This report examines the implications of April’s meeting between Tatarstan and Turkish representatives and highlights Tatarstan’s role in foresting Moscow’ foreign relation and, simultaneously, remaining a key economic and political asset in the Russian hands.
The upcoming Kavkaz Investment Forum in Chechnya presents an opportunity to highlight the economic potential of the North Caucasus region. Recent years have seen robust socio-economic growth, but challenges remain, including over-reliance on tourism and external geopolitical pressures.
Recent developments show significant shifts in transportation and trade routes linking Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Russia’s investment in transport corridors through Iran and the Arctic, alongside developments in the Turkmenbashi port, signifies a strategic move to reshape regional trade dynamics.
The resurgence of Islamist radical activity in the North Caucasus region, particularly attributed to the Ingush Jamaat of the Islamic State Wilayat Kavkaz, poses a significant threat to regional stability and security.
Russia and Tajikistan are currently engaged in joint counterterrorism exercises, which have become even more crucial because of the rise in terrorist activities in Afghanistan. This partnership between Moscow and Dushanbe highlights their commitment to enhancing military and defence cooperation.
On April 8th, 2024, the Al Azaim Foundation released The Voice of Khurasan Issue 34 titled “The Bear Bewildered.” This publication analysed the recent terrorist attacks in Moscow defined as a ‘retaliation’ and serves as a call to action aimed at mobilising the Muslim Ummah against perceived Western invasions and advocating for the restoration of the Caliphate.
Developing and improving the socioeconomic conditions in the Far East is of utmost importance for the Russian Federation, as it offers a substantial opportunity for economic growth and strategic influence. In this scenario, although Beijing might be one of the key investors in the region, there is also the possibility of a conflict between Russia and China for the control and influence of the Far East’s regional dynamics and economic market.
The recent terrorist attacks targeting the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, leaving 147 dead and hundreds injured, have sent shockwaves through Russia and beyond. This tragic event serves as a stark reminder that no nation is immune to the threat of terrorism and the insidious spread of jihadist propaganda.
The landscape of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kyrgyzstan highlights the China-Russia competition in the Central Asian republic with China emerging as the principal investor, surpassing Russia and Kazakhstan.
The devastating terrorist attack that occurred in Moscow on March 22nd, 2024, resulting in 147 casualties and hundreds injured, has starkly emphasised the urgent need to combat terrorism, particularly in the face of the escalating influence of the Islamic State within the spectrum of jihadist groups. This report seeks to address several key questions pertaining to the attack and its implications for Russia.
The terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow serves as a stark reminder of the persistent threat of terrorism within Russia. The indiscriminate violence unleashed by unknown assailants resulted in 40 fatalities and over 100 injuries, highlighting the vulnerability of civilian gatherings and cultural institutions to extremist acts.
The Geopolitical Report Podcast provides a firsthand account of the political landscape in Moscow, Russia, following our team’s on-ground exploration during the week of the Russian presidential elections.
The recent memorandum of understanding of human rights cooperation between Russia and Senegal has marked a significant milestone in their cooperation, highlighting Moscow’s growing interests in the African country.
In the heart of Russia’s political fervour, SpecialEurasia embarks on an official visit to Moscow, the epicentre of the Russian Federation. With the pivotal juncture we are currently facing, characterised by the imminent presidential elections, our team is actively involved in a multitude of endeavours that center on comprehending the intricate dynamics of Russia’s domestic and global affairs.
In our recent podcast episode, we delved into the intricacies of security and terrorism in the North Caucasus, explaining the geopolitical significance this region holds for Russia and its broader role on the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard.
The upcoming Russian presidential elections, scheduled for March 15th-17th, 2024, are a pivotal moment in the nation’s domestic politics. Despite Western claims of irregularities, these elections represent a significant opportunity for Vladimir Putin to reaffirm his leadership and governance.
In the latest podcast episode, we discussed Russia’s recent presidential decree which included the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), as well as the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions into the Southern Military District.
Recent Transnistria’s appeal for protection to Russia has elevated the regional geopolitical risk, underscoring the precarious situation in Moldova. Transnistria, also known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), has sought Moscow’s aid in response to alleged pressure from the Moldovan government.
Dmitry Medvedev’s recent visit to Grozny and meeting with Ramzan Kadyrov and local military officials confirmed the role that Chechnya is plying in supporting Russia in the Ukraine conflict and the North Caucasian republic’s increasing role in regional and state’s dynamics and foreign policy.
The recent suggestion to open an Eurasian Economic Union Trading House in Iran underlined the organisation’s commitment to increase trade and cooperation with the Islamic Republic and the positive and increasing relations between Moscow and Tehran on different issues related to the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard.
In this episode of the “Geopolitical Report” podcast series by SpecialEurasia, we examined the relationship between Iran and Tatarstan. The episode underscores the pivotal role played by Tatarstan in advancing the Moscow-Tehran relationship, underscoring its significance in shaping the Kremlin’s foreign policy in the Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world.
The participation of Vladimir Putin and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in the ceremony for the fourth unit of Egypt’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant underscores the strategic significance of Russo-Egyptian collaboration. The project, led by Rosatom, marks a milestone in Russia’s involvement in Africa, signifying an expanding geopolitical influence.
While the North Caucasus Federal District demonstrates resilience, potential risks include external geopolitical influences and the need for sustained economic stability. The region’s dependency on tourism growth demands careful management to avoid overreliance on a single sector. Additionally, monitoring external pressures on the Russian economy remains crucial for sustained development.
Despite its recognition, Diyanet has been embroiled in scandals in Europe, particularly related to illegal intelligence activities and financial transactions. Its active involvement in the post-Soviet space, notably in Central Asia and Russia, reflects its role as a tool of Turkish “soft power” and an avenue for cultural and humanitarian dialogue.
In this paper published in Geopolitical Report ISSN 2532-845X Vol. 4 Year 2023, the author Giuliano Bifolchi delves into the multifaceted approach undertaken by the Russian government in managing the diverse ethnic groups and indigenous people residing in the North Caucasus.
Kyrgyzstan’s economic landscape is deeply intertwined with Russia, reflecting substantial joint ventures and investments. The recent shift in language policy, diminishing the use of the Russian language, signals a departure in cultural ties. Simultaneously, Kyrgyzstan is strategically engaging with China in energy and infrastructure projects, while Turkish influence extends through education, culture, and military cooperation.
Putin’s visit to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh confirmed Russia’s strategy in the Arab-Muslim world aimed at enhancing economic partnership in energy, logistics, and trade and attracting Gulf monarchies’ investors in Russian infrastructural projects.
The recent arrest of a 23-year-old individual in Ingushetia, implicated in supporting online Imarat Kavkaz, underscores the persistent threat posed by this terrorist organisation in the North Caucasus region. While empirical evidence suggests a strong diminished operational capacity on the ground, the organisation’s propaganda remains a potent force capable of influencing local sentiments.
The upcoming visit to Russia of Qatar Prime Minister accentuates Doha’s role among the Arab and Muslim countries to promote the end of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and Moscow’s desire to become more involved in the Middle Eastern dynamics. Since the Russian Federation has a significant presence of Muslim people in the country and the Kremlin has adopted a foreign policy aimed at strengthening relations and economic cooperation with the Arab-Muslim world, the cooperation with Qatar and other Gulf monarchies might represent an opportunity for Moscow’s strategy in the region.
The Russian ambassador in Dushanbe recently underscored a notable upswing in collaborative efforts between Russia and Tajikistan, specifically in the realms of security and countering drug trafficking, confirming Moscow’s strategy to strengthen its influence in the Central Asian republic.
The Makhachkala Airport protest in the Republic of Dagestan accentuated the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Muslim umma (community) in the Russian Federation and the Kremlin’s necessity to manage potential tensions coming from the coexistence of different religious groups inside the country.
The opening of trading houses between Dagestan and Uzbekistan confirmed Makhachkala’s role in promoting its business in Central Asia and, therefore, supporting the Russian presence in this strategic market. Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the North Caucasus has played a significant role in promoting the Kremlin’s economic and political presence in Russia’s blizhnee zarubezhe.
Emomali Rahmon’s meeting with Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the enduring strategic alliance between Moscow and Dushanbe, underscoring Russia’s deliberate emphasis on fortifying collaborative efforts with Tajikistan, particularly in matters pertaining to defence and security, along with education and societal domains.
In August 2023, SpecialEurasia undertook a visit to Abkhazia, engaging in discussions with Viacheslav Chirikba, Director at the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of Abkhazia, to delve into both the regional geopolitical dynamics and the intricacies of the local socioeconomic landscape.
The recent capitulation of Nagorno-Karabakh in the face of Azerbaijan’s military offensive has brought to light Russia’s recalibrated strategic approach in the region. This shift focuses on forging a robust alliance with both Baku and Ankara, a move designed to bolster the INSTC and leverage Turkish land as a potential hub for its new energy approach.
The establishment of the Dagestan National Centre in Russia and the Dagestan Volunteer Battalion ‘Imam Shamil’ in Ukraine underscores the reverberations of the Ukraine conflict in the North Caucasus. This development highlights a substantial threat emanating from various movements and organisations, advocating for the destabilisation and fragmentation of the Russian Federation.
Russia’s concerted efforts in Kyrgyzstan, focused on supporting local educational and humanitarian initiatives, represent a significant augmentation of its soft power and cultural influence in the region. The cornerstone of this strategy lies in the establishment of Russian language schools in Kyrgyzstan, a project actively backed by Moscow.
In the ongoing contest between Russia and Ukraine for endorsement from the Islamic world, the North Caucasus emerges as a critical asset in the Kremlin’s strategic arsenal. It serves as a linchpin for Moscow’s domestic political efforts in managing a diverse, multireligious, and multiethnic society, while also underpinning Russia’s foreign policy activities directed towards the Arab-Muslim world.
Nikol Pashinyan’s recent statements on Armenia’s ‘erroneous’ dependence on Russia may reflect a new direction in Yerevan’s foreign policy, signalling a desire to seek alternative solutions, particularly by cultivating stronger relationships with Western nations
The forthcoming CSTO exercises in Belarus serve as a clear demonstration of the organisation’s strategic commitment to safeguarding its member states, focusing particularly on protecting Moscow and Minsk from potential external threats originating from Europe.
The Astrakhan region has historically served as a significant centre of Russian presence in the Caspian region for centuries. Since the late 20th century, following the geopolitical shifts caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Astrakhan’s role in Russia’s Caspian policy has acquired considerable prominence.
Chinese Minister of Defence’s visit to Russia and Belarus reflects the cooperation between these countries in the realm of defence and highlights the significance of multilateral discussions in ensuring global stability and security.
Given the significance of the North Caucasus region in the intricate Eurasian geopolitical landscape and the potential role of indigenous communities within Russian society, SpecialEurasia decided to visit the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia to attend the Forum of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation.
The recent mutiny led by the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner in the Russian Federation brought forth a critical moment for President Vladimir Putin. During this crisis, Putin garnered the support of the Russian army, regional governors and heads of states, reaffirming his powerful position in the political and military landscape.
The orchestrated military rebellion, led by Evgeny Prigozhin, against the central authority in Russia, presents an opportunity for Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen leader, and his military troops to emerge as significant allies and actors in the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy landscape.
Recent developments in Russia have brought attention to the involvement of the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) in an attempted armed rebellion or mutiny. The incident, which unfolded on the evening of June 23rd, 2023, has triggered a series of reactions and measures by key institutions, leaving the country on high alert.
The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) serves as a significant milestone in Russia’s foreign policy and economic strategy.
This report highlights the reasons the North Caucasus remains important and necessitates ongoing monitoring and provides some future scenarios about the region.
The recent meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon has unveiled the Central Asian republic’s strategic role for Moscow’s foreign policy in the region in defence, security, economy and social sectors.
Dagestan and Tajikistan’s entente on developing cooperation confirms the North Caucasus’s role in promoting relations between Russia and foreign countries, especially those in the blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad) where the Kremlin wants to confirm its presence and influence.
The KazanForum 2023 and Zelensky’s visit to Jeddah during the Arab League summit underlined how strategic is the Muslim world for Russia and Ukraine.
The KazanForum 2023 and the “China-Central Asia” Summit definitely emphasise Kremlin and Beijing’s strategies in Eurasia and the Islamic world’s strategic areas in time of confrontation with the West.
The CIA video in the Russian language published on YouTube, which invites dissatisfied Russians to provide information to the U.S. Intelligence agency, confirms Washington’s strategy to create a network of assets inside the Russian Federation and put pressure on the Kremlin.
On the surface, the Ukraine war appears to be a conflict between two primary actors, namely, the Russian Federation and the sovereign nation of Ukraine. On deeper analysis, however, it can be said that the Ukraine war is an example of great power competition.
The Kremlin might face a new wave of violent attacks or regional destabilisation due to the establishment of the Ingush Liberation Army, a military branch that the Ingush Independence Committee created to support an independent Ingushetia separated from the Russian Federation.
In the last months, the South Caucasus has again experienced regional turbulence. While there have been protests in Georgia over a controversial draft law that would have required some organisations receiving foreign funding to register as “foreign agents”, Armenia and Azerbaijan might be again on the edge of an escalation involving the CSTO and, therefore, Russia.
Increased Russian investments in Adygea confirm the Kremlin’s strategy to implement the North Caucasus’ socioeconomic development and transform the region into a logistics hub supporting the diversification of Russian exports.
SpecialEurasia discussed with Alexandr Sharov, General Director of the transport company LLC Neftekhimtrans, Group of companies Rusiranexpo, the current geopolitical significance of the INSTC and possible future developments and impact in the Eurasian strategic chessboard.
Russia-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan’s ‘trilateral gas union’ might represent geopolitical leverage in favour of Moscow and Beijing because it might simultaneously satisfy the Chinese energy market’s needs and support the Russian and Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia.
The presence of the Musul’manskij korpus “Kavkaz” in the Ukraine conflict stressed the significant role that volunteer battalions have in supporting Kyiv and fighting against the Russian Federation, which they consider an imminent threat to the Ukrainian territory and the Muslim umma.
In Russia, the detention of five people connected with the terrorist organisation Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and a person linked to Katiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad confirmed FSB’s effort to guarantee regional security and avoid the link between local Russian citizens and terrorist organisations operating in the Middle East.
Il forum economico “Russia – Mondo islamico” che si svolgerà a Kazan nel maggio 2023 sottolinea l’importanza che il mondo musulmano ha nella politica estera russa, in special modo a seguito delle imposizioni delle sanzioni occidentali che hanno spinto Mosca a riversare i propri interessi su mercati alternativi.
In the context of the Ukraine conflict and the changing geopolitical scenario in Eurasia, Islamabad denied the ammunition supply to Ukraine to avoid any possible deterioration of the relations with the Russian Federation, which is actively involved in promoting the Pakistani energy and logistic markets.
SpecialEurasia, Mondo Internazionale, Opinio Juris – Law & Political Review e MInter Group srl organizzano il giorno martedì 21 febbraio 2023 alle ore 19.00 il webinar online “Un anno di guerra in Ucraina: riflessioni, analisi geopolitica, possibili sviluppi futuri” il cui obiettivo è quello di analizzare le dinamiche inerenti al conflitto ucraino contestualizzandone nello scacchiere geopolitico eurasiatico.
La presenza di foreign fighters e battaglioni di volontari in Ucraina accresce il rischio geopolitico dello scacchiere strategico eurasiatico essendo questi attori non statali impegnati attualmente nel combattere le forze armate russe e al contempo collegati direttamente o indirettamente con membri della diaspora o della militanza armata-jihadista che negli ultimi anni hanno operato nello spazio post-sovietico e in Medio Oriente.
The recent Russia-Turkmenistan business forum attended by the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin confirmed Kremlin’s strategy in Central Asia and Moscow’s desire to deepen economic and diplomatic cooperation with Ashgabat to avoid any further external interference by the European Union, China, or the United States.
The Kremlin’s project to evaluate the opportunity to implement Islamic banking in Russia might support the national economy, attract foreign investors from the Arab-Muslim world, and counter the consequences of Western sanctions imposed against Moscow due to the Ukraine conflict.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked economic sanctions, which are meant to cripple the economy while detracting from Russia’s ability to wage war. This paper will analyse the sanctions’ impact, the war on the Russian economy and possible future implications.
The commercial and political partnership between Dagestan and Azerbaijan might support the increasing relations between Moscow and Baku and implement the Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.
The Russian State Duma’s official visit to Abkhazia confirms the Kremlin’s presence in the South Caucasus and the Abkhaz territory’s strategic role in Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow-Sukhum improving relations stress the Russian desire to confirm its influence in the Caucasus in a challenging time characterised by the Ukraine conflict and the confrontation with the West.
The beginning of the Ukraine conflict drew a line under the development of the geopolitical situation on the Eurasian continent over the past three decades since the beginning of the 1990s.
Stavropol authorities’ desire to open trade offices abroad might underline Russia’s strategic economic goal in the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard, especially in Azerbaijan, Iran, China, and the United Arab Emirates.
The creation of the Turan Battalion confirmed that the Ukraine conflict had become the perfect battleground for international fighters and contractors united by the desire to fight against the Russian Federation and promote their ideologies and goals.
The establishment of an IT Park in Ingushetia named after Adam Khamkhoev, killed in May 2022 in Ukraine, underlined local and central authorities’ desire to promote economic development and support Kremlin’s narrative related to heroism and national unity.
The Stavropol territory welcomed representatives from the Middle East and Africa in the event “North Caucasus in the Changing World”, whose goal was to create a link between the region and potential foreign investors and markets.
The first “Central Asia-Russia” summit in Astana confirmed the Russian importance in the region and the Kremlin’s strategy to increase economic cooperation with Central Asian republics.
Tokayev’s suggestion to create an organisation in the framework of the CIS to promote the Russian language might be interpreted as Kazakhstan’s attempt to normalise relations with Russia, which were downgraded due to the Ukraine conflict and the Western sanctions.
Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has played a decisive and influential role in assisting the Russian military operations on the ground with his kadyrovtsy and Chechen troops and supporting the Kremlin’s ideological confrontation with the West.
Recent arrests of Russian citizens in the Stavropol territory linked with the Islamic State confirmed that jihadist propaganda penetrated the Russian territory by exploiting local problems and influencing the Muslim communities disseminated in the country, especially in the North Caucasus, where the Kremlin has contrasted local militancy and religious extremism.
Due to the Ukraine conflict and the following Western sanctions, Russia and Belarus have increased their economic and trade cooperation by increasing joint projects in different fields.
Russia and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) signed the most significant deal since the Taliban movement came to power last year, confirming Kremlin’s interests in the country and Moscow’s will to become a key regional actor.
The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the Russian Federation organised an event in the city of Makhachkala to promote the national culture and create a link with Dagestan, a strategic North Caucasian republic located on the Caspian Sea.
The possibility that Donbas will soon hold a referendum to join the Russian Federation might significantly influence the Eurasian geopolitical chessboard by exacerbating the confrontation between Moscow and the West and, therefore, impacting regional and international political and socioeconomic dynamics.
In a video message, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the partial military mobilisation, confirming the difficult situation that the Russian troops are experiencing in the Ukraine conflict due to Kyiv’s counter-offensive to reconquer Donbas and Crimea.
Kremlin’s promotion of Dagestan culture and society in Sochi underlines Moscow’s goal to contrast Kavkazophobia and, simultaneously, improve the link between ethnic Russians and local ethnic Dagestani groups since this North Caucasian republic has a strategic role in the Caspian Sea region.
The Russian Federation’s humanitarian help to Pakistan might strengthen the political and economic relations between Moscow and Islamabad and support the Russian desire to expand its influence and presence in Central and South-East Asia.
Georgian authorities denied that Tbilisi would hold a referendum to open a “second front” against the Russian Federation, destabilising the South Caucasus and threatening the Georgian economy, which is heavily dependent on the Russian market.
In the framework of the Eastern Economic Forum 2022, we met Dr Shoaib Khan to analyse the current state of relations between Russia and India, key areas of cooperation and expectations from the Forum.
The recent phone conversation between the President of Russia and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia might be interpreted as the Kremlin’s move to counter the recent U.S. President Joe Biden’s official visit to Riyadh.
In a world of growing polarity, Kazakhstan has been attempting to portray itself as a bridge connecting the East and the West. However, the so-called Russian “special operation” in Ukraine has forced the Central Asian nation to distance itself gradually from Moscow.
Although Russian – Iranian ties date back to the Islamic Revolution, Moscow’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine (or special military operation as the Kremlin has always declared) and Tehran’s nuclear ambitions have strengthened the cooperation and pushed these Western adversaries together.
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF 2022) confirmed the diplomatic, economic and political partnership between Russia and Kazakhstan and the strategic role that Tatarstan and Bashkortostsn play in promoting Moscow-Nursultan relations.
The Russian Federation is not immune to jihadist propaganda and terrorist activities. Arrests in the last months of people connected to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham have demonstrated that this terrorist organisation has created or attempted to create a network in different Russian regions.
The Russian Federation will host international business companies and government representatives at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF 2022), an event that underlines the Kremlin’s economic strategy and foreign politics in Eurasia and the global arena.
The Russian Federation outlined a programme to deploy the Pacific submarine flotilla as the Kremlin’s response to the growing geopolitical instability in the Northwest Asia-Pacific region. In this area, the Russian Federation identifies the Sea of Japan and the Korean Peninsula as the main geostrategic areas
The war in Ukraine provided Serbia with an opportunity to continue and boost the policy, which was already unfolding even before the war, of replacing Russia with China as Serbia’s primary non-Western partner.
Recent cyber attacks against Italian government websites highlighted the Ukraine conflict’s impact on the cyber landscape and possible future threats to Europe and Russia’s public institutions and private businesses.
Since several Muslim soldiers are fighting in Ukraine among the ranks of the Russian troops, there is considerable debate and propaganda if they can be considered ‘mujahideen’ who fight in ‘the path of Allah’ or ‘disbelievers’.
According to the Russian Defense Ministry, several foreign fighters from different countries are fighting in Ukraine to support Kyiv’s Government. On the other hand, Middle Eastern newspapers reported that Syrian and Iranian fighters might arrive in Ukraine to fight among the Kremlin’s ranks.