Executive Summary
This report examines the divergent state strategies regarding Islam in Russia and Central Asia, specifically the “instrumentalisation” of religious identity for geopolitical expansion and the systematic “limitation” of faith to ensure domestic autocratic stability.
Moscow leverages Islamic institutions to circumvent Western economic sanctions and extend its influence in the Global South. Simultaneously, Central Asian governments, particularly those in Dushanbe and Astana, have escalated legal constraints on religious practices to counteract perceived dangers to their secular-authoritarian systems.
Intelligence Requirements (IR)
- How do Russia and the Central Asian republics differentiate between “traditional” and “foreign” Islam to regulate public life?
- To what extent is Islam utilised as a diplomatic and economic bridge to the Middle East and the Global South?
- How do violent attacks (e.g., Crocus City Hall, ISKP activity) reshape state-Ummah relations and legislative frameworks?
Context
Resilience against external colonial and ideological pressure has defined the historical trajectory of Islam in the post-Soviet space. Since the 7th-century Arab conquests in Transoxiana and the 922 AD adoption of Islam by the Volga Bulgars, the religion has been inextricably linked to local identity and resistance.
During the Tsarist period, Islam and adat (customary law) established the legal and social foundations for the Murid Wars (1829-1859) in the North Caucasus, giving rise to iconic figures like Imam Shamil and influencing Russian literature, as exemplified by Leo Tolstoy’s novel Hadji Murat, which continues to shape local and Russian society today.
The Soviet period (1917–1991) attempted to replace religion and cultural tradition with the “homo sovieticus” ideal, relegating faith to the private sphere through the destruction of mosques and the creation of “Official Muftiates” designed to keep the clergy loyal to the Communist Party. Despite this, “parallel Islam” endured through covert Sufi organisations and ancestral practices, preparing the way for the substantial religious “renaissance” that became apparent after the USSR’s disintegration in 1991.
Currently, the Muslim population represents a critical demographic and political factor across the region. The Russian Federation is home to about 15-20 million Muslims, concentrated in the North Caucasus, the Volga-Urals (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), and major urban centres like Moscow.
In Central Asia, the demographic dominance is absolute: Uzbekistan has approximately 32-33 million Muslims, Kazakhstan over 13 million, Tajikistan around 9 million, Kyrgyzstan 5-5.5 million, and Turkmenistan 5.5 million. These populations are no longer passive because of their increasing integration into global Islamic discourses, which forced states to transition from mere repression to more sophisticated strategies of “management” and “instrumentalisation.”
Recent legislative shifts reflect these developing state attitudes. In Russia, the Kremlin has moved to formalise Islamic economic integration through the Federal Law on Islamic Banking, which entered its second phase of pilot implementation in early 2026 across four Muslim-majority republics.
Conversely, Central Asian states have adopted a defensive posture. Tajikistan’s Law No. 2048, enacted in June 2024, has effectively banned the public and educational display of “foreign” religious garments, specifically citing the hijab and characterising it as a detriment to national culture. In Kazakhstan, the 2025 amendments to the Law on Religious Activities have tightened the registration requirements for missionaries and religious education, ensuring that any Islamic activity remains strictly under the purview of the state-controlled Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAMK).
Analysis
IR 1: State Behaviour and the “Traditionalist” Binary
The governments of Russia and Central Asia have adeptly employed a “traditional versus non-traditional” dichotomy to control the Muslim ummah (community).
In the Russian Federation, the Kremlin promotes a “traditional official Islam” which is demonstrably loyal, patriotic, and historically interwoven with the imperial framework. By empowering specific Muftiates, such as the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation (DUMRF), the Kremlin creates a monopoly on “correct” interpretation.
This allows the state to “instrumentalise” religion. For example, prominent Muslim figures and regional leaders, such as Ramzan Kadyrov, have characterised the Ukraine conflict as a “Holy War” (Jihad). This framing offers a religious rationale for the Kremlin’s so-called “special military operation”, appealing to conservative segments of the populace.
In Central Asia, states tend to limit or standardise Islam and Muslims’ organisation. Authorities in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan perceive any Islamic expression not officially approved by the state as a direct pathway to radicalisation and a threat to the legitimacy of those in power. This results in a “Secularist Militancy” where the state dictates the length of beards, the content of Friday sermons, and even the names parents can give their children.
By restricting or controlling Islam’s public presence, these governments intend to stop the development of a political Islam that could rally populations against the economic difficulties and absence of political choice inherent in their governance. This establishes a government-controlled “monopoly on faith,” reminiscent of the Soviet system but enhanced with modern surveillance capabilities.
IR 2: Strategic Leverage in Foreign and Domestic Politics
Islam has become a primary lever for Russia’s “Pivot to the East” and “Pivot to the South.” Faced with sanctions from the West, Moscow has leveraged its position as an Observer Member of the OIC to portray itself as a “civilizational ally” to Muslim nations.
The KazanForum, held annually and focusing on Russia-Islamic World relations, has moved beyond its origins as a regional trade exhibition to become a crucial diplomatic hub for Russia’s oil production talks with OPEC+ and its efforts to secure investment from non-Western countries.
Internally, this “instrumentalisation” serves to calm Russia’s Muslim republics by allowing them a measure of “Islamic autonomy” and economic prospects in return for complete political allegiance to the Kremlin.
Central Asian republics use Islam as a “multi-vector” diplomatic tool to balance the influences of Russia, China, and the West. Although they restrict/control Islam domestically, they leverage it internationally to get funds from the Islamic Development Bank and the monarchies of the GCC.
For instance, Uzbekistan has used its historical locations in Samarkand and Bukhara to market itself as the “centre of Islamic civilization,” which has drawn billions in investment from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for both infrastructure and “Halal” tourism.
However, this creates a tension: the states must welcome Gulf capital while simultaneously working to suppress the more conservative religious ideologies that often accompany such investments, leading to a precarious balancing act between economic greed and regime security.
IR 3: Security Threats and Governance Repercussions
The threat of terrorism serves as the ultimate justification for the state’s “limitation” and “instrumentalisation” strategies. The Kremlin faced a difficult situation following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, which was conducted by the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP).
Despite the Kremlin’s initial attribution of blame to Ukraine and the West to uphold its geopolitical narrative, it concurrently escalated the persecution of Central Asian migrants. The escalated actions served as a basis for enacting more rigorous biometric regulations and augmenting mosque surveillance. Within this framework, terrorism functions as a tool for the state to delineate “unreliable” Muslims more precisely, facilitating the removal of individuals whose beliefs diverge from the state-sanctioned interpretation of Islam.
In Tajikistan, the central government has used the “spectre of the Taliban” and ISKP activity as a blanket excuse to eliminate the political opposition. President Emomali Rahmon’s designation of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) as a terrorist organisation has resulted in the criminalisation of all expressions of political Islam. This “limitation” strategy has culminated by 2025-2026, at which point even private religious study groups are classified as terrorist cells.
The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy: by eliminating legal channels for religious and political discourse, the state inadvertently pushes moderate adherents toward extremism, providing a rationale for increased repression and restrictions aimed at upholding the existing power structure.
Indicators to Monitor
- Success of the Islamic banking pilot in Russia by 2028 as a metric for non-Western financial integration.
- Participants, statements, and economic developments coming from KazanForum 2026, organised on 12-17 May 2026.
- Possibility that Kazakhstan’s religious restriction are mirrored by Kyrgyzstan, showing a regional shift toward “hard secularism.”
- The ratio of Saudi/Emirati investment in Central Asian infrastructure versus introducing new religious schools (madrasas).
- Increases in ISKP propaganda targeting Central Asian diasporas in Russia as a response to increased state “limitation” policies.
- The degree to which Russian Muftis continue to provide theological “Fatwas” to support state military objectives.
Outlook
Islam will remain one of the most potent socio-political forces in the post-Soviet space, serving simultaneously as a tool for Russian geopolitical “instrumentalisation” and a target for Central Asian state “limitation.”
Economically, the region’s dependence on Islamic finance and Gulf alliances will intensify to mitigate Western pressures, although the GCC economic support now depends also on the consequences of the Middle East war. This development, nevertheless, carries the inherent consequence of increased ideological influence originating from the GCC.
The persistent threat of radicalism, when viewed through the lens of security, will serve as a convenient justification for autocrats in Tajikistan and surrounding regions to curtail dissent, thus ensuring that the state’s-controlled version of Islam will remain the only allowed form of religious expression indefinitely. Conversely, this approach could engender discontent and frustration within Central Asian populations because of state-imposed restrictions. This may foster an environment amenable to jihadist recruitment, heightening geopolitical instability for regional governing authorities.
