Executive Summary
This report assesses the strategic implications of recent maritime attacks near Oman and evaluates whether Muscat’s long-standing neutrality can withstand intensifying regional escalation.
It examines how shifting military dynamics, great-power competition, and infrastructure exposure are reshaping Oman’s security calculus.
Key Takeaways
- Oman’s neutrality might no longer guarantee operational immunity in an increasingly kinetic Gulf environment.
- The development of Duqm enhances strategic relevance but simultaneously increases exposure to great-power rivalry.
- Muscat’s role as mediator depends on all major actors retaining an interest in preserving it as neutral ground.
Information Background
A Palau-flagged oil tanker under US sanctionswas hiton Sunday off Oman’s Musandam Peninsula.The attack followed earlier drone strikes at the commercial port of Duqm on the Arabian Sea.The US Treasury in December 2025 sanctioned Red Sea Ship Management and Skylight, among other vessels, accusing the management company and its owner of operating a shadow fleet to transport Iranian petroleum products in the Gulf.
The targeting of a vessel with Indian and Iranian crew members proves that regional stability is no longer being managed by diplomats, but by a kinetic momentum that ignores traditional loyalties. As for now,it is not clear whether Iran or the US/Israel is behind these attacks.
Tehran’s Command and Controlhas fractured following the death of its leadership. Iran is now “acting independently”, meaning Oman’s high-level diplomatic relationships might no longer translate to safety on the water. Whileacknowledgingthis fracture as an adaptation strategy which follows the decapitation of part of the Iranian military leadership by the US and Israel,Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stressed that what happened in Oman was not the government’s choice.
Araghchi affirmed that Iran’s interactions with its Gulf neighbours are friendly, and that the nation is resolute in fostering these connections.
Oman’s Unique DNA
Experts in the diplomatic world often refer to Oman as the “Switzerland of the Middle East”, but that label is reductive. Oman’s neutrality is not a lack of opinion; it is a deliberate, highly calculated strategic asset known as “Strategic Quietism”.
Unlike the Sunni-Shia divide that fuels regional proxy wars, Oman is predominantly Ibadi. This provides a theological buffer, allowing them to talk to both Riyadh and Tehran without being seen as a sectarian partisan.
Established by the late Sultan Qaboos, the doctrine on which they based their foreign policy is:“Friend to all, enemy to none”.This provides the deniability and safe space required for clandestine talks.
Furthermore, Muscat shares control of the vital chokepoint of theStrait of Hormuzwith Tehran. Stability is not a preference; it is an existential necessity for its economy.
Key Historical Milestones
There have been specific instances where Omani intervention changed the course of regional security. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), while other Gulf states funded Saddam Hussein, Muscatmaintaineddiplomatic ties with Tehran. This allowed Oman to serve as the primary channel for ceasefire negotiations and prisoner exchanges.
Still,the crown jewel of Omanimediationhas been the JCPOA(The Iran Nuclear Deal, 2013–2015). Starting in 2011, the Gulf country hosted secret meetings between US and Iranian officials (a secret channel often referred to as the “Muscat Channel”). The Oman succeeded because it provided a venue away from the prying eyes of the press and even its own neighbours (who were skeptical of the deal).
In the case of the Yemeni Civil War (2015–present), Oman is the only GCC member that didnot jointhe Saudi-led coalition.They serve as the literal physical bridge for Houthi negotiators to meet with Western and UN envoys. Moreover, Muscat leverages its neutral ground status to facilitate medical evacuations and hostage releases, favouring humanitarian logistics.
As the Abraham Accords were taking place, Oman managed nearly the impossible: hosting Israeli Prime Ministers (Rabin in 1994,Netanyahu in 2018) while maintaining a staunchly pro-Palestinian public stance and solid ties with Iran.They act as a “soft-normalisation” tester for the region.
Unlike the UAE or Bahrain,it refuses to sign the Abraham Accords until there is a clear “two-state” path.This makes Muscat the only place where Israeli intelligence (Mossad) and Iranian officials can potentially share a zip code without an immediate diplomatic explosion. The country provides “active disengagement” services—allowing enemies to coexist in the same space to prevent accidental escalation.
The most recent initiative was undertaken by Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, who was facilitating indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States in Geneva.On the eve of the US–Israel strike, hestatedthat a peace agreement between Iran and the United States was within reach,emphasising that any alternative to diplomacy would fail to resolve the issue.
According to the diplomat, the parties had reached a consensus to irreversibly halt nuclear stockpiling and enrichment—a milestone never achieved and a key demand of US President Donald Trump. Following the attack, Albusaidi urged the United States to reconsider its strategy, highlighting that the conflict was not theirs.
The Intelligence Angle
Oman has three strategic pillars: it provides plausible deniability, an intelligence hub, and stability as a product.
The country offers a “black box.” Global powers can fail at the negotiating table in Muscat without losing face publicly. In contrast, European capitals like Vienna or Geneva pose higher risks of media exposure, diplomatic interference, and intelligence surveillance.
Moreover, because everyone talks to Muscat,the Omani Internal Security Service (ISS) possesses one of the most comprehensive human intelligence maps of regional intentions. Although the Omani ISS maintains close intelligence and security ties with both the United Kingdom and the United States, acting as a key partner in regional counterterrorism, Iran still considers it a partner with red lines that doesn’t leak.
Lastly, it “exports” stability to protect its own fragile transition under Sultan Haitham. Sultan Haitham is more focused on the economy than Qaboos was;a regional war would be fatal toOmani Vision 2040.
As Riyadh and Abu Dhabi compete for regional hegemony, Oman’s “middle path” is becoming harder to walk. Muscat is deeply concerned about Emirati influence in Yemen’s Al-Mahra province (which borders Oman). ItviewsUAE-backed militias there as a direct threat to its backyard. While Riyadh and Abu Dhabi compete for hegemony, they both occasionally pressure Oman to pick a side. Therefore, Muscat must be careful and not risk being bought out of its neutrality by GCC neighbours during economic downturns.
Analysis
TheStrait of Hormuzis one of the world’s most critical maritime choke points, with roughly a fifth of global oil and a significant share of LNG exports transiting its narrow waters each day, linking Gulf producers to Asian, European, and global markets. Because anydisruptioncan immediately shock energy prices and global supply chains, control or closure of the strait has become a powerful geopolitical lever, enabling regional actors to exert disproportionate strategic pressure on major energy-importing powers.
Therefore,the real strategic shift has been Oman’s attempt to decouple its economy from the Strait. The country has poured billions into thePort of Duqm, which strategically sits outside the Strait on the Arabian Sea. This allows the country to offer a “back door” for global trade (and potentially oil exports via future pipelines) that bypasses Iranian or Emirati chokepoints. This is the economic insurance for their neutrality—they are making themselves too useful to the West, India, and China to be ignored, even if the Strait is closed.
The strategic landscape shifted violently following theFebruary 2026 US-Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure. The attack on theSkylight,a US-sanctioned tanker, might mark the end of immunity by association. Oman’s strategic quietism was built on the premise that being a “friend to all” provided a physical shield. The attack on a ship with an Iranian crew in Omani waters might prove that things might change.
Another important actor involved is New Delhi. In late 2025/early 2026,India significantly increased its naval footprint in Duqmto protect its mission-based deployments and bypass the high-cost, high-risk Persian Gulf. If Oman allows the US or India to use Duqm for retaliatory logistics, it will lose its “Switzerland” status with Tehran.
If the port becomes a target, Oman will have to choose between its theological neutrality and a formal (Western?) security umbrella to protect its Vision 2040 infrastructure. This would be the definitive end of the “Switzerland” era.
The recent kinetic explosion has effectively liquidated the diplomatic equity Oman spent decades accumulating. Prior to this escalation, the region had been benefiting from the2023 Riyadh-Tehran normalisation mediated by Beijing. This period of pax sinica had ushered in an era of rare de-escalation, allowing for joint economic projects and the stabilisation of the region.
As Qatar’s former Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani critically noted, theGCC states are being “pushed by external forces into a direct clash with Iran”that no local capital desired. Oman is no longer mediating a peace process but managing a catastrophe channel.
Conclusion
Oman’s long-standing strategic quietism is entering its most severe stress test in decades. Theattacks off Musandam and at Duqm show that neutrality no longer guarantees insulation from kinetic spillover, particularly in an environment where attribution is opaque and escalation dynamics are externally driven.
Whether the recent strikes are part of a coordinated pressure campaign or the byproduct of fragmented command structures, the operational reality is the same: Omani waters are no longer perceived as politically immune space.
The expansion of Duqm as a logistics hub for extra-regional powers increases Oman’s strategic relevance, yet simultaneously heightens its exposure. The more Duqm becomes a node in great-power competition, the harder it will be for Muscat to sustain the perception of equidistance.
The core question is no longer whether Oman can mediate, butwhether regional actors still have an incentive to protect the mediator.If deterrence fails and the maritime space around Oman becomes normalised as a contest zone, Muscat may be compelled to formalise security alignments to safeguard Vision 2040 and critical infrastructure. Such a shift would mark the end of Oman’s “Switzerland” era and alter the Gulf’s diplomatic architecture.
