Executive Summary
This report assesses the strategic and economic implications of the first meeting of Central Asian special representatives on Afghanistan, held in Uzbekistan on 26 August 2025.
This report seeks to determine the value of this undertaking for regional economic partnerships, stability, and security. Central Asian countries are working together in this meeting to create a unified position on Afghanistan, motivated by their desire for stability to boost trade, logistics, and infrastructure projects.
Persistent threats from terrorism, narcotics, and political volatility in Afghanistan continue to endanger these ambitions.
Key Takeaways
- Central Asian republics have formed a Contact Group to institutionalise dialogue and coordination on Afghanistan.
- Regional economic integration projects depend heavily on stabilising Afghanistan and securing transit access to South Asia.
- Security threats from terrorist groups and narcotics networks continue to pose structural risks to both Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Background Information
On August 26, 2025, Uzbekistan hosted the inaugural meeting of special representatives from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to discuss Afghanistan. This action followed the Central Asian Heads of State approved the 2025–2027 Roadmap for regional cooperation at their Sixth Consultative Meeting in Astana, August 2024.
The Contact Group served as a regional platform for regular consultations, coordination, and dialogue on Afghanistan-related issues. The conversations highlighted how crucial it is to cultivate self-reliant regional initiatives for Afghanistan, considering its interwoven geography, culture, and economy. Attendees committed to rebuilding trade, logistics, and humanitarian links with Afghanistan, even while understanding the need to balance relations with Kabul’s government and their own national interests.
Geopolitical Scenario
The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 reshaped Afghanistan’s international position, creating new opportunities and constraints for Central Asia. Since July 2025, when Russia formally recognised the Taliban government, Central Asian states have moved towards deeper engagement, driven by the urgency of securing stability along their southern border. Their primary goal is to stabilise Afghanistan as a dependable transit partner, opening routes to Pakistani ports and integrating into wider connectivity projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, but also the Middle Corridor, and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
However, the geopolitical environment remains uncertain. The Taliban are dealing with considerable internal challenges, such as opposition from minority communities, internal disagreements, organised crime, and narco-trafficking. The lack of structural integrity undermines Afghanistan’s reliability as a safe business ally.
Terrorist networks, particularly Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP), remain active and can project threats beyond Afghanistan into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Instability in Afghanistan presents Central Asian governments not only with the danger of cross-border insecurity but also with a threat to their aspirations of becoming a Eurasian logistics centre.
External powers add further complexity. Moscow’s recognition of the Taliban could strengthen its standing in the area and counteract Western policies that exclude others, although Russia’s financial limitations restrict how much backing it can offer. Despite its caution, China sees stability in Afghanistan as critical for its Belt and Road Initiative and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, mainly focusing on security collaboration and targeted infrastructure projects. Because of constant sanctions and political isolation, Iran’s ability to be a dependable transit partner is limited, causing Central Asian countries to rely more on Afghan and Pakistani routes.
The Taliban themselves are seeking to diversify their partnerships to avoid excessive dependence on any single power. By engaging with Central Asia, they gain access to trade, energy partnerships, and political acknowledgement. Yet weak governance and a reliance on coercive rule hinder their capacity to deliver on commitments. This creates an asymmetric relationship: Central Asian states need stability to pursue growth, while the Taliban require economic integration to survive politically and financially.
Indicators to Monitor
- Frequency and outcomes of future Contact Group meetings.
- The Taliban government’s engagement with Central Asian republics in trade and transit agreements.
- Levels of terrorist activity linked to the ISKP and similar groups in Afghanistan and border areas.
- Shifts in narcotics trafficking flows through Afghanistan and Central Asia.
- Implementation of regional transport projects linking Central Asia to Pakistan’s ports.
- External involvement by Russia, China, and Iran in Afghan-Central Asian cooperation.
Conclusion
The creation of the Contact Group shows a coordinated attempt by Central Asian states to exercise collective responsibility in shaping engagement with Afghanistan. Without a stable Afghanistan, Central Asian economic goals such as entering South Asian markets and participating in major connectivity projects are unattainable.
Persistent threats from terrorism, narcotics, and governance deficits in Kabul remain critical obstacles. Successful regional collaboration concerning Afghanistan demands an enduring political commitment, strong coordination, and a capacity to manage involvement carefully while addressing potential dangers.
*Cover image: The Central Asian Special Representatives on Afghanistan (Credits: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan)
