Executive Intelligence Snapshot

Italy is strengthening its presence in the Caspian Sea region through a dual engagement with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

Rome’s strategy combines energy security, logistical connectivity, and political cooperation, positioning Italy as a key European actor in the Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans‑Caspian Middle Corridor.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to Baku and Italy’s participation in the Italy–Kazakhstan Supply Chain Forum 2026 highlight a coherent attempt to consolidate relations with two of the most relevant partners for the European Union in the Caspian basin.

Context

In the first week of May 2026, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni travelled to Baku, marking the first visit by an Italian premier to Azerbaijan in thirteen years. The visit occurred at a moment of heightened instability in the Middle East and followed the temporary relocation of the Italian embassy in Iran to Baku. During her mission, Meloni met with President Ilham Aliyev to discuss energy cooperation, regional security, and Italy’s broader role in the Caspian Sea region.

The meeting centred on the Southern Gas Corridor, particularly the Trans‑Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which terminates in Apulia and supplies Italy with Azerbaijani natural gas extracted from Shah Deniz‑2. In 2025, Azerbaijan exported 25 bcm of natural gas, of which 9.5 bcm went to Italy, confirming Rome as Baku’s most important European customer. Both leaders discussed the need to expand TAP’s capacity, building on recent upgrades to compressor stations in Greece. Meloni emphasised that Azerbaijani oil and gas had been “decisive” for Italy’s energy security since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, and she reiterated Italy’s ambition to act as the “privileged gateway” for Caspian energy entering the European market.

The visit also reflected Italy’s intention to strengthen its economic presence in Azerbaijan. Around 30 Italian companies currently operate in the country, with 23 projects underway in the Nagorno-Karabakh. Bilateral trade reached €10.2 billion last year, and both sides confirmed plans for a Business Forum in Baku in the second half of 2026. Meloni also reaffirmed Italy’s support for the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalisation process, started in August 2025 and mediated by the United States, recognising that regional stability is essential for the security of energy corridors.

In the same period, Italy expanded its engagement with Kazakhstan through the Italy–Kazakhstan Supply Chain Forum 2026, held in Astana. The event brought together representatives of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport, state institutions, international organisations, and Italian and international businesses. The forum focused on the development of the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), a key east–west logistics route linking China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Europe.

Kazakhstan presented its strategy to strengthen its role as a Eurasian transport and logistics hub, highlighting ongoing efforts to modernise infrastructure, digitalise logistics processes, and eliminate bottlenecks along the route. Italian participants expressed interest in contributing to infrastructure development, logistics services, and transport cooperation along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan emphasised that it offers stable and transparent conditions for long‑term investment in the transport sector, aiming to transform the Middle Corridor from a simple transit route into a competitive global logistics product.

Analysis

Italy–Azerbaijan: Energy, Stability, and Strategic Access

Italy’s relationship with Azerbaijan is anchored in energy cooperation. TAP has delivered more than 45 bcm of gas to Italy since its launch, covering around 16% of national demand. Recent upgrades to compressor stations in Greece have increased capacity, and discussions are ongoing regarding further expansion.

Meloni’s visit to Baku confirms Italy’s intention to deepen its role in the Azerbaijani market. Rome seeks to expand cooperation beyond energy into infrastructure, reconstruction projects in the Nagorno-Karabakh, and industrial modernisation. Around 30 Italian companies already operate in Azerbaijan, and bilateral trade reached €10.2 billion last year.

Italy also supports the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalisation process, recognising that regional stability is essential for the security of energy corridors and for the protection of Italian investments.

Opportunities

• Energy security: Increased gas volumes through TAP reinforce Italy’s diversification strategy.
• Industrial presence: Italian companies can expand their role in reconstruction, infrastructure, and modernisation projects.
• Political influence: Rome strengthens its position within EU policy towards the South Caucasus.
• Gateway function: Italy consolidates its role as the main European entry point for Caspian energy.

Challenges

• Regional instability: The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process remains fragile and could affect energy corridors.
• Geopolitical competition: Turkey and Russia maintain strong influence in the region.
• Infrastructure constraints: TAP expansion requires sustained investment and political coordination.
• Security environment: Middle Eastern instability may indirectly affect Italian operations in the region.

Italy–Kazakhstan: Logistics, Connectivity, and the Middle Corridor

Italy’s participation in the Italy–Kazakhstan Supply Chain Forum 2026 demonstrates Rome’s interest in the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan is promoting the route as a competitive Eurasian logistics product, emphasising infrastructure modernisation, digitalisation, and the elimination of bottlenecks.

For Italy, the Middle Corridor offers an opportunity to diversify supply chains, strengthen its presence in Central Asia, and support EU connectivity initiatives. Italian companies are exploring opportunities in transport infrastructure, logistics services, and digital solutions along the route.

Kazakhstan provides a stable and transparent investment environment, and Italy’s involvement supports Astana’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian and Chinese transit routes.

Opportunities

• Logistics integration: Italian companies can participate in the development of the Middle Corridor.
• Market diversification: Kazakhstan offers a stable environment for long‑term investments.
• Strategic positioning: Italy strengthens its presence in Central Asia, supporting EU connectivity goals.
• Caspian cooperation: Joint projects with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan enhance Italy’s role in regional transport networks.

Challenges

• Geopolitical pressure: Russia and Iran may oppose deeper EU involvement in Caspian connectivity.
• Infrastructure gaps: The Middle Corridor requires significant upgrades to become fully competitive.
• Regulatory harmonisation: Synchronisation of customs, digital systems, and logistics processes remains incomplete.
• Regional dynamics: Balancing relations with China’s Belt and Road Initiative is necessary to avoid strategic friction.

Outlook

Italy is emerging as a significant actor in the Caspian Sea region. Through its partnerships with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Rome is consolidating its role in European energy security as well as EU foreign policy, expanding its presence in Eurasian connectivity, and supporting the development of alternative transport routes that bypass traditional chokepoints.

For foreign investors, particularly those from Italy and the European Union, Rome’s expanding role in the Caspian Sea region opens additional avenues for economic engagement. The sustainability of these opportunities, however, depends on the region’s stability and the preservation of the current geopolitical configuration in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

In the short term, businesses and investors must closely monitor developments in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. The durability of any settlement will directly influence the security of energy corridors, the viability of reconstruction projects in the Nagorno-Karabakh, and the broader investment climate in Azerbaijan. A deterioration in relations between Baku and Yerevan could introduce geopolitical risks affecting Italian and European commercial interests.

Regarding Kazakhstan, the country’s ambition to strengthen ties with the EU and European partners such as Italy reflects Astana’s strategy to diversify its trade routes and consolidate its position as a logistics hub in Eurasia. Nevertheless, investors should pay attention to Kazakhstan’s evolving relations with Moscow and Beijing. Although Astana maintains a multi‑vector foreign policy, its economic and security links with Russia and China remain significant. Monitoring these dynamics is essential to avoid exposure to potential secondary effects of Western sanctions, particularly for Kazakh companies engaged in sensitive sectors or maintaining active cooperation with Russian entities.

Overall, Italy’s growing engagement in the Caspian Sea offers promising prospects, but it requires a careful reading of regional political developments and an informed assessment of the strategic environment shaping both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.