The Enduring Doctrine: Reflections on the Foreign Policy Legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei

Ali Khamenei and Iranian Foreign Policy_SpecialEurasia

Executive Intelligence Snapshot

This report intends to analyse the enduring political and strategic legacy of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei by examining how his institutionalised worldview has permeated the state doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It demonstrates that his strategic framework has transcended the influence of a single individual, solidifying into a permanent institutional culture that will continue to govern the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and national security paradigms.

Context

Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei assumed the supreme leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1989, succeeding the founder of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and subsequently directing the geopolitical vector of the state for over three decades.

On 28 February 2026, as part of a series of airstrikes aimed at high-ranking Iranian officials, Israel killed Ali Khamenei in Tehran.

On 3 July 2026, Iran commenced several days of official public mourning as the body of the late Supreme Leader lay in state at Tehran’s Grand Mosalla Mosque, ahead of his scheduled burial in Mashhad next Thursday. Iranian authorities estimate that between 12 and 20 million people will attend the funeral ceremonies.

These events take place against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire between Tehran and Washington, following a preliminary agreement aimed at halting the hostilities that erupted after the US-Israeli strikes in February 2026.

Analysis

In the history of nations, individuals sometimes transcend their own eras to become an integral part of a country’s strategic memory. In such cases, evaluating them is not merely passing judgment on the record of a ruler, but rather an attempt to comprehend a school of thought that has permeated the political institutions, decision-making culture, and a nation’s perception of the external world.

The martyrdom of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei belongs to this very category. The answer to the question of what the Islamic Republic of Iran will do in his absence is directly linked to another question: to what extent the doctrine that Ayatollah Khamenei has formulated and institutionalised over three decades has transcended the will of a single individual and evolved into the strategic thinking of the Islamic Republic.

In conventional international relations literature, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic is often interpreted through the lens of ideology, as if all of Tehran’s decisions can be explained solely by referencing the slogans of the Islamic Revolution. While this narrative captures a fragment of reality, it falls short of explaining the logic behind Iran’s foreign policy. Policy, as the long-standing tradition of Persian political thought testifies, has always been the product of the relationship between ideals and pragmatism.

From Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasatnama (The Book of Government) to the reflections of contemporary thinkers, the survival of the state, the preservation of authority, and the safeguarding of independence have been deemed the primary conditions for realising any grand ideal. In this sense, the legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei should be sought not in the clash between idealism and realism, but in the endeavour to synthesise the two.

His strategic worldview was anchored in a fundamental premise: the international system remains an arena of unequal distribution of power, and states live under the shadow of the balance of power before they live under the shadow of legal frameworks. From this perspective, security is not a gift bestowed by great powers upon others; security is the product of a nation’s capacity to safeguard its own independence. This understanding was not merely an abstract international relations theory but arose from Iran’s historical experience—a country that, over the past two centuries, has repeatedly paid the price of weakness, dependency, and foreign intervention, viewing independence not as an abstract concept, but as historical capital.

Consequently, the concept of “independence” in Ayatollah Khamenei’s thought was more than a political slogan; it was the backbone of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy under his rule. Independence meant the right to make decisions freely on national issues, without the will of external powers overriding the will of the nation. It was on the basis of this understanding that the development of defence capabilities, self-reliance in strategic industries, investment in indigenous technologies, and the reinforcement of deterrence became indispensable components of national strategy. In this logic, a country that abdicates its means of self-defence to others will sooner or later surrender its political decision-making power as well.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s mistrust of the United States is also explainable within this framework. Rather than stemming from temporary hostilities, this mistrust was rooted in a reading of great power behaviour, where international politics is organised around interests and the balance of power rather than trust. From this perspective, negotiation was never rejected, but it only held value when conducted from a position of strength. Diplomacy, in this framework, was not an alternative to power but an extension of it—just as Persian statecraft has traditionally held that a lasting peace is only established when backed by authority.

The Islamic Republic’s nuclear dossier was the clearest manifestation of this outlook. Accepting dialogue and agreement did not mean abandoning the components of power. On the contrary, the premise was that political agreements, no matter how significant, cannot substitute for deterrence. Therefore, even during the years of active diplomacy, the development of the country’s defence capabilities was pursued with equal vigour. This synchrony stemmed from the belief that while agreements are subject to political shifts, national power is the only safeguard whose longevity remains entirely in the hands of the nation itself.

Within this same framework, the Islamic Republic’s regional policy also gains meaning. What was perceived from the outside merely as the expansion of Iranian influence was, in the strategic logic of the Islamic Republic, the creation of “strategic depth” for a country situated in one of the world’s most turbulent regions. Supporting the Axis of Resistance, forging alliances with aligned forces, and striving to prevent threats from establishing themselves near Iran’s borders were components of a policy aimed at raising the cost of any aggression against the country.

Undoubtedly, there are differing views regarding the consequences of this strategy. Some see it as a factor elevating Iran’s geopolitical standing, while others emphasise its economic and political costs. Yet, irrespective of these judgments, it is difficult to overlook the role of this policy in reshaping the security dynamics of the region.

Another prominent feature of Ayatollah Khamenei’s strategic thinking was his attention to the gradual transformation of the global order. Years before speaking of a “post-Western world” became commonplace in international relations literature, he emphasised the gradual end of the monopoly of power and the movement of the global system toward more multipolar arrangements.

Accordingly, the policy of expanding relations with Asian powers, developing regional cooperation, and diversifying international partners was pursued. Of course, this policy was not immune to the constraints of the real world, as no power, whether in the East or the West, sacrifices its national interests for another. However, the core strategy was to reduce reliance on a single pole and increase Iran’s room for manoeuvre in the international arena.

Nonetheless, evaluating any strategic doctrine is not possible solely by counting gains or costs. During Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership, Tehran managed to raise its deterrent capacity to a level where direct military threats against the country involve far more complex calculations than in the past. Concurrently, the Iranian economy faced extensive sanctions, financial constraints, and difficulties in interacting with the global economy. These two realities must be viewed alongside one another, rather than against each other; for foreign policy is not the art of choosing between easy options, but of navigating through hardships.

Perhaps the most significant legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei lies not in any single decision, but in the institutionalisation of a certain “strategic culture”, a culture that prioritises independence over dependence, regards deterrence as the prerequisite for peace, and views diplomacy as effective only when backed by national power. This culture is tied less to an individual and more to Iran’s historical experience, its geopolitical position, and the political elite’s perception of the international environment.

For this reason, the martyrdom of Ayatollah Khamenei will not mark the end of the doctrine he formulated and institutionalised in foreign policy over many years. Strategies, when linked with a nation’s geography, history, and security memory, outlive their architects. If so, the primary legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei is not a collection of temporary decisions, but the consolidation of an understanding of foreign policy in which independence, authority, and deterrence constitute the three pillars of Iran’s national security—an understanding that will likely remain one of the most vital foundations for thinking about the Islamic Republic’s place in the future world order.

Conclusion

The strategic framework consolidated during the tenure of Ayatollah Khamenei represents a calculated synthesis of revolutionary ideology and pragmatic realism, aligning modern state preservation with traditional tenets of Persian political thought. By institutionalising the concepts of comprehensive self-reliance, robust military deterrence, and regional strategic depth, his administration systematically reduced vulnerabilities to external pressure and restructured the security dynamics of the Middle East.

While this uncompromising pursuit of sovereign independence generated profound economic complications and systemic isolation through international sanctions, it simultaneously advanced Iran’s defensive capabilities to a threshold that severely complicates external military calculations.

Ultimately, the defining characteristic of his three-decade rule is the successful transmission of an individual strategic vision into a resilient, self-perpetuating institutional culture. This established strategic memory ensures that the core pillars of Iranian foreign policy (principally the distrust of unilateral international frameworks, the reliance on asymmetric alliances, and the prioritisation of absolute authority) will persist as the foundational baseline for the state, remaining insulated from upcoming leadership transitions and domestic realignments.


Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and terminology expressed in this report are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official stance, policy, or editorial position of SpecialEurasia.

Written by

  • Abed Akbari

    Deputy at the Strategic Directorate of the Iranian Presidency. He earned his PhD in History and Political Sciences from Shiraz University and previously served as a lecturer at Allameh Tabataba’i University (ATU) in Tehran. His broad research interests include international security studies, European studies, and Iran-Europe relations. 

    Read the author's reports

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