Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 51 Issue 15
Author: Riccardo Rossi
Executive Summary
Russia’s so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine has shifted Moscow’s military focus toward Europe, enhancing the operational capabilities of its Northern Fleet, Western, and Southern Military Districts. This decision has raised the concerns of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) about a decline in Moscow’s attentions to the Asia-Pacific North.
This report analyses the influence of the Ukrainian conflict on Moscow and Beijing’s economic-military relations and their respective perspectives on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the U.S. military presence in Japan.
Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation
Heavy European and U.S. economic sanctions hit the Russian Federation after it launched the Special Military Operation in Ukraine; however, simultaneously, the Russian Federation strengthened trade relations with the PRC, reaching USD 244.8 billion in 2024, a slight increase from USD 240.1 billion in 2023.
Last year, Russia exported crude oil to the Chinese market at an average of 2.2 million barrels per day, 1% more than the previous year. Moscow also became Beijing’s third-largest supplier of liquid natural gas (LNG), with 6.74 million tonnes, accounting for 10.6% of China’s total annual LNG imports.
In December 2019, Moscow and Beijing activated the 1,400-km-long Power of Siberia 1 (PS-1) pipeline used to transport natural gas from the Chayanda field to China’s Heilongjiang province. In 2020, PS-1 delivered about 5 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas to China. This year, PS-1 is expected to reach its full capacity of 38 bcm, potentially meeting almost 10% of the PRC’s natural gas consumption. In 2022, Moscow and Beijing, observing the success of PS-1, accelerated negotiations on the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline, aimed at transporting 50 BCM per year from western Siberia to northern China.
In December 2024, the Russian Federation exported large quantities of fossil resources to China and imported technologically advanced goods from the PRC: cars ($806 million), telephones ($349 million), computers ($237 million), delivery trucks ($226 million) and motor vehicles ($212 million).
In the coming years, Sino-Russian economic cooperation will grow because of:
- The Chinese need to implement a policy of diversification of energy supply sources, functional to overcoming the Malacca Dilemma since Beijing’s excessive dependence on the Sea Line of Communication.
- The Kremlin’s need to exploit the successful availability of fossil sources to implement a medium and long-term economic development programme and increase its political-economic credibility in the Asia-Pacific region.
Moscow’s strategic priorities in the Asia-Pacific
In China’s assessment, Russia’s actions in Ukraine showed a disregard for mutually important strategic matters: the situation in the Korean Peninsula and the U.S. military presence in Japan. Since 2013, Beijing and Moscow have defined a common political-strategic doctrine for Korea, aimed at protecting two geopolitical priorities:
- Supervise the Strait of Korea, one of the key passages of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the maritime communication route that crosses the Straits of La Perouse, Bering and the Arctic Ocean, connecting the Asian and European markets.
- Moscow and Beijing see North Korea’s proximity to Russia and China as a geopolitical threat; in a hypothetical war between the U.S. and North Korea, Chinese and Russian cities could be targeted by the U.S. Air Force. Therefore, Moscow and Beijing have tried to control the economic-nuclear development of Kim Jong-Un’s regime so that it can effectively perform the function of a buffer state, separating Russian-Chinese territories from Seoul and U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union viewed the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) as a threat to the Vladivostok Fleet and the Kuril Archipelago, which the Soviets thought of as a natural bastion to defend the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy submarine nuclear base, in the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
Since the 2000s, Vladimir Putin’s presidency has confirmed this Soviet approach, strengthening the operational capabilities of the Eastern Military District and establishing military cooperation with the People’s Republic of China.
Following the start of the Ukraine conflict, the Kremlin has underscored the importance of cooperation with China by participating in Beijing’s military drills, thus reminding Xi Jinping of their shared goals. In 2024, troops belonging to the Eastern Military District took part in 11 joint exercises with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
With the Korean peninsula, the Putin presidency ratified the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Moscow in October 2024, which was followed by sending North Korean soldiers to Ukraine.
Conclusion
The shifting focus of Russia’s military priorities, driven by the conflict in Ukraine, has intensified its economic and strategic partnership with China, particularly in the energy sector. This shift, however, risks undermining Moscow’s interests in the Asia-Pacific, particularly concerning the Korean Peninsula and the U.S. military presence in Japan. While the Russia-China alliance strengthens economically, it risks growing tension within their geopolitical coordination, with Beijing increasingly concerned about Moscow’s reduced attention to the region.
In the years to come, Moscow faces the challenge of maintaining ties with Beijing while simultaneously strengthening its strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The risk of a Chinese frustration over Russia’s shifting focus could destabilise the fragile equilibrium in East Asia, particularly around the Korean Peninsula. As Russia continues to deepen its military ties with North Korea, it may exacerbate tensions with the West and potentially provoke stronger U.S. responses in the region.
Looking ahead, the Kremlin’s need to leverage its energy resources for economic gain, alongside its desire to maintain strategic influence in the region, will drive its policy. Mutual need, not shared global ambitions, might govern the relationship with China, leaving Moscow exposed to Beijing’s shifting priorities. Russia’s actions could further diminish its standing in the region, setting the stage for continued volatility and potential significant realignments in the Asia-Pacific’s strategic landscape.
*Cover picture: Map of 58 countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the main integration groups and their interrelations (Source: Литвинов Н.Н. Стратегический менеджмент на примере Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона. Монография. — М., 2010. — 200 [10] с. — (Strategic Management in the Asian-Pacific) – ISBN 978-5-91252-029-7)
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