Executive Summary
This report examines Iran’s evolving strategic posture in Afghanistan following the erosion of its influence in Syria. The loss of key proxy leaders, Israel’s war in Gaza, and Syria’s collapse as a reliable geographical link force Tehran to seek alternative arenas.
Tehran’s current pragmatic overtures towards the Taliban regime despite deep-rooted ideological differences might suggest that Iran is capitalising on Afghanistan’s instability to offset strategic losses in the Levant.
The aim of this report is to assess whether Afghanistan could emerge as Iran’s next strategic frontier following Syria’s decline.
Key Takeaways
- The collapse of the Assad regime and Israel’s intensifying operations in Gaza have dramatically weakened Iran’s traditional influence axis through the Levant.
- Iran is pragmatically engaging the Taliban regime, despite longstanding ideological discord, highlighting a calculated pivot towards Afghanistan as a compensatory zone of influence.
- This recalibration revives historic precedents, as Tehran explores the revival of models akin to Hezbollah’s institutional evolution, this time leveraging Afghanistan’s fragile security and institutional vacuum.
Historical Background
During the period of the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), while Gulf countries and the US provided sustained support to the mujahideen within the framework of their broader anti-Soviet strategy, Tehran supported Shiite resistance groups such as Sazman-e Nasr (the Organisation of Victory) and Sepah-e Pasdaran (the Army of the Guardians). In 1988, Tehran also facilitated the merger of various Hazara factions into the Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami party, continuing to support it throughout the subsequent Afghan civil war.
In 1997, Saudi Arabia recognised the Taliban government, while Iran supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (also known in the West as the “Northern Alliance”). Tehran’s commitment further deepened after the 1998 massacre of thousands of Hazara civilians and the assassination of nine Iranian diplomats by Taliban forces in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, Tehran collaborated with the US to overthrow the Taliban regime. Tehran provided critical intelligence and support to the US-led coalition and played a significant role in the Bonn Conference, which established Afghanistan’s post-Taliban government.
More recently, the US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan on September 2021, followed by Ashraf Ghani’s government collapse, left the country in a vast humanitarian, economic and socio-politic crisis. The Taliban’s takeover raised serious concerns for Iran, as it posed a threat of increased extremism and terrorism, risked triggering a mass migration wave, and threatened to exacerbate drug trafficking.
Therefore, following the first virtual meeting hosted by Pakistan on September 8, 2021, Tehran hosted the second meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries on October 27, 2021, demonstrating its willingness to play a major role in the Afghan dossier.
For the purposes of this report, it is important to note that as early as 2019, the Afghan administration unofficially voiced concerns that thousands of Shiite militants—who had fought in Syria alongside President Assad—could pose a potential threat upon their return to Afghanistan.
On July 2021, shortly before the collapse of the Ghani’s administration, Iranian press shared data that the intensification of offensive actions by the Taliban led to a strong mobilisation of the Shiite population of Afghanistan. In particular, after dozens of Afghan districts surrendered to the Taliban, the Shiite militant group Hashd al-Shi’a (Shiite Mobilisation) emerged.
Geopolitical Scenario
The regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus has served as a critical strategic pillar for Iran, particularly in supporting the operations of the Quds Force and facilitating the projection of its proxy militias across the Levant. Syria has functioned as an essential link in the so-called “Shia Crescent”, a territorial axis connecting Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria itself. The Iranian Quds Force has utilised Syrian territory as a base to train, coordinate, and deploy allied militias.
Furthermore, by protecting key Shia religious sites in Syria, such as the Sayyida Zaynab shrine, Iran has reinforced its religious legitimacy and attracted Shia fighters from across the world, thereby consolidating both its cultural and ideological influence in the region.
While Afghanistan cannot geographically replace Syria as a link to Lebanon, it offers both the opportunity for religious and cultural penetration given the common historical background and, more importantly, it might offer the ground for Iranian proxy groups’ activities. Particularly, Tehran’s presence is vital given the threat emerging from Afghan-linked groups.
Sunni regional terrorism has always represented a threat to the Iranian internal security and to the Shia regional community. The Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP), which was created in 2014, has always claimed to be against the Shiites in Afghanistan.
The terrorist attack on January 3rd, 2024, at Kerman’s Martyrs’ Cemetery in Iran during a ceremony commemorating Qasem Soleimani, was a critical event for the Middle Eastern country. On one side, it highlighted a security breach in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the immediate need to address border and internal security. On the other side, it was symbolic. Qasem Soleimani, also known inside Iran as the “anti-terrorism General”, was the leading Iranian military figure in the fight against the Islamic State and was the architect of the Iranian network of proxy groups in the Middle East.
Against the backdrop of Israel’s war in Gaza, the decapitation of key Iranian proxy leadership figures and the erosion of Syria as a geographic link and base have made it imperative for Tehran to preserve its regional posture by exploring new strategic options. This evolving context has driven the Islamic Republic to pursue initiatives that, while potentially controversial, could provide it with new leverage in Afghanistan.
In this regard, a UN report released in 2024 unveiled the existence of al-Qaeda’s safe havens in Herat, Farah, and Helmand provinces, which allegedly aid in the movement of its members between Afghanistan and Iran. Accordingly, the UN and the US Justice Department believed Sayf al-Adl, leader of al-Qaeda, to be in Iran.
A complex interplay of strategic pragmatism and ideological divergence characterises Iran’s relationship with al-Qaeda. Tehran’s decision to host certain al-Qaeda figures seems motivated by a desire to exert influence over the group, gather intelligence, and potentially use these individuals as leverage in broader geopolitical negotiations. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic implemented a similar approach with respect to Sunni groups from other Central Asian nations.
Beside Tehran’s networking activities with regional groups, Tehran has also succeeded in the diplomatic field. Despite Tehran not officially recognised the Taliban-led government in Kabul, Iran officially handed over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to Taliban-appointed diplomats on February 26, 2023.
Moreover, the two countries have established cooperative frameworks for trade (creating for example a Joint Chamber of Commerce and establishing Special Economic Zones – SEZs), transit (such as the Chabahar Transit Project and the Khaf-Herat Railway), and diplomatically addressed water disputes.
Conclusion
The collapse of the Assad administration in Syria marked a dual setback for Iran. On one hand, Tehran lost a critical geographic link vital for the projection of its influence across the Middle East; on the other, the emergence of a new Syrian government opened the door to expanding Turkish influence—an adversary and regional competitor of Iran.
Although Afghanistan does not share Syria’s geographic advantages, it could nonetheless serve as an alternative base for Iranian activities, albeit under the control of a hostile Taliban regime. As early as 1988, Iran had sought to establish a foothold in Afghanistan by supporting the creation of the Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami party, attempting to replicate the model it successfully applied with Hezbollah—transforming a guerrilla movement into a political entity aligned with Iranian interests.
While Iran’s effort to achieve institutional penetration in Afghanistan ultimately failed at that time, today Tehran possesses a broader array of tools that could exploit the country’s current instability and the Taliban’s inability to provide effective security.
Author: Silvia Boltuc
*Cover image: Ali Reza Bekdali, the acting head of the Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran in Kabul, visited the National Gallery of Afghanistan, and discussed cultural cooperation with the Taliban (Credits: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran)
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