Executive Summary
Iran is experiencing an acute water crisis driven by long-term precipitation decline, intense drought since 2022–2023, and rapid groundwater depletion.
Recent rains have often been short, intense, and erosive, producing floods rather than groundwater recharge.
This report examines the current state of Iran’s water crisis and its implications for the country’s political trajectory.
Key Takeaways
- Iran’s renewable water resources have declined by over one-third in two decades, pushing the country into absolute water scarcity.
- Sanctions have severely restricted access to water management technologies and financing, while government mismanagement has deepened systemic inefficiencies.
- Escalating water shortages are likely to become a major driver of domestic unrest and cross-border tensions, particularly with Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq.
Information Background
The United Nations defines a water crisis as less than 1,000 cubic metres per capita per year. With an expected population of around 94 million in 2025 (approximately 87 million residents and 7 million migrants, both regular and irregular), the estimated 850 m³ per person places Iran firmly in the category of absolute water scarcity.
President Masoud Pezeshkian was cited as saying that if it does not rain in Tehran by late November, the government will have to ration water, and if it still does not rain, evacuation of Tehran may become necessary.
Historically, between 1977 and 2001, Iran’s renewable internal water resources averaged 128 billion m³ annually — about 98 billion m³ from surface runoff and 5.5 billion m³ from pumped groundwater. The long-term average is now estimated at around 80 billion m³ (water year 2024–2025).
In normal conditions, Iran receives about 6 billion m³ of surface water from Pakistan and Afghanistan (via the Helmand River) and 4 billion m³ from the Aras River on the Azerbaijani border. Roughly 55 billion m³ of surface runoff flows annually into seas or neighbouring countries.
The per-capita availability has fallen from 4,500 m³ in 1976 to under 2,000 m³ by 2008, and to around 1,000 m³ today.
Land subsidence around Tehran — home to at least 25% of Iran’s population — could reach up to one metre within a few years. Groundwater loss also increases soil and water salinity, undermining agricultural fertility and threatening long-term food security. Subsidence can permanently reduce aquifer capacity and alter natural drainage patterns.
Agriculture consumes over 90% of the nation’s water — mostly through inefficient flood irrigation for water-intensive crops such as wheat, alfalfa, and watermelon.
To address this issue, on October 2025, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in collaboration with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has launched a new Regional Technical Cooperation Project aimed at strengthening national and regional capacities for climate-resilient agriculture.
Iran has around one million wells, half of which are illegal. Excessive pumping has severely depleted aquifers, particularly in the Central Plateau, Tehran region, Lake Namak, and the central desert basins. By March 2019, authorities had declared 405 “forbidden plains” where new wells were banned due to excessive extraction. Updated data indicate 422 restricted or critical plains as of early 2025, with 359 suffering from land subsidence or severe groundwater depletion.
Impact of Sanctions on the Water Crisis
Sanctions have curtailed Tehran’s access to modern water management technologies, including satellite-based irrigation control systems, advanced desalination equipment, water recycling technologies, and monitoring sensors.
Prior to intensified sanctions (pre-2010), Iran had several joint projects with European and Japanese partners on water efficiency and wastewater reuse. Most were suspended after 2012.
Restrictions on international banking and supply chains prevent procurement of spare parts for desalination plants and pumping infrastructure, increasing inefficiency and loss.
The exclusion from global finance (SWIFT and secondary sanctions) has limited or blocked access to multilateral loans or international water-sector funds such as those from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or Green Climate Fund.
Domestic financing priorities shifted towards maintaining economic stability and defence spending, reducing public investment in infrastructure renewal.
Sanctions have depressed oil revenue and GDP growth, compelling farmers and local authorities to prioritise short-term survival over sustainable practices.
Declining incomes led to over-extraction of groundwater for subsistence agriculture. Many of the ~500,000 illegal wells were dug during years of heightened economic stress.
Energy subsidies—retained for political reasons under sanctions pressure—encourage cheap electricity for pumping, reinforcing depletion.
To ensure food security under sanctions, the government increased incentives for domestic production of staple crops, even water-intensive ones such as wheat. This strategic self-sufficiency policy amplified groundwater extraction and discouraged crop diversification toward less water-demanding alternatives.
The crisis response has therefore remained largely technocratic and reactive, not systemic or reformist.
Geopolitical scenario
Persistent over-extraction, poor agricultural efficiency, and weak water governance underpin Iran’s worsening crisis. Without structural reforms in water management and agricultural policy, the country faces escalating risks to its economy, food security, and energy systems.
Some experts suggest investing in non-conventional sources such as desalination in coastal regions, yet warn that even these efforts cannot offset long-term depletion without demand-side reform. The overall trend points to rapidly declining renewable water resources and high vulnerability driven by mismanagement and climate change.
Agriculture remains by far the largest freshwater consumer (estimates ~80–87% of use), meaning supply shocks translate quickly into food/welfare and economic stress.
Iran’s 2024–2025 water crisis is deep, widespread (Tehran and many provinces), and persistent — not a one-off weather event. This transforms water from a technical/sectoral problem into a core national-security risk.
Domestic political risk is high and rising. Water shortages already trigger protests (Khuzestan precedent) and recent official warnings about rationing/evacuation for Tehran indicate the government faces acute legitimacy and public-order pressure. When cuts impact urban services and agriculture simultaneously, it is possible to expect more localised unrest and a greater possibility of escalation.
The government’s inability to prevent persistent shortages in Tehran — combined with visible service failures (nightly pressure cuts, municipal shortfalls) — amplifies public frustration across socioeconomic groups. Where service failures intersect with ethnic or long-standing grievances (e.g., Khuzestan), protests can rapidly widen.
Authorities will oscillate among short-term technical fixes and order measures (rationing, supply trucking, local shutdowns), political concessions (public holidays, subsidies), and securitised responses (deployment of security forces to protest hotspots). Heavy securitisation reduces immediate protest risk but increases long-term political costs and international reputational damage.
Water scarcity might increase transboundary friction (Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey) and incentivise pursuit of technical and diplomatic measures (water diplomacy, infrastructure projects, cooperation with neighbours) — but implementation is slowed by sanctions and fiscal strain.
As for the transboundary friction, the Helmand River is the main surface-water source for Iran’s Sistan–Baluchestan province, feeding the Hamun wetlands on the Iranian side. Satellite and on-ground monitoring show low flow releases from Afghanistan’s Kajaki and Kamal Khan dams, particularly since 2021.
Iranian officials repeatedly accused the Taliban government of violating the bilateral water treaty signed in 1973; in May–June 2023, Iranian border guards and Taliban forces clashed near the Helmand crossing — the most serious armed incident in years.
The Karkheh and Karun Rivers from western Iran flow into Iraq’s southern marshlands and the Shatt al-Arab system. Flow reductions and dam projects in Iran affect downstream water quality and salinity in Basra and southern Iraq.
Conversely, Iraqi mismanagement and Turkish upstream dams also affect the same basins, creating triangular interdependence. Iran, on his side, has built or expanded dams (e.g., on the Karun tributaries), triggering Iraqi criticism.
Turkey controls headwaters of several rivers affecting Iran and Iraq, notably the Araz (Aras) and Little Zab tributaries. Its extensive Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) dams on the Tigris–Euphrates system already constrain regional flow.
When Turkey accelerated its dam programme and expanded irrigation schemes, Iran observes reduced inflows into western provinces (West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah) and periodically complains. Ankara, in turn, frames this as legitimate sovereign use.
In 2025, Turkey and Iraq signed new frameworks for water management and data-sharing — Iran was not included, fuelling Iranian concern about exclusion from a key hydropolitical bloc.
Furthermore, rural depopulation (forced migration to cities) and potential cross-border movements from hardest-hit provinces can stress border security and complicate relations with neighbours — especially where shared ethnic groups span borders. This raises the need for coordinated humanitarian/diplomatic handling.
Economic impact
Agriculture (~80% of national water use) will face output shocks; yield losses and forced fallowing raise domestic food-price inflation and increase import needs. This worsens an already fragile macroeconomic picture and constrains fiscal room.
Iran’s energy system remains highly dependent on hydropower and fossil fuels, while solar and wind together make up only a small share of total capacity. Lower reservoir levels reduce hydropower output and affect thermal plant cooling water supplies — risk of rolling outages and reduced industrial production. Energy shortfalls might interact with water shortages to compound economic disruption.
Emergency relief, water transfers, and planned desalination/infrastructure responses are capital-intensive. Sanctions and limited foreign financing slow large-scale investments, forcing prioritisation (urban supply first, rural/irrigation later), with political consequences for affected regions.
Plan budget scenarios where water mitigation (desalination, wastewater reuse, groundwater artificial recharge) becomes a high fiscal priority.
Conclusion
Iran’s worsening water scarcity has evolved into a multidimensional national-security challenge, with severe implications for domestic stability, food security, and regional relations.
Without structural reforms in water governance, agricultural practices, and regional cooperation, the crisis will continue to undermine the Islamic Republic’s socioeconomic resilience and geopolitical standing.
The intersection of sanctions, mismanagement, and climate stress makes the country’s water emergency both acute and enduring.
