Executive Summary
This report assesses the geopolitical risks tied to Tajikistan’s position in Western Critical Raw Material (CRM) supply chains, especially considering the antimony market, drawing on trade figures, publicly available investment data, and regional and international media coverage.
Tajikistan is among the world-leading antimony producers and draws Western interest amid broader efforts to build more resilient CRM supply chains. Yet its structural dependence on China and Russia, through investment, debt, trade, and security, undermines its reliability as a partner.
In a geopolitical crisis, Tajikistan is unlikely to resist coordinated pressure from Beijing and Moscow, endangering Western engagement. The case underscores a key risk: diversification strategies that fail to account for a supplier’s broader dependencies and vulnerabilities may backfire when access is needed most.
Key Points
- Tajikistan is a major supplier of antimony, but its role in the global supply chain is geopolitically vulnerable.
- In a geopolitical crisis, Moscow and Beijing, not Brussels, Washington, or Dushanbe, will determine Western access to Tajikistan’s antimony.
- The antimony case highlights a potential flaw in Western CRM strategies: diversification that ignores a supplier’s broader dependencies and vulnerabilities risks collapsing when access matters most.
Background Information
Antimony is a CRM, essential for defence and solar industries, and necessary in the production of semiconductors, flame retardants and batteries. The European Union and the United States officially list it as a CRM; China designates it as strategically significant.
Tajikistan, despite modest economic development, was the world’s second-largest antimony producer in 2023, accounting for 26% of global output and supplying 42% of all antimony imported into the European Union, making it the bloc’s single largest external source. Tajikistan’s importance in the sector is further highlighted by global supply contraction. Sanctions complicate imports from Russia; Myanmar, another key supplier, remains politically unstable; and China has already halted exports to Europe, triggering a global price spike.
Tajikistan is deeply rooted in both Russian and Chinese spheres of influence. China is the country’s largest creditor and heavily involved in infrastructure investments and joint mining ventures, while Russia maintains a military presence and wields leverage through trade ties and large-scale labor migration flows.
The entrenched Russian and Chinese positions have not deterred growing Western interest. The largest antimony mine, the Anzob Mining Complex, is operated by the US based Comsup Commodities Inc. Additionally, in 2024, Denmark-based FLSmidth signed a memorandum of understanding on mineral development cooperation with Tajikistan’s Ministry of Industry and New Technologies. Similarly, UK-based Vast Resources plc agreed to a joint venture with Open Joint Stock Company Korkhonai Boygardonii Takob.
Geopolitical Analysis
With the majority of global antimony reserves and production concentrated in Russia and China, Tajikistan is a relevant actor in Western CRM diversification efforts. The Central Asian state might not represent classic ‘friendshoring,’ but is seen as a pragmatic, if imperfect choice, outside China’s direct control and beyond Russia’s sanctioned economy.
However, this framing overlooks the fact that Tajikistan’s de facto sovereignty is limited. Chinese firms not only hold significant influence in mining, such as through joint ventures between Tibet Huayu Mining and Tajikistan’s largest state-owned mining company TALCO Gold, but across trade, investment, and infrastructure. China ranks simultaneously as Tajikistan’s third-largest trading partner, largest foreign investor, with a 30% share of total foreign investment—and main external creditor. Taken together, these factors give Beijing extensive leverage across Tajikistan’s economy, and therefore also broader policy, reducing Dushanbe’s flexibility and autonomy in times of geopolitical tension.
At the same time, Moscow maintains significant influence over Tajikistan through its military footprint and economic leverage. Russia is Tajikistan’s largest trade partner, accounting for roughly 21% of its total foreign trade volume in 2023, and remains economically vital as remittances from Russia account for more than a third of Tajikistan’s GDP. Dushanbe also hosts Russia’s largest military base abroad, the 201st Military Base, and relies on Moscow in managing instability along the Afghan border.
Beijing’s economic leverage alone could significantly constrain Tajikistan’s ability to act independently, challenging Western assumptions of the country as an autonomous supplier. Russia complements China’s leverage because of its dominant role in Tajikistan’s security, large trade share, and economic influence because of remittances. In a high-stakes geopolitical confrontation, Tajikistan would likely lack the capacity to resist coordinated pressure, and Moscow and Beijing, if push comes to shove, would have the final say in who gets access to the resources.
Western actors face a dilemma. On the one hand, antimony is too critical to ignore and Tajikistan is one of the few viable alternatives outside of China and Russia. On the other hand, any serious engagement risks being undone the moment geopolitical tensions escalate in earnest. In a future confrontation, whether over Taiwan, in Eastern Europe, or broader trade wars, Tajikistan would not be a buffer against China and Russia, but a potential point of coercion. The very logic of diversification collapses if the supplier cannot resist the coordinated influence of the very powers Western policy aims to hedge against. This is particularly critical in the case of antimony, a material with few substitutes and concentrated production.
In a crisis, Western access to Tajikistan’s antimony will not be decided in Brussels or Washington, and neither in Dushanbe, but determined in Moscow and Beijing.
Conclusion
Tajikistan appears to offer a pathway to CRM diversification, but its structural dependence on China and Russia makes this path strategically fragile. The country’s limited de facto sovereignty means that access to critical materials like antimony can be curtailed precisely when it is most needed. For Western actors, the dilemma is clear: investing in Tajikistan may seem pragmatic today, but it risks reinforcing the very vulnerabilities diversification is meant to reduce.
Author: Amin Vogel
Cover image: Antimony chemical element, Sign with atomic number and atomic weight, Periodic Table Element (Credits: Freepik)
*This report reflects early-stage analysis intended to contribute to ongoing discussion on CRM supply chain vulnerabilities. Further technical or sector-specific review is encouraged.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the positions of SpecialEurasia. This piece offers an analysis intended to inform and provoke thought.
