Executive Summary

This report examines the increasing relevance of Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, in the global rare earth elements (REEs) and rare metals (RMs) market.

Central Asia is becoming a potential new supplier of critical minerals as global demand soars because of the green energy transition and geopolitical tensions involving the West, China, and Russia. Significant limitations in infrastructure, processing capacity, and political risk hinder the region’s ability to independently capitalise on its mineral wealth.

This report outlines Western and Asian powers’ developing strategic interest in Central Asia’s mineral assets and assesses the challenges that may determine the region’s future role in global supply chains.

Key Takeaways

• Central Asia has abundant rare earth and rare metal reserves, but needs more technological and financial capabilities to develop them on its own.
• China, Russia, and Western powers are vying for control of critical minerals, transforming the region into a strategically important area.
• Systemic challenges, including environmental risks, governance issues, and reliance on external factors, prevent Central Asia from becoming a reliable supplier to global markets.

Background Information

In the first quarter of 2025, Kazakhstan announced the discovery of a substantial rare earth deposit in the Karaganda region, estimated at over 935,000 tonnes. This announcement came shortly before the EU–renewed declarations from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan regarding similar exploratory efforts and investment plans followed the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand.

The coordinated timing suggests that regional governments are strategically positioning themselves as credible players in the global critical minerals market. Leaders in Central Asia, especially President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, have acknowledged Rare Earth Elements (REEs) and Rare Metals (RMs) as a valuable strategic asset with geopolitical and economic importance similar to oil.

Simultaneously, external interest in the region has intensified. Amid growing concerns about China’s export controls and Russia’s strategic manipulation of mineral supplies, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada want to ensure access to these resources.

Western countries have also worked to include Central Asian nations in wider partnerships focused on critical minerals, like the Minerals Security Partnership. However, to date, no Central Asian republic has completed any major industrial projects, and much of the region’s mineral wealth remains under-explored or in early development stages.

Geopolitical Scenario

Central Asia’s growing role in the rare earth and rare metal supply landscape is a direct consequence of systemic shifts in global strategic priorities. The international move toward net zero emissions has significantly increased demand for critical minerals used in wind turbines, electric vehicles, semiconductors, and battery storage systems.

The International Energy Agency forecasts a fourfold increase in demand for REEs and RMs by 2040, making secure access a national priority for most industrial economies. Because China and Russia control much of the world’s production and processing, Western governments are seeking alternative suppliers because of geopolitical tensions, increasing Central Asia’s importance.

Kazakhstan’s history of uranium mining and its Soviet-era industrial infrastructure make it the region’s most promising player. Unlike China’s vertically integrated REE industry, Astana still lacks end-to-end processing capabilities. Despite interest from France (uranium) and the UK (rare earths), its reliance on Russian logistics and processing, especially for uranium, is a major weakness. Moscow’s long-standing dominance in the nuclear sector and its leverage over Kazakh supply routes represent a critical point of influence.

China has solidified its control over rare earth minerals by prohibiting the export of processing technologies and directly securing mining rights in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Although China’s share of global rare earth element (REE) production has fallen since 2010, its domestic demand continues to grow, strengthening its desire to acquire Central Asian resources. This is part of a larger strategy to mitigate the United States and European Union’s efforts to restructure global supply chains and lessen dependence on China for crucial minerals.

Although Central Asia could replace African or Chinese sources, it presents substantial geopolitical and economic challenges. Strong regimes govern predominantly the region with opaque regulatory environments and histories of political volatility. Substantial Chinese lending and investment over the past decade has created financial dependencies that may complicate attempts to diversify partnerships. Western stakeholders may therefore be cautious in making long-term commitments, particularly if governance reform and operational transparency do not match access to resources.

Another layer of complexity stems from intra-regional coordination. Although Central Asian leaders recognise the importance of working together to draw foreign investment and boost competitiveness, long-standing disputes over infrastructure, trade routes, and water resources could hinder their efforts. Regional fragmentation could reduce investor confidence and delay the creation of a unified platform for REE and RM development.

Conclusion

Central Asia’s mineral wealth positions it as an asset in the geopolitics of clean energy and technological development. Without a coordinated strategy encompassing internal reforms and targeted international collaborations, the region faces the risk of exploitation as a resource periphery by outside forces, rather than establishing itself as an autonomous participant in global value chains. While Kazakhstan may spearhead development because of its relative stability and industrial experience, the broader regional environment remains uncertain.

If China continues to tighten its export restrictions, we can expect more Western investment through joint ventures and technology transfers. However, if Central Asia cannot overcome infrastructure and political hurdles, it may remain reliant on Chinese and Russian supply chains.

Geopolitical competition for these resources is likely to intensify, demanding that strategic actors prepare for a fragmented, contested environment with increasingly securitised access to rare earths.

*Cover image: Rare-earth oxides used as tracers to determine which parts of a watershed are eroding. Clockwise from top centre: praseodymium, cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, samarium, and gadolinium (Credits: Peggy Greb, US department of agriculture, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)

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