
At SpecialEurasia, we believe that strategic cooperation with other think tanks and independent platforms is an essential asset for expanding intelligence depth, facilitating open analytical debate, and ultimately providing our clients with solid, decision-ready geopolitical risk assessments.
To foster this cross-platform dialogue, we spoke with Nicholas Britzolakis Murphy, a UK-based legal and political researcher, and graduate of Law with Politics with the University of Liverpool. He is the founder of GeoPrism, an independent analysis platform dedicated to open debate, democratic values, and clear geopolitical analysis.
Below is our interview with Nicholas Britzolakis Murphy:
In an era increasingly dominated by institutional think tanks and corporate-backed media, GeoPrism operates strictly as an independent platform committed to open debate and autonomous analysis. How does this independence shape the editorial standard of your coverage, and what structural gaps in mainstream international relations reporting are you aiming to bridge by opening your platform to independent contributors?
“I founded GeoPrism in October of last year, and from the outset I envisioned it to be a publication that answers broad, complex questions in geopolitics in a time of increasing uncertainty and volatility in international affairs. States and organisations with vested interests are increasingly understanding the power of online media in shaping people’s perceptions, and that online information can be used as a tool for political ends. I believe independent media has a crucial role in contributing to the upkeep of democracy by allowing people to arrive at their own informed conclusions without special interests influencing them for their own agendas. These independent organisations are especially important for allowing accurate, honest coverage to be accessed in states and territories where information is heavily restricted.
GeoPrism is open to external contributors within the boundaries of our editorial guidelines, which require that articles have a clear analytical focus and answer a central question, rather than opinion-led commentary. Despite being a small and growing publication, we have accepted submissions from a wide range of authors from around the world who can bring their own unique expertise about the countries they live and work in, and we seek to extend our coverage to cover as many international theatres as possible.
One of the reasons I founded GeoPrism was because I noticed that mainstream coverage of international relations is dominated by a small group of organisations which are often out of reach to those who have expertise to contribute. Our publication seeks to platform as diverse a range of voices as possible that can offer expert analysis on geopolitics.”
Looking at Eurasia through your combined lens of international law and foreign policy, what do you assess to be the single most critical, yet underreported, geopolitical risk threat-multiplying across the supercontinent over the next decade, and how are shifting alliance dynamics accelerating that risk?
“A major geopolitical risk looming over Eurasia in the coming years and decades will be competition over increasingly scarce resources such as water, which will likely be exacerbated by global warming and migration flows from increasingly unlivable parts of the world.
The tension between Egypt and Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) along the river Nile is one contemporary example of the kind of disputes we are likely to see more of in Eurasia as global warming reduces river flows and makes vital water resources more scarce. Despite decades old treaties giving Egypt and Sudan nearly total control of the Nile’s waters, Ethiopia’s government took the position that it was not bound by these agreements and needed to take its resource security into its own hands unilaterally, leading many analysts to fear that this tension could boil over into open conflict.
The majority of Iraq’s vital water comes in from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers via Turkey, which controls how much water gets into Iraq. The flow of water has historically been a source of tension between the two countries, and in 2009 Turkey came to an agreement with Iraq which secured Iraqi collaboration against Kurdish militants and petroleum agreements in exchange for increased water flows. Despite this, in 2025 Iraq experienced a particularly severe drought, and as these events become more common we are likely to see more examples of heightened tensions between countries that control water resources and those who rely on them, and more alliances and agreements such as the 2009 agreement between Turkey and Iraq which offer resource security in exchange for concessions.
It is also expected that increasing water insecurity and harsher climates will lead to much larger migration flows from water stressed countries toward Europe. We have already seen in 2020 with the Evros border crisis and the 2021 Belarus-EU border crisis how states have proven willing to weaponise migration flows to put pressure on the EU, and we may see moves to amend international laws and treaties regarding migration as well as more agreements between common migrant origin and migrant destination countries to try and prevent further such incidents.”

The Western Balkans remain a primary intersection of European integration ambitions and external power competition from actors like Russia and China. How do you see the erosion of international legal norms and unresolved post-conflict frameworks impacting long-term stability and sovereignty across the region?
“China’s economic footprint in the Balkans is growing steadily, and is now the second largest trading partner of the Western Balkan Six (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) behind the European Union, in large part due to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Serbia has been in negotiations to join the Union since 2012, but slow progress and political deadlock has made closer alignment with China more attractive to Serbian governments over the past few years.
The European Union has made normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia a mandatory precondition for both states to become members, which the European Commission says is still far from being realised. The EU-mediated 2023 Ohrid Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo set out a framework for normalisation between the two countries, but there were few domestic political incentives for either government to fully implement the steps in the agreement, particularly given that the 1999 Kosovo War and its trauma remains in living memory for much of the electorate in both states. Additionally, historic ties between Serbia and Russia have led to Serbia abstaining from supporting EU positions on foreign policy issues such as the war in Ukraine.
While the EU remains Serbia’s largest trading partner and still retains a large degree of influence in the country, this resulting deadlock has allowed China to step in and expand its political and economic footprint in Serbia, securing arms deals and agreements on multi billion dollar infrastructure projects. Montenegro has also worked with China on large infrastructure projects. A $1 Billion loan was taken out with China’s Exim-Bank in 2014 to build the The Bar-Boljare Highway, which ultimately strained Montenegro’s finances to the point that further loans and grants from the EU were needed to help restructure the debt and ensure the highway’s completion. There are legitimate concerns around the impact of such agreements on the sovereignty of Balkan states if they become economically or politically bound to the countries financing such projects.
Montenegro is now in advanced stages of talks to join the European Union, which if successful will bind the country closer to Europe economically and politically. The EU is still yet to develop a clear message to candidate and member states on how broadly and intimately they may align themselves economically with states like China, and it is this grey area in which China is able to entrench itself into the Balkans.”
Energy discoveries and overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims have turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a high-stakes arena for maritime law and power projection. What legal or diplomatic mechanisms do you view as essential for de-escalating tensions between key regional actors, and where do traditional frameworks currently fall short?
“As we have seen from the ongoing conflict in Iran, control over energy resources is increasingly important as a means of wielding geopolitical and economic power. Natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean in the past two decades have reignited disputes between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus over the extent of their Exclusive Economic Zones, which grant states sovereign rights over the natural resources within them.
The disagreement between Greece and Turkey over the extent of their EEZs is a result of differing interpretations and applications of international law. Greece is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Greece claims grants islands their own maritime zones as part of its national EEZ. Turkey is not a signatory to UNCLOS, and instead claims that islands do not generate full maritime zones, meaning both countries’ maritime claims overlap. While UNCLOS contains provisions pertaining to the settlement of cases of overlapping claims, Turkey’s non signatory status complicates the process of mediation within the bounds of the treaty.
This issue has recently been reignited by Libya’s Tobruk-based House of Representatives ratifying a memorandum of understanding with Turkey which sought to draw a maritime boundary between Turkey and Libya within Greece’s claimed EEZ. The memorandum was criticised by the EU, Egypt, Bahrain and others, particularly for ignoring the maritime entitlement of Crete, Greece’s largest and most populous island, and for attempting to redraw the maritime borders of a country without its agreement. The memorandum was drafted as a result of Turkey’s irredentist ‘Blue Homeland’ policy, which seeks to widen Turkey’s EEZ and continental shelf deep into waters claimed by Greece under UNCLOS.
One of the central problems at the heart of this dispute is the decentralised nature of international law, where states retain discretion over which treaties they choose to accept and which ones they don’t, meaning international legal frameworks are not always universally applied. Mechanisms have been proposed to settle the disagreement between the two countries, such as referral of the dispute to the ICJ for adjudication, but thus far the two parties have not agreed to jointly enter a case to settle the matter. Confidence building measures are ongoing between the two countries, leading to a meeting between delegations of the Greek and Turkish Navies in October of this year. I believe gradual trust building measures like these and a rejection of irredentist and expansionist concepts in the region could help maintain peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, as both states have considerable economic and security interests in avoiding escalation.”
The Middle East is undergoing rapid realignments while simultaneously facing severe crises surrounding international humanitarian law and regional deterrence. How are these regional dynamics reshaping European foreign policy priorities, and what role should independent analysts play in separating ideological narratives from strategic realities in the region?
“The ongoing conflict in Iran has in my view exposed the widening divergence between the US and Europe on foreign policy. The intervention in Iran led to global price surges in oil, disruptions to the flow and safety of international maritime traffic, and contributed to volatility in the wider Middle East region which all have serious downstream effects to European countries. The collapse of the JCPOA Nuclear Deal, which the UK, Germany and France helped to negotiate, undermined European foreign policy efforts which sought to provide greater stability to the region.
The European Union must be capable of projecting a distinct foreign policy that consistently advocates for diplomatic solutions to regional issues and the maintenance of stability in which international trade can occur unimpeded. This must include condemnation of actions that oppose this where they occur, even if that involves condemning its own partners. That is how Europe maintains credibility as an honest partner and interlocutor.
As independent analysts, it is key to understand the underlying reasons and contexts behind ideological narratives as well as being able to parse them from other considerations which may be at play behind the scenes. Ideology is in many cases an expression of a state’s understanding of its own interests, in other cases it can be used to mask economic or domestic political interests of those in power. Independent analysts must always be able to apply a consistent analytical lens to the behaviour of states and should draw attention to violations of human rights and actions that threaten global peace. They must also not be afraid to challenge prevailing narratives expressed by governments, media organisations and political institutions.”