Executive Summary

This report assesses the strategic implications of an Iranian-proposed ten-point framework within the context of United States crisis management, characterised by a calibrated balance between escalation and negotiation.

It argues that the current dynamic redistributes both strategic and economic costs to Eurasian actors while preserving American leverage and regional fragmentation.

Key Takeaways

• The United States is deliberately sustaining a controlled level of instability to preserve strategic flexibility while preventing a stable Middle Eastern and Eurasian order.
• Economic and security costs generated by Middle Eastern tensions are strategically externalised onto Eurasian actors, particularly Europe and Asia.
• The current de-escalation phase might be temporary, with structural distrust, Israeli autonomy, and systemic volatility limiting the durability of any agreement.

Information Background

Multiple versions of a purported Iranian ten-point proposal are currently circulating in open sources, with no definitive confirmation of a single authoritative text. Despite this ambiguity, the United States has reportedly accepted such a framework as a preliminary basis for negotiations. The programme appears to encompass the following core elements:

1. The Strait of Hormuz to be reopened “under the co-ordination of the armed forces of Iran”.
2. The war against “all components” of Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance to end.
3. US forces to withdraw from “all bases and points of deployment within the region”.
4. The establishment of a “secure transit protocol” in the Strait of Hormuz.
5. The full payment of compensation to Iran.
6. The lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions, as well as the resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and the Security Council.
7. The release of all frozen Iranian assets and properties abroad.
8. Acceptance of uranium enrichment.
9. Proposal to levy a $2 million transit fee per vessel passing through the Strait of Hormuz; proceeds would be shared with Oman and earmarked for reconstruction efforts.
10. Recognition of Iranian regional security interests.

These points should be treated as indicative rather than definitive, given the lack of a verified official document.

Analysis

The United States appears to be managing the international system through a deliberate combination of tension and negotiation, rather than pursuing definitive resolution. This approach enables Washington to maintain flexibility while strategically preventing the emergence of a stable and autonomous regional order in the Middle East and Eurasia.

A central outcome of this strategy is the deliberate disruption of regional equilibrium. The instability generated across the Middle East does not translate into proportional costs for the United States itself. Instead, these costs are effectively transferred onto external actors, particularly across Eurasia.

The securitisation of maritime routes, especially in the Strait of Hormuz, introduces transit fees, increasing insurance premiums, and energy costs that are ultimately borne by European and Asian economies. In this sense, the material consequences of regional destabilisation are externalised, allowing the United States to achieve a strategic advantage while shifting the economic burden onto others.

The question of who benefits from the current framework remains intentionally ambiguous. Both Washington and Tehran present the developing arrangement as a success. Interpretations that portray the United States as weakened due to domestic political pressures on Donald Trump are not supported by historical precedent.

US political leadership has repeatedly demonstrated resilience in the face of internal controversies, and such dynamics do not necessarily translate into diminished strategic capacity, although a certain part of the US Congress called the impeachment in light of the US President’s threat to erase the Iranian civilisation.

Iran has achieved a notable improvement in its external image, particularly among segments of Western public opinion. Nevertheless, this shift has yet to translate into a change in official policy from European governments, with only a few exceptions. This reflects a partial erosion of long-standing adversarial narratives shaped by years of sustained information warfare against the Islamic Republic.

While Iran’s own domestic messaging has historically contributed to its isolation, the current context has allowed Tehran to reposition itself more effectively on the international stage. By leveraging anti-colonial, human rights, international-based order, and multipolar narratives, it has found renewed resonance within anti-imperialist circles.

Israel remains outside the agreement framework, representing a fundamental structural weakness. Tel Aviv’s strategic behaviour over time shows a consistent readiness to act unilaterally when negotiations approach outcomes perceived as unfavourable or constraining. This introduces a persistent risk that it could undermine any deal at a critical stage.

A structural asymmetry complicates the situation further. Israel does not consistently align with United States strategic directives, yet the United States maintains an unwavering commitment to Israeli security and is unlikely to abandon its principal regional ally. This dynamic reduces the enforceability of any negotiated arrangement, as Washington’s ability to constrain Israeli actions remains limited. Consequently, any ceasefire or diplomatic framework is inherently fragile.

Consequently, a fundamental constraint across all negotiation tracks is the absence of trust. Repeated violations of ceasefire arrangements, including those related to Gaza and mediated by Trump, have occurred with a limited response from Western diplomatic actors, undermining the credibility of guarantees. At the same time, Tehran operates within a long-standing pattern in which negotiations are precursors to military action against the Islamic Republic. This suspicion transforms diplomacy into a tactical instrument rather than a pathway to resolution.

The current phase of de-escalation should therefore be interpreted as temporary. It provides all actors with an opportunity to rebuild military capabilities, recover diplomatic credibility, and stabilise domestic political conditions, while also offering short-term relief to global markets. The likelihood that this pause is instrumental rather than indicative of a durable settlement remains high.

Domestic political pressures also play a role in shaping decision-making. Benjamin Netanyahu is currently facing legal proceedings in Israel on charges including corruption, fraud, and breach of trust. Donald Trump is associated with significant legal and political controversies in the United States, including those linked to the so-called Epstein-related case files. In both instances, the persistence of external crises can contribute to shifting political attention and reinforcing internal support, creating an incentive to maintain high levels of tension.

The assessment that current geopolitical shifts constitute a definitive strategic windfall for China warrants rigorous interrogation. Although Pakistani mediation was self-evidently contingent upon Chinese acquiescence—given the depth of the client-state relationship between Islamabad and Beijing—US retrenchment does not automatically translate into a Chinese hegemony.

The core systemic risk stems not from the US kinetic power, but from the erosion of policy linearity. The pronounced volatility of the Trump administration introduces a level of strategic erraticism that fundamentally disrupts the equilibrium required for Eurasian integration. For a state like China, which prioritises long-term planning and market predictability, such unpredictability serves as a profound deterrent rather than an opportunity.

This caution is further compounded by Beijing’s acute vulnerability regarding its energy security. Despite its dependence on Gulf hydrocarbons, China is unlikely to recommit displaced capital into a theatre defined by such high-amplitude volatility. While a durable cessation of hostilities—however improbable—might eventually create the conditions for “debt-trap” diplomacy through infrastructure reconstruction, the immediate outlook remains one of strategic paralysis.

Furthermore, while Tehran has historically viewed Chinese economic penetration with deep-seated institutional suspicion, recent years’ existential pressure from an imploding economy has forced a pragmatic, albeit reluctant, pivot towards Beijing. Ultimately, the absence of a stable US interlocutor complicates China’s regional calculus, as the risks of miscalculation in a destabilised market outweigh the potential gains of filling a perceived power vacuum.

The role of Pakistan introduces an additional layer of complexity. Its binding mutual defence agreement with Saudi Arabia creates a latent escalation pathway. In the event of a large-scale conflict involving Iran and Gulf monarchies, particularly one perceived by Tehran as existential, Iran’s response would likely be severe and unprecedented. Such a scenario could compel Pakistan to intervene, thereby introducing a nuclear-armed actor into the conflict. This risk factor has likely contributed to the current containment of escalation.

At the systemic level, the principal strategic loss is borne by the Eurasian space. Ongoing instability disrupts major connectivity and integration initiatives, including transcontinental transport and infrastructure corridors linking Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (BRI, INSTC, Middle Corridor, TRIPP). Projects aimed at economic integration through ports, railways, and logistics networks face significant setbacks, risking the erosion of long-term strategic investments.

Europe appears particularly affected, facing uncertainty regarding United States security commitments in NATO while remaining conspicuously absent from the diplomatic response to this conflict. Engagement has been characterised by a fragmented approach, driven independently by the national interests of individual member states pursuing frequently divergent agendas.

Internal fractures have further undermined a cohesive stance; notably, in Germany, a significant rift emerged as the President asserted that the strikes against Iran constituted a violation of international law, while the Chancellor maintained that Israel’s actions are conducted on behalf of, and in the fundamental interest of, Europe. Such discord underscores a profound lack of strategic coordination and confirms the continent’s negligible political leverage within the primary theatres of international decision-making.

The weakening of international legal frameworks further contributes to systemic instability.

Conclusions

The ten-point framework should be understood as a mechanism for managing instability rather than resolving it. The United States preserves strategic advantage by sustaining regional disorder while transferring its economic consequences to Eurasian actors, who emerge as the primary losers in the current configuration.