Executive Summary

This report examines Russia’s readiness to assist Iran in suppressing the protests. It analyses the strategic partnership treaty between the two states and determines whether Moscow is obligated by the treaty to assist Tehran in the event of social unrest.

The report explores Russia’s challenge of backing Iran while sustaining positive relationships with Washington.

Key Points

1. The ongoing massive protests in Iran might lead to the undermining of the regime in Tehran, which is an unlikely situation for Russia.
2. The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and Iran contains only vague expressions on mutual assistance in case of social unrest and foreign interference.
3. Russia does not want to lose its gains in Ukraine for the sake of rescuing the Islamic regime. The possibility of Russia’s assistance to Iran by sending the security forces to suppress the protests is low.
4. Moscow’s assistance to Tehran, considering the potential intervention of the United States and Israel, depends on the potential for survival of the Islamic regime.

Background Information

Iran has entered 2026 with growing unrest on the streets that has already caused dozens of deaths and thousands of arrested protesters by Iranian security forces. The uprisings started in December 2025 because of the historical drop of the Iranian rial and surge in inflation.

Despite the merchants and shopkeepers (the so-called “bazaar”) being considered as the conservative supporters of the Ayatollah’s regime, at the moment they are the major force of the protesters that poses a serious threat to the incumbent elites. The mottos of the protests have shifted from calling to stabilise the currency and the prices to the “death to the dictator” (i.e., Ali Khamenei) and “death to the Islamic Republic”.

The international community has already reacted to the protests. Donald Trump has threatened Tehran with potential strikes if the Iranian security forces continue killing the protesters. China has immediately reacted, claiming that it is against any external interference in the protests. What will be the reaction of Russia? Will it interfere with the protests to save the allied regime in Tehran?

Analysis

In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, that could be used as a basis for Moscow’s interference in the protests. Article 2 of the treaty includes the Russia-Iran agreement to counter foreign interference in the internal affairs of the parties to the treaty.

Russia frequently perceives such upheavals as “color revolutions” sponsored by the West. Article 7.3 relates to the cooperation between the sides in maintaining public security. Although Iran could relate to these points in asking Russia for assistance, the treaty does not describe any obligatory means or mechanism by which Moscow should assist Tehran.

Russia made the vagueness in the most important parts of the treaty, which relate to security cooperation, on purpose to avoid direct confrontation with the United States because Moscow is busy with the conflict in Ukraine.

Moreover, the Kremlin is trying to play on the divisions between Washington and Brussels on the Ukraine conflict, while advancing its forces to occupy more territories in the Donbass region. Sending Russian security forces to assist the regime in Tehran, as Moscow did in Ukraine in 2014 and Kazakhstan in 2022, could provoke the Trump Administration to change its approach to the Ukraine conflict.

Russia faces a double dilemma:

1. Sending the available OMON security forces in Iran to suppress the protests could lead to undermining Trump’s current positive approach to Putin and the subsequent increase in the US assistance to Ukraine;
2. Abstaining from interference, relying on Iran’s security forces’ abilities to protect its own regime. If Russia were to abstain from intervention, this could contribute to the continuation of the peace negotiations between Moscow and the West on the Ukraine conflict and to the positive relationship between Putin and Trump.

Moscow’s abstention from sending the security forces to assist the Islamic regime could be a signal for Washington and Tel Aviv to use the current instability in Iran to overthrow the Islamic regime by military means.

The arrest of the Maduro couple in Venezuela thanks to the US military operation was a reputational blow for Putin. If such an event will repeat in Iran, Russia’s reaction will depend on whether the Iranian regime has a potential for survival:

1. If the Iranian regime will continue losing the ground to the protesters, Russia would not sacrifice its gains in Ukraine to protect the dying regime;
2. If Tehran shows success in suppressing the protests, Moscow will continue supplying military cargoes to the Islamic Republic to prepare it for a potential conflict against Washington and Tel Aviv. In any case, Moscow will provide the Ayatollah’s family and the regime’s top-tier political and military officials with shelter.

Conclusion

The ongoing protests in Iran pose a serious threat to the Islamic regime and the Axis of Upheaval. However, the probability of Russia’s assistance to Iran with security forces is low because it may threaten Moscow’s gains in Ukraine and the possibility of solving the conflict on the best terms for the Kremlin.

The analysis has also demonstrated that the strategic partnership treaty between Russia and Iran includes very vague expressions on mutual assistance in such cases, not putting any obligations on a specific mechanism. However, Russia’s military cargoes continue their flights to Iran, which shows Moscow’s readiness to assist Tehran in preparations to fight back against a potential military operation of the US and Israel against Iran.

OSINT teams should continue monitoring the protests in Iran and the military cargoes in the region to assess the subsequent development of the situation with the social unrest in Iran, the scale of the potential conflict between the US and Israel against Iran, and the scale of Russia’s military supplies to Iran considering this potential conflict.

Disclaimer: SpecialEurasia does not endorse or support the findings and conclusions presented in this report, which are solely attributed to the author. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the company.