Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 52 Issue 5
SpecialEurasia OSINT Team

Executive Summary

This report assesses the security risks in Syria following recent sectarian violence in Latakia and Tartus, where factions linked to the transitional government reportedly targeted Alawite civilians. Local sources report hundreds killed in what they describe as mass executions.

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa, the deteriorating security situation highlights the government’s inability to contain armed groups and prevent sectarian reprisals. Failing to impose control over radical elements, including foreign fighters, raises concerns about prolonged instability and the potential for further conflict.

Background Information

On the night of Thursday, March 6^th, 2025, armed factions aligned with Syria’s transitional government attacked villages in the Alawite strongholds of Latakia and Tartus, conducting field executions and calling for the “purification” of the country.

This violence followed an earlier assault by Assad loyalists against government forces stationed in Alawite-majority cities. Ghiath Dallah, a former brigadier general in Assad’s army, recently announced the formation of the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria, a resistance movement opposing the new government. The group includes not only hardline Assad supporters but also former military, police, and public sector personnel whom interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa dismissed after taking power.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights, an independent UK-based monitoring group, reports that at least 740 people, mostly civilians, have died in what they describe as mass executions. Some witnesses report that among the perpetrators were fighters speaking Uzbek and Chechen, suggesting the involvement of foreign combatants.

On Sunday, March 9^th, 2025, interim president al-Sharaa accused Assad loyalists of instigating the violence and vowed that his government would punish all those responsible for the deaths of civilians.

The Alawites are a religious minority in Syria, constituting approximately 10-12% of the population, and follow a sect of Shia Islam with distinct esoteric beliefs. Historically, they have been politically dominant under the rule of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, leading to their close association with the Syrian regime and making them a target of sectarian tensions during the country’s conflicts.

Analysis

• Persistent violence in Alawite-majority areas highlights the lack of security under al-Sharaa’s government. Despite al-Sharaa’s condemnation of the violence in Latakia and Tartus, the high number of civilian casualties underscores the interim government’s inability to establish security and stability. The presence of Assad loyalists under the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria and their ongoing clashes with government forces indicate Syria is likely to face a prolonged power struggle in the short to medium term.
• The involvement of Chechen and Uzbek fighters suggests internal divisions and risks of radicalisation. Reports of Chechen and Uzbek fighters among the attackers raise concerns about the composition and cohesion of Syria’s interim military forces. Fighters from the post-Soviet space, particularly Chechnya, played a significant role in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and their incorporation into the new military apparatus under al-Sharaa was likely a strategic necessity. However, HTS’s presence could also introduce radicalisation risks, because of their previous al-Qaeda affiliation and jihadist ideology. The involvement of foreign fighters in mass killings suggests that factions within the interim government’s forces may operate outside central control, potentially undermining al-Sharaa’s leadership.
• Syria’s instability creates opportunities for external actors, increasing the risk of regional intervention. With the government unable to secure its own territory, foreign actors could exploit the security vacuum. The presence of Assad loyalists in coastal regions may prompt Russia and Iran to increase support for their former ally’s remnants, further fuelling the conflict. Simultaneously, as Syrian forces focus on stabilising Alawite areas, Israel may see an opportunity to advance militarily in strategic locations, challenging Syrian sovereignty.
• Internal fractures within the interim government could lead to further radicalisation and insurgency. If al-Sharaa enforces punitive measures against HTS-linked fighters involved in the violence, this could alienate radical elements within his forces, potentially leading to new insurgencies. Disillusioned hardline factions could reject al-Sharaa’s moderate stance and seek alternative leadership, exacerbating instability and fuelling jihadist resurgence.

Conclusion

The recent violence in Latakia and Tartus underscores the deep-seated instability in Syria, as the interim government under Ahmad al-Sharaa struggles to assert control over security forces and suppress sectarian and factional tensions.

Civilian killings, allegedly committed with foreign fighters’ involvement, expose internal conflict in the new administration, questioning its governing capacity. As the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria rallies Assad loyalists and discontent grows among ex-security forces, a lengthy insurgency is quite likely. Al-Sharaa’s need to balance governance, security, and appeasement of different factions—some with radical Islamist ideologies—further complicates the country’s fragile transition.

Syria’s instability, aside from internal conflict, might draw in more outside players—namely Russia, Iran, and Israel—all pushing their own agendas in the absence of security. Meanwhile, extremist violence might resurface because of radicalisation within the interim government’s military, potentially destabilising Syria and the wider region.

*Cover picture: Syria ethnoreligious group composition map (Credits: Institute for the Study of War, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)

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