databases. This strategy of overwhelming with sheer quantity has compelled naval coalitions, such as Operation Prosperity Guardian, into a financially unviable defensive stance. Naval coalitions allocate substantial financial resources to deploy interceptors that counter economical, AI-supported Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs).

This crisis has fostered a strategic alliance between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. For example, Ethiopia’s economic stability now intrinsically links to Red Sea war-risk premiums. These premiums can rapidly increase following singular kinetic occurrences.

By 2026, the Red Sea will remain one of the most unstable economic hubs globally. This instability highlights how non-state actors in asymmetric warfare can artificially inflate worldwide freight charges. They achieve this by diverging from intrinsic market values through continuous, sophisticated technological interference.

Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf has effectively transformed into a maritime “Kill Zone” following the initiation of Iran’s Operation True Promise 4, signalling a definitive shift from grey-zone harassment to overt state-on-state kinetic warfare.

This shift has broadened the regional risk landscape to encompass a complete asymmetric maritime blockade, wherein the principal hazard has transitioned from unintentional escalation to a calculated strategy of maritime obstruction. Since 2 March 2026, commercial tanker traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz has seen a precipitous drop exceeding 90%. This development stems from the new Iranian leadership, under Mojtaba Khamenei, integrating the closure of the waterway into their strategic framework to mitigate pressure from Western powers and Israel.

The Iranian forces employed a strategy of naval interdiction, augmented by sophisticated technological countermeasures. By incorporating widespread GPS jamming and utilising “dark vessels” (unidentified assets that conceal their origin), Tehran has effectively hindered interception operations conducted by US-led naval coalitions.

The consequence is a catastrophic collapse of the insurance market. Global P&I clubs have effectively abrogated war-risk coverage for the area, rendering maritime transit prohibitively expensive for commercial operators. Direct military actions against GCC infrastructure also worsen the situation, and notable incidents occurred in Bahrain and the UAE. The destruction of desalination plants in these areas poses a significant risk to the water supply for over 62 million people.

Indian Ocean

In 2026, the Indian Ocean has become the strategic pivot of the 21^st century, acting as the main stage for the “Democratic Security Diamond” where India, Australia, Japan, and the United States are working together to counterbalance China’s increasing maritime influence.

Central to this competition is India’s decisive move toward strategic autonomy; the 2026 commissioning of the INS Varsha naval base provides a hardened, underground facility for nuclear submarines, granting India a credible second-strike capability and a direct counterweight to China’s Longpo base.

China’s response to this regional military buildup involves a twofold increase in its military exercises within the Indian Ocean Region, extending from the Gulf of Oman to the Mozambique Channel, alongside the establishment of trilateral naval drills with Russia and Iran to counter Western-led maritime principles.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has developed into a functional mini-lateral arrangement; however, it faces challenges such as Washington’s unilateral “America First” policy and New Delhi’s reluctance to commit to an overt anti-China coalition.

Considering this fragmented security architecture, bilateral relations have strengthened, notably between India and Australia, as they have unified their maritime commands to confront the escalating threats of cyber warfare and piracy.

With China’s naval expansion, the Indian Ocean is now the key theatre for competition regarding regulatory doctrines and global data transmission, which will shape the future of the Asian era.

Pacific Ocean

The Pacific Ocean remains the pre-eminent theatre of global maritime risk in 2026, as China’s assertive posture in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait systematically challenges the remnants of the rules-based regional order.

China has strategically transformed its considerable civilian fishing fleet into an undeclared naval instrument, utilising over 200,000 vessels for staged blockades and ambiguous coercive tactics. The aim is to incapacitate allied maritime forces without triggering a comprehensive war. Reinforcing this strategy are “cognitive warfare” and signal spoofing techniques, which involve the use of fraudulent AIS data to construct artificial vessel presences in Taiwanese ports, ultimately compromising the island’s maritime domain awareness and its capacity for threat perception.

Taipei regards the South China Sea as an indispensable artery, given that any impediment to passaging its 98% imported liquid natural gas (LNG) would be tantamount to an act of “energy decapitation,” possibly compelling political capitulation to the CCP.

A varied network of mini-lateral security frameworks, such as AUKUS, the Quad, and “the Squad,” has been formed to counter this revisionist expansion and ensure a credible “deterrence by denial” stance. In 2026, a significant achievement occurred within AUKUS Pillar I when the United Kingdom began rotating nuclear-powered submarines through HMAS Stirling, enhancing Australia’s capacity to host such vessels.

Concurrently, AUKUS Pillar II has expedited the deployment of asymmetric assets, such as the “Ghost Shark” autonomous undersea vehicles, which serve as an economical countermeasure to China’s naval modernisation efforts.

Even with unilateral “Donroe Doctrine” policy changes originating from Washington, the Indo-Pacific continues to be the primary focus. The struggle for control over undiscovered natural gas deposits and sophisticated tech supply chains will be the critical factor in determining global systemic risk by 2026.

Indicators to Monitor

• The ongoing US-Israel conflict with Iran, and Tehran’s persistent efforts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.
• Security and stability in the Red Sea, as the Houthis can increase their “maritime guerrilla warfare” against trade vessels and, therefore, increase insurance premiums.
• The increase in “flag hopping” by sanctioned oil tankers and the rise in ships with deactivated AIS transponders as evidence that maritime governance is weakening and regional supervision is failing.
• Environmental impact and the sea level in the Caspian Sea whose repercussion might affect maritime trade and operations.
• China’s military exercises in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean as a sign to regional and Western allies of Beijing’s willingness to use naval force in the area.
• The mobilisation of Western capital into TRIPP and TITR projects, weighed against unannounced maintenance outages or physical interference at Novorossiysk.

Outlook

Maritime geopolitical risk in Eurasia is expected to remain high or “under constant pressure” through the end of 2026.

Looking at the trajectory of 2026, the Eurasian maritime landscape is shifting from a rules-based order toward a “transactional security” model. With the US “Donroe Doctrine” emphasising dominance in the Western Hemisphere, Eurasia can face a security vacuum. A volatile mix of regional middle powers and non-state actors will likely fill this void, employing asymmetric “naval guerrilla” tactics.

The successful implementation of blockades by Iran and the Houthis implies that the age of assured “freedom of navigation” has effectively ended. In its place, a new paradigm has emerged wherein maritime passage is now considered a bargained-for commodity rather than an established legal right.

In the future, the growth of AI-powered drone swarms and “dark fleet” operations will make traditional naval deterrence prohibitively costly, requiring stakeholders to employ digital deception and agile “transactional flexibility” to manage the emergence of persistent maritime “Kill Zones.”

On the geoeconomic front, a systemic divergence between the struggling Western “petrostates” and China’s “electro-state” hegemony will define the rest of 2026. Given the disruptions in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, the global economy’s stability depends now on the swift development of alternative routes such as TRIPP and the Middle Corridor. However, the security apparatus of Russia and Iran, who use infrastructure lawfare to impede energy transit, confront these routes with a compounded existential risk. An escalating environmental crisis in the Caspian Sea also imperils the physical stability of regional ports, further endangering these routes.

The erosion of traditional insurance markets because of force majeure provisions will precipitate a significant change, prioritising autonomous supply chain proficiency and adaptability within a fragmenting global structure over established institutional reliance for maritime achievement.