Executive Summary
Russia’s engagement with Iran, as reflected in the St Petersburg meeting, demonstrates a deepening strategic partnership centred on intelligence sharing, military‑technical integration, and long-term geopolitical coordination rather than immediate battlefield intervention.
The Kremlin’s restrained posture in the Persian Gulf conflict reflects a calculated effort to preserve its mediator role, manage regional instability to its advantage, and strengthen Iran’s resilience while advancing a broader Eurasian strategic architecture.
Key Takeaways
- The presence of GRU chief Igor Kostyukov and advisor Yuri Ushakov at the Russia-Iran meeting signifies that the partnership has moved into high-level intelligence sharing, technical-military coordination, and “big picture” strategic deals that bypass traditional ministerial channels.
- Russia’s military non-intervention is a calculated move to preserve its role as a regional mediator while allowing the conflict to deplete US resources and divert Western attention away from the Ukrainian theatre.
- The relationship is a specialized exchange where Russia provides military-space integration (satellite launches and reconnaissance) and diplomatic legitimacy, while Iran provides operational experience in asymmetric warfare, drone technology, and sanctions.
Information Background
On 27 April 2026, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, in the context of ongoing negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement with the United States on a lasting settlement in the Persian Gulf.
The Iranian delegation included Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi and Iran’s Ambassador to Moscow, Kazem Jalali. The Russian side was represented by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Presidential Aide for Foreign Policy Yuri Ushakov, and Igor Kostyukov, head of Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia was prepared to offer goodwill or mediation services acceptable to all parties in future negotiations concerning a settlement with Iran. In parallel, the Iranian Foreign Minister emphasised that recent developments demonstrated that Iran maintains strong partnerships, including with Russia, and expressed appreciation for Moscow’s support.
On 17 January 2025, Moscow and Tehran signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which entered into force on 2 October 2025. This agreement provides the legal framework for bilateral cooperation across multiple domains, including political, economic, technological, and security fields.
The treaty does not constitute a formal mutual defence pact and does not obligate Russia to provide military assistance in the event of a conflict involving Iran
Russian strategic behaviour indicates that Moscow does not engage in military intervention on behalf of partners unless its core national interests are directly threatened, such as the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the safety of its citizens, or the survival of states hosting Russian military assets. Accordingly, expectations of a comprehensive Russian air defence guarantee for Iran have not been supported by official Russian commitments.
Analysis
On the background of the latest US/Israeli attack on Iran that erupted in a war, Western media often highlighted Moscow’s inaction, treating it as a loss of reputation in front not only on Iran, but of the global south allies it is trying to attract, demonstrating that the Kremlin is not a reliable partner, let alone a security provider. The reality behind Russia’s so-called ‘inaction’ might be more layered.
While the Western decision-makers often react to the news cycle, pursuing with their strategies more immediate results, the Kremlin usually has a different geopolitical planning horizon. Specifically, it applies the so-called strategic patience (strategicheskoye terpeniye), calculating in cycles of decades.
Composition of Delegations and Strategic Significance
The composition of the meeting suggests implications that extend beyond the official post-meeting statements.
The presence of the Head of the Russian Military Intelligence Service, Igor Kostyukov, and Presidential Aide for Foreign Policy Yuri Ushakov in discussions with Abbas Araghchi indicates that the meeting was not limited to diplomatic engagement or delaying negotiations. Rather, it points to discussions concerning the evolving strategic landscape of the Middle East and matters of operational coordination.
In Russian political practice, the participation of the head of military intelligence in such meetings is atypical for purely diplomatic exchanges. Kostyukov’s attendance indicates a focus on technical-military cooperation and intelligence-related matters, suggesting that bilateral interaction has extended beyond political support to include active intelligence-sharing.
The joint technical cooperation is not new. Russia’s requirement for Iranian production capabilities, particularly for variants of Shahed unmanned aerial systems and ballistic missiles, remains significant in sustaining operational tempo in Ukraine. Evidence of this reliance is reflected in the development of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, where Russia has shifted from importing finished systems to establishing domestic production facilities based on Iranian designs.
In exchange, Iran has likely received forms of support that do not directly reduce Russian strategic stockpiles, including satellite reconnaissance and advanced electronic warfare capabilities.
Beyond material support, Russia can provide a valuable asset: its operational experience derived from the conflict in Ukraine, where multiple Western intelligence services have been actively engaged. This experience complements Iran’s longstanding asymmetric defence strategy, which has been shaped by observations of Western military operations in the Middle East
Yuri Ushakov’s presence is also notable. As a senior strategic advisor to President Putin on non-Western affairs, he plays a central role in coordinating Russia’s engagement with multilateral frameworks such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. His involvement indicates that the discussions extended to broader strategic arrangements that transcend conventional diplomatic channels and ministerial structures.
He has surpassed Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in influence, becoming Russia’s most prominent foreign policy advisor. Ushakov handles the “big picture” deals that bypass standard ministries. His role is specifically to manage the last mile of major international agreements.
Accordingly, his participation suggests that the meeting addressed not only immediate developments but also longer-term geopolitical arrangements, including Iran’s integration into alternative economic and security frameworks that could mitigate the impact of Western sanctions.
The presence of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov provides diplomatic legitimacy and reflects Russia’s broader positioning toward the Global South. His role is consistent with efforts to shape international narratives, particularly within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, and to counter attempts to isolate Iran diplomatically. While the West tries to paint Iran as a “rogue state,” Lavrov’s job is to frame the US/Israeli strikes as unprovoked aggression.
He is contributing to the construction of a diplomatic framework aimed at preventing the formation of a unified coalition against Iran. By maintaining a visible alignment with Araghchi, Lavrov conveys to key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, that Russia positions itself as a credible mediator capable of containing the conflict and preventing its escalation into critical energy-producing regions.
The presence of Araghchi is also significant. He is both a veteran of the Iran–Iraq War and a survivor of the long chain of assassinations that have decapitated the leadership of the Islamic Republic. He is an experienced negotiator, capable of operating across both political and military domains.
In contrast to more ideologically driven figures, Araghchi’s selection reflects his capacity to engage in pragmatic, power-oriented dialogue.
The Iranian Foreign Minister also conveyed a personal message from Mojtaba Khamenei to President Putin, which indicates that the meeting extended beyond a conventional ministerial exchange and approached the level of direct state-to-state communication.
Furthermore, the involvement of Russian military representatives shows that the discussions were not limited to political dialogue but also included interaction between Russian military intelligence structures and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The deaths of key Iranian figures, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, as well as other senior officials such as former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, have altered the structure of Iran’s established external engagements with Russia. The transition of authority to Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Khamenei represents a critical shift currently under evaluation. Reports that Araghchi conveyed a direct message from Mojtaba Khamenei to President Putin indicate that bilateral relations are being managed at the highest possible level of secrecy, bypassing even the normal Iranian Foreign Ministry channels.
Russia’s Strategic Posture in the Context of the Persian Gulf Conflict
Moscow appears to have applied a principle of managed instability to the conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Kremlin’s interests do not align with either a decisive Iranian victory, which could trigger a regional nuclear conflagration, nor with an Iranian collapse. Rather, its strategic objective lies in the gradual depletion of Washington’s resources and the diversion of its attention away from the Ukrainian theatre.
Within this framework, each deployment of US military assets to the Persian Gulf represents a corresponding reduction in resources available for operations in Ukraine. By refraining from direct kinetic involvement, Russia contributes to prolonging US engagement in the region, while maintaining its primary focus on operations in Ukraine and the consolidation of its positions in the Donbas.
Notably, Washington and Tel Aviv’s actions have also significantly affected Russian interests in the region. Iran, and particularly its ports, constitutes a critical component of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which Moscow has sought to integrate into a broader Eurasian network of trade and connectivity, including the economies of the Gulf monarchies, as part of its strategic reorientation away from the West.
However, while physical infrastructure can be reconstructed, strategic autonomy is less easily restored. Despite damage to port facilities, the geopolitical importance of the INSTC has increased. As a result, Tehran’s dependence on Russia as a principal northern gateway has likely intensified.
By avoiding over-extension through direct kinetic involvement, the Kremlin preserves its position as a mediator. At present, it remains one of the few actors capable of maintaining simultaneous channels of communication with Tehran, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv. Other actors face constraints in this regard, including Turkey, due to its current diplomatic tensions with Israel, and the European Union, due to its perceived alignment with Israeli positions and prior support for actions targeting Iran. China, for its part, is reportedly encouraging Pakistan to assume a mediating role between the United States and the Islamic Republic.
From a Western perspective, the absence of direct Russian military intervention may be interpreted as a failure to defend a regional partner. However, this assessment does not fully account for indirect or asymmetric forms of support. Although not officially confirmed, indications of intelligence-sharing suggest a form of assistance aimed at strengthening Iran’s deterrence and defensive capabilities. In this context, the presence of Kostyukov at the St. Petersburg meeting may indicate the provision of intelligence support, including satellite reconnaissance and signals intelligence, addressing existing capability gaps on the Iranian side.
At the same time, Moscow appears intent on avoiding entanglement in a proxy conflict. Direct involvement could have risked legitimising the formation of a broader international coalition against Iran, while also straining Russia’s relations with key Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Russia’s approach instead appears oriented toward integrating Tehran into multilateral frameworks such as BRICS+, while positioning it as a state victim of external attacks by the West. By operating primarily through diplomatic mechanisms, including the United Nations, the Kremlin has preserved its relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Both of these nations are covertly pleased with Iran’s diminished influence but are keen to prevent further escalation and avert a broader regional conflict.
Another relevant aspect is that the Iranian leadership did not publicly criticise Russia for its lack of direct intervention, suggesting a level of prior coordination. Tehran appears to have obtained the forms of support it considered essential, namely technical-military cooperation and strategic depth, rather than direct military involvement.
By analogy, Russia and Iran may be seen as pursuing a calculated and incremental approach, in contrast to more coercive strategies employed by Western actors. Within this perspective, while the Kremlin may have incurred some reputational cost among segments of the Global South, it has preserved its strategic resources and flexibility for longer-term objectives.
In contrast, the United States appears to be experiencing a gradual erosion of both prestige and resources under the Trump administration, as it continues to uphold a rapidly shifting international status quo. Recent critics by Chancellor Friedrich Merz to the US would have been highly unlikely only a year earlier, while the Trump presidency has contributed to growing friction with European partners, which are increasingly moving toward independent reorganisation, particularly amid perceptions of reduced US commitment to NATO.
In this context, Moscow’s approach appears less proactive and more observant, effectively awaiting the unfolding of structural changes within the international system. Narratives concerning Western double standards have also gained traction, particularly in light of perceived inconsistencies in responses to conflicts such as Gaza and Nagorno-Karabakh compared to Ukraine. Statements by a senior Canadian official suggesting that international law has a structural bias have further contributed to this perception, reinforcing arguments commonly associated with Russian discourse.
The war in the Persian Gulf has helped create a rupture in the largely negative narrative constructed over years of information warfare surrounding Iran, thanks also to an updated communication strategy exploited by the new Iranian generations. At the same time, Russia has expanded its gas exports to Europe.
A prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or the imposition of transit fees, could increase pressure on European decision-makers to reconsider increased reliance on competitively priced Russian gas supplies.
Why Russia Was Engaged Prior to China
While China is likely to become the principal sponsor of reconstruction efforts in the longer term, Russia is currently operationally more critical for Iran’s resistance in a war of attrition. In this context, whereas a decisive victory for Washington would require the complete collapse of Iran, for Tehran victory is defined primarily by endurance. Accordingly, both China and Russia have focused less on providing offensive capabilities and more on defensive systems such as radar networks, satellite reconnaissance, and electronic warfare jamming technologies.
Russia was chosen as the first diplomatic destination rather than China because the Kremlin provides capabilities that Beijing has historically been reluctant to fully extend, particularly in the domain of military-space integration. The key distinction lies between technological utilisation and system-level integration. Iran may utilise Chinese technologies, but with Russia it is increasingly integrating into military systems architecture.
Since late 2025, Moscow has reportedly been responsible for launching several Iranian satellites, including Pars-1, Kanopus-V, Kowsar, and Nahid-2, using Soyuz launch vehicles. In exchange, Russia gains access to Iranian drone-control algorithms and opportunities to test electronic warfare systems against Western-origin platforms in an active operational environment (the Middle East), with potential application to the Ukrainian theatre.
While Iran’s most significant contribution to China is related to energy supplies and transport infrastructure, its contribution to Russia also includes exposure to alternative financial and logistical systems. Both states are reportedly exploring interoperability between Iran’s Shetab banking system and Russia’s MIR payment network. Iran also brings extensive experience in sanctions management and barter-based oil trade structures.
In this configuration, Russia may be characterised primarily as the provider of military and diplomatic leverage, while Iran functions as a source of operational knowledge on sustained economic and financial resilience under conditions of prolonged Western sanctions.
Long-Term Orientation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
To understand the discussions between Araghchi and Putin in St. Petersburg, it is necessary to move beyond a narrow “drones-for-radar” interpretation. While unmanned systems and defensive equipment are relevant at the tactical level, the broader framework of Iran–Russia coordination operates on an existential geopolitical scale. The objective is not limited to trade, but extends to the construction of a more resilient Eurasian system designed to reduce vulnerability to Western naval pressure and sanctions mechanisms.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty functions as a long-term strategic roadmap rather than a purely declaratory document, outlining cooperation over a multi-decade horizon. Within this context, in the event of strikes on Iranian infrastructure, Russia’s role would be positioned not as a security actor but as a potential reconstruction partner.
A similar logic applies to cooperation in the nuclear energy sector. Russia is involved in the supervision and development of Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, including plans for significant expansion of nuclear energy capacity, with the objective of reaching approximately 20 GWe. Through participation in the construction of multiple reactor units, Russia maintains a degree of oversight over Iran’s nuclear development, consistent with its generally cautious approach toward nuclear proliferation in regions close to its borders, including in relation to partner states.
Another central element of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, supported by the legal framework of the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, concerns the strategic character of the Caspian region. The Convention establishes that military presence in the Caspian Sea is limited to the five littoral states, prohibiting external military forces. This arrangement effectively consolidates the Caspian as an exclusive regional zone of control for bordering states, facilitating secure transport routes between Russia and Iran for strategic goods and reducing exposure to external naval influence, including that of NATO.
Finally, since Russia’s engagement with Iran includes cooperation on legal and institutional frameworks governing strategic waterways, concepts of regulated or conditional passage in the Strait of Hormuz might lead to a similar legal logic elsewhere. If successfully established in the Gulf context, it could have implications for other strategic regions, including the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic.
Conclusion
Within the Kremlin’s internal structure, high-level meetings are not symbolic. The presence of key institutions such as the GRU indicates that discussions extend beyond diplomacy to include intelligence cooperation and operationally relevant assessments, including battlefield intelligence and satellite-derived information.
Strategically, the conflict also serves to divert Western resources and attention, while providing indirect operational benefits in terms of experience and pressure dispersion across multiple theatres. At the same time, Russia’s non-intervention preserves its role as a potential mediator in any future settlement, avoiding escalation that could draw it into a broader confrontation.
Overall, Moscow’s approach combines restraint with strategic engagement, balancing regional instability with long-term geopolitical positioning.
