Russia-Belarus Joint Military Exercise “Zapad-2025”: Intel Briefing

Russian President Vladimir Putin during Zapad-2025

Executive Summary

Russia and Belarus conducted the joint strategic exercise “Zapad-2025” from 12 to 16 September across 41 land and maritime training areas in both countries.

Around 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercise, which also involved up to 7,000 Belarusian soldiers and 10,000 pieces of military hardware.

The operation explicitly framed itself as a defensive measure to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union State, but it also incorporated high-intensity combat simulations, including the theoretical deployment of tactical nuclear capabilities and advanced missile systems.

Despite military observers from NATO nations and other allied countries at the military exercises, Zapad-2025 alarmed regional security, particularly from Poland and the easternmost members of NATO.

Key Takeaways

  1. “Zapad-2025” showcased the Russian-Belarusian capability to conduct large-scale, multi-domain operations, including potential nuclear deployments, signalling strategic deterrence to NATO.
  2. The presence of select foreign observers and high-level systems suggests a strategic calibration of openness and operational secrecy regarding core capacities.
  3. The exercises have heightened regional security tensions, prompting NATO’s eastern flank to reinforce defence postures and surveillance measures in response to perceived escalatory threats.

Facts

“Zapad-2025” represents the culminating stage of the annual joint training cycle for Russian and Belarusian forces. President Vladimir Putin attended the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod to observe operational manoeuvres and review weaponry and special equipment. The military conducted the exercises across multiple geographic directions, including the Arctic, and incorporated scenarios simulating large-scale aggression on the western strategic axis of the Union State.

Approximately 100,000 personnel were engaged, supported by 10,000 units of military equipment. Military contingents from Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, India, Iran, Congo, and Mali participated, along with observers from 23 countries, including NATO members Hungary, Turkey, and the United States. Belarus emphasised adherence to the OSCE Vienna Document, extending invitations to all 56 participating states.

Russian forces positioned Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems in Kaliningrad, which are equipped for nuclear strikes, and performed electronic missile launches that simulated operational readiness without physical missile launches. The exercises encompassed extensive command-and-control procedures, aerial and artillery attacks, unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance, and simulated casualty evacuation. The exercises included a situation where an adversary sought to destabilise a fictional allied state (”Polesye”), which was addressed by a joint Russian-Belarusian counter-operation.

The exercises occurred concurrently as increased NATO activity, including Poland’s Iron Defender drills with 30,000 participants and 600 pieces of equipment, and NATO’s Eastern Sentry patrol, which was launched in response to Russian drones entering Polish airspace.

Analysis

“Zapad-2025” demonstrates Russia and Belarus’ ability to integrate large-scale, multi-domain operations encompassing conventional, aerial, and potential nuclear capabilities. The deployment of advanced systems like the Iskander-M in Kaliningrad, alongside electronic launch simulations, highlights a strategic communication strategy aimed at NATO and nearby rivals. The exercise, which depicted a hostile force destabilising allied land, demonstrates Russia’s ongoing focus on swift, pre-emptive tactics in the West.

The deliberate involvement of foreign observers, including NATO members, seems intended to project transparency while preserving strategic ambiguity regarding nuclear and high-impact systems.

The presence of US military representatives, despite the absence of an operational US embassy in Minsk, suggests tentative engagement aimed at stabilising bilateral relations amid ongoing sanctions adjustments.

Poland’s actions, alongside NATO Eastern Sentry program, demonstrate an increased vigilance regarding potential threats, signifying a wider adjustment in Eastern European security measures.

Implications

  • Possible acceleration of military modernisation and operational integration within the Union State, increasing Russian-Belarusian rapid deployment capabilities.
  • Increased regional tensions and arms posturing along NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in Poland and the Baltic States.
  • Increasing of Russia’s strategic communication regarding non-strategic nuclear readiness and deployment flexibility.
  • Opportunity for diplomatic engagement between NATO members and Belarus to mitigate misinterpretation of exercises as aggressive intent.
  • Reinforcement of the NATO eastern flank defence posture and surveillance measures in response to perceived airspace and border violations.

Conclusion

“Zapad-2025” constitutes a high-profile demonstration of Russian-Belarusian operational capacity, combining conventional and nuclear-capable forces in multi-domain exercises.

Although presented as defensive, the scenario’s design and the deployment of equipment suggest wider strategic objectives, focused on regional deterrence and communication with NATO. The exercises are likely to sustain heightened alertness along NATO’s eastern borders and may prompt further military and diplomatic adjustments.

Ongoing strategic observation of Union State training sessions, nuclear deployment dynamics, and NATO reactions is vital for evaluating sustained regional stability.


*Cover image: Vladimir Putin inspected the weapons, military, and special equipment participating in the Zapad-2025 exercise. (Photo: Mikhail Metzel, TASS – Credits: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International – President of Russia)

Written by

  • Giuliano Bifolchi

    SpecialEurasia Co-Founder & Research Manager. He has vast experience in Intelligence analysis, geopolitics, security, conflict management, and ethnic minorities. He holds a PhD in Islamic history from the University of Rome Tor Vergata, a master’s degree in Peacebuilding Management and International Relations from Pontifical University San Bonaventura, and a master’s degree in History from the University of Rome Tor Vergata. As an Intelligence analyst and political risk advisor, he has organised working visits and official missions in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, and the post-Soviet space and has supported the decision-making process of private and public institutions writing reports and risk assessments. Previously, he founded and directed ASRIE Analytica. He has written several academic papers on geopolitics, conflicts, and jihadist propaganda. He is the author of the books Geopolitical del Caucaso russo. Gli interessi del Cremlino e degli attori stranieri nelle dinamiche locali nordcaucasiche (Sandro Teti Editore 2020) and Storia del Caucaso del Nord tra presenza russa, Islam e terrorismo (Anteo Edizioni 2022). He was also the co-author of the book Conflitto in Ucraina: rischio geopolitico, propaganda jihadista e minaccia per l’Europa (Enigma Edizioni). He speaks Italian, English, Russian, Spanish and Arabic.

    Read the author's reports

Get Your Custom Insights

Need in-depth geopolitical, security, and risk analysis of Eurasian countries and regions?
Our custom reports and consulting services provide tailored insights.
Contact us at info@specialeurasia.com for more information!

Online Course "Geopolitical Intelligence Analysis"_November 2025

22 November 2025 – Online Course Geopolitical Intelligene Analysis

This course represents a practical step for professionals aiming to refine their analytical discipline in a rapidly shifting global environment.

SpecialEurasia Training Courses 1-to-1 Formula