Executive Summary
This report examines the temporary suspension of multiple OSINT Telegram channels, with a focus on those affiliated with Ukraine, alongside the disruption of various Telegram and WhatsApp accounts, and assesses the resulting geopolitical and intelligence implications.
The investigation assesses allegations of political bias, potential platform manipulation, and operational risks for intelligence agencies that use Telegram. Within the context of the Ukraine conflict, this analysis will inform decision-makers and the intelligence community about strategic weaknesses related to platform dependency within contested regions.
Key Takeaways
- Telegram inexplicably suspended over ten established OSINT channels, some belonging to Ukrainian users.
- Ukrainian analysts claim Telegram is furthering Russia’s agenda through an anti-Ukraine disinformation campaign.
- The simultaneous outages on Telegram and WhatsApp suggest possible state-directed tests for future nationwide service restrictions in Russia.
Background Information
On Friday, June 27, 2025, Telegram blocked multiple OSINT-focused channels, active for several years, without warning. These included Ukrainian channels like OSINT Пчелы, Cat Eyes OSINT, and OSINT Грузия, as well as others from Belarus and Russia. The account suspension, lasting several hours, fuelled censorship allegations despite denials of any community guideline violations.
The incident happened during the Ukraine conflict, a situation where OSINT has become vital for civilians and unofficial groups to track military activities and political developments.
Telegram serves as a primary platform for the dissemination of such intelligence in Russian-speaking regions, because of its encryption features, wide accessibility, and limited content moderation compared to Western platforms.
Simultaneously, on the night of June 30, 2025, users recorded over 12,000 reports of disruptions on Telegram and nearly 1,500 on WhatsApp in Russia. Russian digital freedom project “НА СВЯЗИ” interpreted the events as a rehearsal for a full-scale block of foreign messaging platforms.
Shortly after President Vladimir Putin signed a law allowing a national messaging platform modelled after China’s WeChat, disruptions began. This raises strategic concerns about Moscow’s plan to tighten its grip on domestic digital communications.
Situational Awareness
Telegram confirmed that blocking the OSINT channels was a mistake, and restored access within hours. However, the affected communities contest this, suggesting the incident may reflect political motivations. Ukrainian sources cited Telegram’s past disabling of Ukrainian military bots as evidence of Russian influence.
Allegations of collusion between Telegram and Russian intelligence are growing, especially from Ukrainian groups like OSINT Пчелы, who claim it is a deliberate attack on pro-Ukraine analytical communities.
The risk for OSINT practitioners is twofold:
- OSINT analyst’s dependence on Telegram leaves them vulnerable to censorship, and perceived political bias erodes confidence in essential communication channels.
- Problems with open-source intelligence gathering could hinder strategic and tactical decisions for defence organisations that use it.
Because itis widely used across post-Soviet states, Telegram’s content moderation decisions significantly impact the information environment.
Since Telegram and WhatsApp went down simultaneously, only for Russian users and after some Telegram’s OSINT channel were temporary shutdown, points to a state-sponsored trial run of nationwide internet restrictions.
The upcoming deployment of a state-sponsored messenger application, Max (developed by VK), and recent legislative changes support this assessment. Russian officials have signalled their intention to apply stricter controls on foreign messengers following the rollout of the national service.
These developments underscore the critical need for intelligence analysts to diversify their platforms, enhance their digital backup systems, and remain current on legislation affecting online information.
Conclusion
Telegram’s temporary suspension of some OSINT Telegram channels, later explained as an internal error, and Telegram and WhatsApp’s disruptions, exposed significant vulnerabilities in how the Russian-speaking online community spreads information.
Internal mismanagement or external pressure can disrupt non-state intelligence channels, undermining operational stability and public trust in digital neutrality.
This event underscores the need for intelligence analysts and defence personnel to use diverse communication channels and build resilience against information suppression. In view of the complex technical and political landscape, SpecialEurasia’s focused training on navigating Russian digital ecosystems becomes even more crucial.
