Executive Summary
This report evaluates the feasibility of a Kurdish ground incursion from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq into north-western Iran in the context of escalating US-Israeli military pressure on Iranian security infrastructure.
It assesses the operational readiness of Kurdish armed groups, the geographic and logistical constraints of the theatre, and the broader regional dynamics that could shape such an intervention.
Key Takeaways
- Kurdish forces appear to be preparing for cross-border operations, while US-Israeli strikes degrade Iranian border security and police infrastructure.
- The Zagros terrain and limited entry routes make a large-scale invasion unlikely, favouring small-unit infiltration and insurgent tactics.
- Kurdish groups would likely play an auxiliary role, supporting disruption and reconnaissance rather than decisive conventional operations.
Information Background
Several media outlets have reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is working to arm Kurdish forces inside Iran and that Donald Trump called the Kurdish leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) personally after an Iranian drone strike on their camp in Northern Iraq.
In fact, on March 1-2, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched drone and missile strikes against the headquarters of the PDKI (in Koya and Erbil) and Komala (in Zargwez, Sulaymaniyah). These IRGC strikes may reflect Iranian concerns about force concentration near the border and potential cross-border activity.
Hassan Sharafi from the KDPI leadership team, said that they have prepared all war scenarios, and regarding the situation in Iran, they are ready to move in and play a leading role.
The US/Israeli goal is no longer just decapitation by air, but the physical dismantling of the Iranian government’s internal security apparatus to possibly allow opposition forces to hold territory.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has warned of “terrorist movements” at the border with Iraq, in a phone call with Bafel Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraq. In 2023, Tehran agreed with the Iraqi government, which obligated it to disarm the armed separatists in the regions of Iraq and Kurdistan, evacuate the military barracks they established, and relocate to the camps designated by the Iraqi government.
On 22 February 2026, five major Kurdish opposition groups in Iran declared the formation of a unified alliance (the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan – CPFIK), placing the overthrow of Iran’s ruling system at the top of their agenda. Included in the coalition are: the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), the PDKI, the Organisation of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (Khabat), and the Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan (led by Reza Kaabi).
After a few days, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (led by Abdullah Mohtadi) also joined the group. The Komala – Kurdistan Organisation of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI) remains outside the coalition. This alliance aims to coordinate political and organisational efforts against the Iranian government, asserting that the current system has lost its legitimacy. The announcement shows increased political coordination among factions that have historically operated independently.
On 2 March 2026, the newly formed Coalition released its first official statement, warning that Iran is entering a decisive phase and describing an accelerating collapse of the ruling system that could trigger a domino effect within the state structure.
The Kurdish Coalition issued a formal directive to security personnel in Iranian Kurdistan, urging immediate defection. By framing the choice as “joining the side of the nation”, the coalition sought to dismantle the regime’s local enforcement capacity from within. Crucially, their call to secure and preserve public institutions signals a transition from disruptive insurgency to territorial administration, showing that the coalition suggests an aspiration to assume civil governance in the event of a security vacuum.
Since the KRG is under pressure from Baghdad and Tehran to remain neutral, these parties have framed their mobilisation as “independent volunteers” or “civilian defence units” to give the official KRG government plausible deniability. On 28 February 2026, the KRG Interior Ministry issued a stern warning that the Kurdistan Region “will not allow” its territory to be used as a launchpad for operations against neighbours.
These parties have refused to disarm or relocate further from the border. Specifically, PAK officials stated on March 1 that they are “ready for any action in the coming days” despite the KRG’s official diplomatic caution.
The IRGC’s own targeting patterns and Araghchi’s words corroborate the information regarding the move toward staging areas.
Iranian geography
The geographic and strategic analysis of a ground operation from the Kurdistan Region (KRI) into Northwest Iran (the provinces of West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan) reveals a theatre of extreme difficulty. While airpower can decapitate leadership, a ground invasion must contend with the Zagros “fortress”—a natural defensive barrier that has thwarted invaders for millennia.
A ground operation from the Kurdistan Region (KRI) into Northwest Iran is, in fact, geographically possible for small-unit infiltration, but extremely challenging for sustained conventional operations. While the air campaign has softened the region, a ground invasion faces unique geographic and strategic hurdles.
The primary impediment is the Zagros Mountain Range, which acts as a massive natural wall between Iraq and the Iranian plateau. This is high-alpine warfare. Soldiers must deal with elevations exceeding 3.000 meters, and movement is restricted to narrow mountain passes (choke points).
Because of the rugged peaks, any invading force—whether Kurdish light infantry or mechanised units—is forced into predictable routes. This allows even a weakened Iranian force to use asymmetric ambushes and the high-ground advantage. In March, these passes are often still choked with snow and prone to mudslides. Logistics would likely be the most significant constraint on sustained operations.
There are only a few viable gates into western Iran. The northern axis will be the Haji Omran Pass (route: Erbil, Iraq -> Piranshahr, Iran), the most direct path to the West Azerbaijan plains. Recent strikes have targeted the Oshnavieh border guards to clear this.
There is the central axis, the Bashmaq Crossing (Sulaymaniyah, Iraq -> Marivan, Iran), ideal for Kurdish light infantry (Peshmerga/PJAK). Very rugged, perfect for guerrilla infiltration but bad for tanks. Lastly, there is the southern axis, Parvizkhan/Munziriyah (Garmian, Iraq -> Kermanshah, Iran), which leads to the Kermanshah plains. It is the most “mechanised-friendly” route but is heavily defended by the IRGC’s Nabi Akram Corps.
Field location of active groups
The Zargwez Sector (Southern Axis, Sulaymaniyah Province): Open-source reporting shows that Komala elements may be consolidating units in this area. Footage from March 3 shows fighters loading technical vehicles (pickups mounted with DShK machine guns) and preparing logistical supply lines. Reports confirm Iranian Shahed-136 drones targeted Komala headquarters here.
From a tactical perspective, this staging area is positioned to strike toward the Bashmaq-Marivan corridor. The recent targeting of the Marivan Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Headquarters and the Sanandaj LEC Headquarters by Israeli/US strikes helps to remove the first line of resistance for these units.
The Koya/Degala Sector (Northern Axis, Erbil Province): The PDKI unit is concentrated here, primarily based in the Azadi Camp, Zwi Spi, and the Degala/Dikla area of the Koya district. Koya Mayor Tariq Haydari confirms three drones and a missile hit Azadi Camp and Zwi Spi on March 3. PDKI spokesperson Aso Saleh and official Mustafa Hijri have issued statements urging Iranian soldiers to defect and stating that “everything is possible” if fighters are inside Iran.
Local reporting suggests increased personnel presence at the PDKI base in Koya, though scale and intent are difficult to independently assess. PDKI commander Mohammed Nazif Kader and spokesperson Aso Saleh confirmed that while their bases were hit, they are “preparing for the near future” and have already claimed limited operations inside Iran (targeting border bases and police stations).
These forces are aimed at the Haji Omran-Piranshahr entry point. This route provides the most direct access to parts of West Azerbaijan, though holding territory there would require capabilities beyond the current Kurdish force structure.
The Kirkuk-Erbil Corridor: The PAK has bases in Pirde (Altun Kupri) and Gomaspan (west of Erbil). Led by Hussein Yazdanpanah, the PAK is the most militarily active and has previously been trained by US forces during the anti-ISIS campaign. Their spokesperson, Khalil Nadri, confirmed on 1-2 March 2026 that their positions between Erbil and Duhok were struck by ballistic missiles and drones. They are the most vocal about a “unified command centre”. Their target entry is Pawa / Kermanshah.
The Qandil Mountains / Border Region: The PJAK has mobile positions in the Qandil Mountains and along the rugged border of West Azerbaijan. According to some Kurdish sources, PJAK has claimed limited cross-border activity inside Iran, consistent with its historical pattern of small-scale operations. They are generally considered the most battle-hardened for mountain guerrilla warfare. Their target entry is Oshnavieh / Kotol.
As for the entry points, the US/Israeli strikes on the LEC (Police) and Border Guard in Sanandaj, Marivan, and Piranshahr might be oriented to pave the way for a Kurdish advance by removing the specific units that guard those gates. President Trump has publicly stated he is not ruling out ground forces.
These groups try to exploit an asymmetric advantage: the fighters are not moving in large, armoured convoys that would be easy targets for any remaining Iranian air defences. Instead, they are operating in small unit tactics (SUT), moving in groups of 10–20 to maximise mobility in the Zagros mountains.
Reports from Erbil markets suggest a massive surge in the purchase of cold-weather gear, fuel, and medical supplies by these groups (besides civilians), confirming they are preparing for a sustained presence inside Iranian territory rather than just a hit-and-run raid.
Currently, these units appear to be in a holding pattern. It is unclear whether they are acting independently or expecting broader regional escalation. They might be waiting for a green light from Tel Aviv/Washington.
As of the last 24 hours, some Kurdish-aligned sources allege that small reconnaissance elements have crossed the border near Oshnavieh and Piranshahr. The IRGC has also reportedly been moving ground forces toward these border cities.
Strategic Assessment
The US/Israel is currently in the suppression of enemy air defences and security infrastructure destruction phase. They are targeting the LEC hubs in strategic locations, ensuring that in case the Kurds or allies cross, there is no organised police or paramilitary force to stop the initial surge. Indeed, the pattern of these strikes—targeting police and border regiments rather than just nuclear sites—seems to be shaping the environment for a ground movement.
While the intent to use Kurdish forces is highly probable, the execution remains the most fluid part of this intel. The formation of the CPFIK and the 2nd statement urging IRGC defections represents a coordinated psychological warfare.
Groups like PJAK and the PDKI have publicly claimed they are currently engaging Iranian security forces inside the border as of yesterday. It is impossible to know if there will be a full-scale division-level push across the border with Western assistance. However, these activities are consistent with the reconnaissance phase.
The regime change might transition from a high-altitude bombing campaign to a provincial insurrection model. By hitting provincial IRGC units, the US-Israeli coalition is trying to degrade the regime’s regional enforcement and retaliatory capabilities. The degradation of the Al-Hadid unit—a specialised Aerospace Force element based at Imam Ali Missile Base capable of devastating Kurdish staging areas with ballistic strikes—would be critical. In doing so, the coalition would effectively remove the primary obstacles to a Kurdish ground incursion.
Tel Aviv and Washington might seek to replicate the Syrian model, where local rebel groups (supported by outside airpower) did the heavy lifting on the ground, while strikes paralysed the central government, leading to the fall of Assad. Given the extensive infiltration of Iran by Mossad forces, they may have already performed limited ground operations within Iran, but this remains speculative. These are likely “pathfinder” missions—designating targets and establishing secure communication lines for the arriving Kurdish fighters.
Turkey views a Kurdish-led invasion of Iran as a precursor to a greater Kurdistan. Ankara may launch its own buffer zone operation (similar to Operation Castle of Claws launched in 2022) to prevent Kurdish forces from seizing the border (and establishing of a Kurdish corridor), effectively trapping the invasion between Iranian fire and Turkish blockades.
While the Kurdish population may welcome “liberators”, the region is an ethnic mosaic. In West Azerbaijan, there is a significant Azeri population that may be hostile to a Kurdish-led ground force, potentially leading to localised civil war in cities like Urmia or Khoy rather than a clean regime change.
Western border regions offer the most accessible terrain for armed opposition movements, though sustained territorial control would remain highly contested. Undoubtedly, it cannot be a “blitzkrieg”.
Moreover, the IRGC remnants are still capable of inflicting heavy losses on insurgents. Iran’s Defence has spent decades preparing for this exact scenario. Tehran has strategically decentralised command. On 3 March 2026, President Pezeshkian officially devolved power to provincial governors, allowing regional IRGC commands to continue operations even under degraded central coordination. Moreover, even after the damage at the LEC (Police) hubs, the IRGC Ground Forces (NEZSA)—specifically the Hamzeh Sayyid al-Shohada Base—are trained to fight without orders from Tehran.
The country has also hardened its infrastructure, building “missile cities” and command bunkers deep inside the Zagros rock. Air strikes can hit the surface, while the boots on the ground will still face IRGC units emerging from tunnels.
Conclusion
Iran retains interior lines, Basij mobilisation capacity, IRGC reserve brigades, aerospace missile deterrence, and deep logistics depth. A Kurdish incursion would likely resemble an escalated insurgency, not a structured invasion if not supported by the US or Israel.
Historically, Iranian Kurdish movements have rarely advanced explicit separatist claims. Their political platforms have generally focused on demands for greater administrative autonomy, cultural recognition, and enhanced political representation within the Iranian state. This raises a degree of uncertainty regarding how Iranian Kurdish communities might respond to any cross-border intervention carried out by Kurdish forces originating from Iraq.
It is also important to consider the precedent of the United States’ instrumental use of Kurdish actors in previous regional conflicts. Kurdish forces were placed at the forefront of the campaign against the Islamic State in both Syria and Iraq—an effort in which Tehran itself also played a significant role—only to later experience a sharp recalibration of US policy in Syria in favour of other regional arrangements. This historical pattern of strategic discontinuity in Washington’s alliances introduces additional risk for Kurdish actors contemplating deeper involvement in a confrontation with Iran, even if current dynamics suggest a degree of alignment encouraged by Israeli strategic interests.
From a strategic perspective, Iraqi Kurdish leadership would need to carefully evaluate the potential consequences of such engagement. Any Kurdish participation in operations against Iran would almost certainly trigger direct Iranian retaliation, exposing Kurdish territories in northern Iraq to significant security and economic pressure. At the same time, such a development could create further opportunities for Turkish strategic intervention, as Ankara has previously demonstrated its willingness to conduct cross-border military operations and establish de facto zones of control in northern Iraq under the pretext of countering Kurdish militant activity.
From a military perspective, Iraqi-based Kurdish armed groups could provide useful but limited contributions to any hypothetical ground operation against Iran. Their capabilities are best understood in terms of irregular warfare, reconnaissance, and localised disruption, rather than large-scale manoeuvre warfare. They maintain long-standing cross-border human networks, knowledge of terrain, smuggling routes, and mountain passes, and contacts among local Kurdish communities inside Iran.
In military terms, they could act as forward reconnaissance and pathfinder elements supporting a larger campaign. These groups are well suited for light-infantry infiltration operations; their operational doctrine emphasises hit-and-run tactics and trigger an internal insurgency environment. Alone they lack heavy weapons, air defence and operate with very shallow logistics depth. They are politically fragmented and have limited manpower.
In conclusion, without external help they are not able to invade Iran in a conventional military sense, capture large cities such as Urmia, Sanandaj, or Kermanshah, defeat IRGC brigades, hold territory against sustained counterattack, or operate in division-level manoeuvre warfare. Their role would be auxiliary and irregular, not decisive.
