Executive Summary
This report analyses China’s recent diplomatic and economic activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a focus on agreements that aim to boost trade, security collaboration, and infrastructure development.
These developments highlight Beijing’s plan to incorporate Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and gain access to key resources. Ongoing security threats, governance issues, and regional conflicts may hinder these goals
Key Takeaways
- China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have reaffirmed their intent to expand political, economic, and security cooperation.
- China aims to incorporate Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative to strengthen regional trade routes.
- Long-term investment faces considerable challenges because of security risks posed by militant groups and Afghanistan’s restricted international recognition.
Background Information
On August 20, 2025, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, met in Kabul with the Afghan Prime Minister, Mullah Mohammed al-Ghani, and senior Taliban officials to discuss economic cooperation, resource development, and security arrangements. Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and its objection to financial limitations imposed on Kabul. China has stated its willingness to invest in mining, agriculture, and infrastructure, encompassing projects within the BRI.
This bilateral meeting followed a trilateral session between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in Kabul, where the three states pledged enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation, increased trade, transit facilitation, and further integration of Afghanistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The agreements underscored shared strategies for border management, along with China’s stated intention to help patrol the Wakhan Corridor.
Geopolitical Scenario
China’s approach to Afghanistan combines security imperatives with long-term economic positioning. Beijing is working to stabilise its western border regions, restrict Uyghur separatist groups’ activities, and establish dependable land routes to the Arabian Sea. Incorporating Afghanistan into BRI and extending CPEC serve both commercial and strategic purposes, reducing reliance on vulnerable maritime routes.
For the Taliban government, Chinese involvement is significant for both economic survival and gaining international legitimacy. However, its capacity to deliver security and governance remains doubtful. The Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) continues to stage high-profile attacks, challenging Taliban authority and directly threatening foreign investors. The Taliban’s unclear position on transnational militant groups, such as al-Qaeda or Uyghur factions, increases Beijing’s worries.
Pakistan plays a crucial facilitating role but is itself a source of uncertainty. Because of internal instability, economic vulnerability, and conflicts with Kabul concerning the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamabad faces challenges in guaranteeing a stable corridor for Chinese projects.
Russia’s realistic approach to the Taliban, including its recognition of the Islamic Emirate, indicates a challenge to China’s power. Moscow aims to keep its influence in Central Asia and hinder Beijing from controlling Afghanistan’s economic integration. Iran similarly seeks to link Afghanistan to its own trade routes through Chabahar, offering an alternative to Chinese-controlled connectivity.
Beijing’s support for the Taliban in international forums, such as its resistance to freezing assets, seeks to build favour but could link it to a regime widely shunned globally. Continued instability or a major attack on Chinese assets might compel Beijing to re-evaluate its risk, revealing the delicate equilibrium that supports its present approach.
Indicators to Monitor
- Attacks on Chinese nationals, facilities, or interests within Afghanistan.
- Taliban actions against ISKP and other transnational militant groups.
- Jihadist propaganda against Chinese, Afghan, and Pakistani cooperation.
- Progress in formalising Afghanistan’s participation in CPEC projects.
- Shifts in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations affecting trilateral cooperation.
- Russia and Iran’s diplomatic strategies seeking greater involvement in Afghan reconstruction.
Conclusion
China’s recent involvement shows a plan to include Afghanistan in regional economic projects while protecting its security concerns. However, ongoing militant activity, the Taliban’s governance problems, and conflicting regional interests jeopardise the long-term viability of these plans. The possibility of China achieving its economic goals in Afghanistan depends on closely monitoring security improvements and the effectiveness of trilateral processes.
*Cover image: A picture of the Sixth China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue held in Kabul (Credits: Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China)
