Executive Summary
This report evaluates the strategic implications of the new China-Iran railway corridor. It highlights Iran’s geopolitical importance as a multimodal Eurasian hub and analyses the competing interests of major powers vying for influence over Iranian ports.
The report concludes with an assessment of the risk posed to Western efforts to politically and economically isolate Tehran, because of the country’s growing integration into the Eurasian network.
Key Takeaways
- The new China-Iran overland corridor helps mitigate the risks of naval interdiction by Western forces that hamper Iranian trade.
- The railway deepens Tehran’s integration into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and offers Central Asian countries an access to Iranian ports on international waters.
- Tehran’s growing economic and logistical integration into the Eurasian network may undermine Western efforts to isolate the country.
Information Background
On May 25, 2025, the first freight train from Xi’an, China, arrived at the Aprin dry port, Iran, marking the official launch of a direct rail link between the two countries. This new logistical artery significantly reduces transit times (from 30–40 days by sea to roughly 15 days by land) yielding a direct impact on transportation costs.
Notably, a dry port is an inland intermodal terminal directly connected by road or rail to a seaport, operating as a centre for the transhipment of sea cargo to inland destinations. As a result, Chinese shipments transported via the new railway can effectively access international maritime routes. The railway is part of the broader East-West Corridor (still in the process of consolidation) which aims to link China with Iran, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and eventually Europe.
Geopolitical Scenario
The advantages of this new infrastructure are not merely commercial. The route also circumvents vulnerable maritime chokepoints often patrolled by hostile actors, offering Tehran and Beijing a potential tool to bypass sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. Moreover, the railway presents a resilient alternative to contested maritime bottlenecks. As evidenced by the recent 250% surge in shipping costs driven by instability in the Red Sea, key maritime chokepoints, such as the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, and the Strait of Hormuz, are highly volatile and can severely disrupt global trade flows.
This overland corridor helps mitigate the risks of naval interdiction by Western forces that hamper Iranian trade, particularly the transport of crude oil by Tehran’s so-called “ghost ships.” Nevertheless, it is important to note that transporting hydrocarbons by rail involves considerable logistical challenges.
Amid stalled nuclear negotiations, the U.S. administration under Trump has reactivated its “maximum pressure” doctrine aimed at isolating the Islamic Republic’s economy and eliminating its energy exports.
Over 30% of global maritime oil trade passes through the South China Sea, more than 90% of which transits the Strait of Malacca, a critical chokepoint over which Washington maintains strategic control through the Seventh Fleet and regional alliances, enabling it to close the strait at will. Against this backdrop, the China-Iran rail axis assumes crucial importance, offering both countries a structured alternative shielded from American military pressure.
In addition to deepening Iran’s integration into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which Tehran joined in 2019, the new infrastructure offers opportunities for Central Asian countries long interested in accessing Iranian ports on international waters. This objective underpinned the May 12, 2025, meeting in Tehran among senior railway officials from Iran, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey, focused on building a transcontinental rail network poised to reshape Eurasian geopolitical dynamics.
Finally, the China-Iran railway corridor inside the broader China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/Europe transport corridor, also linked to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) backed by Moscow, emerges as a potential alternative to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), the Indo-Western project aimed at turning Israel into a strategic hub for commercial and energy flows in Western Asia.
While China, having previously invested heavily in corridors and ports through Pakistan, is now directing greater attention to the Islamic Republic, whose internal situation is perceived as less vulnerable to security challenges and more stable, Tehran must carefully navigate the implications of the ongoing rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi. Both powers have strategic interests in Iranian ports, viewing them as vital gateways to and from Central Asian markets.
Moreover, India and China are key stakeholders in the two major transport corridors crossing Iran: the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking Russia to India, and the East–West Corridor, which connects China to Europe. For now, the commercial interests of these two regional giants appear to align with Tehran’s multi-vector foreign policy, one that prioritises engagement with Central Asia but could also bring tangible benefits to the Caucasus region.
In the context of the 25-year Iran–China partnership agreement signed in 2021, India’s primary concerns revolved around the potential for Chinese involvement in the Chabahar port, widely regarded by Indian analysts as India’s strategic crown jewel in Iran, and the broader implication of Beijing securing a naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean, a region critical to New Delhi’s strategic interests. Following the agreement, in fact, China moved to open its first consulate in Iran and announced an investment plan on the Makran coast, aiming at a massive settlement of Chinese companies in the area and to connect Iranian ports to the Belt and Road Initiative.
On the other hand, New Delhi’s investments in the Chabahar port stalled under pressure from its U.S. ally. The close ties between India and the United States may lead Iran to lean toward China, not out of ideological alignment, but as a matter of strategic pragmatism.
Conclusion
In an increasingly polarised global context, Western sanctions appear not only partially ineffective but also act as a catalyst for strategic alignment among historically rival actors such as Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.
Iran’s geographically strategic location has long positioned it as a bridge between East and West, as well as a key crossroads along the ancient Silk Road. Since 2013, when Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Tehran has publicly expressed its support for the project.
Under President Raisi’s administration, Tehran has actively leveraged its position by pursuing a foreign policy aimed at integrating the country into major regional transport corridors, joining key regional organisations, and strengthening bilateral relations with leading Eurasian actors. Iran’s growing economic and logistical integration into the Eurasian network may undermine Western efforts to isolate the country and could discourage partner states from withdrawing from economic engagement with Tehran.
