Executive Summary

In 2026, the Eurasian security framework encounters a phase of systemic volatility, marked by the dissolution of conventional counter-terrorism collaborations and the proliferation of hybrid warfare strategies contingent on narrative manipulation.

While 90% of kinetic terrorist activity remains localised in active conflict zones, the strategic utility of these incidents has shifted: non-state actors now leverage local violence to trigger global socio-political shocks. In the East, theTaliban’s inabilityto serve as a comprehensive security guarantor has forcedRussia and Chinainto divergent and risky interventionist strategies. The “theatre of terror” inWestern nationsskilfully exploits existing political fault lines, engendering a self-reinforcing pattern of reciprocal radicalisation.

The current reporting period underscores a critical confluence of threats: the BLA’s “Operation Herof 2.0” in Pakistan, the officialisation of military cooperation between Russia and the Taliban, and the precariousness of the post-Assad transition in Syria, all of which suggest a highly volatile first and second quarter of 2026.

Main Findings

1. The AfPak border has effectively transitioned into a borderless insurgent sanctuary, facilitating a multi-front war for Islamabad against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a tactically rejuvenated Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).
2. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has effectively shifted its focus to “economic terrorism,” specifically targeting Chinese and foreign interests within Afghanistan.
3. Western domestic political reactions to infrequent lone-actor assaults unintentionally affirm extremist ideologies, propagating a cycle of xenophobia and radicalisation that aligns with the enduring strategic aims of global jihadist organisations.

Security Context

The opening months of 2026 have witnessed a dramatic escalation in militant sophistication. OnJanuary 31, 2026, theBalochistan Liberation Armystarted “Operation Herof 2.0,” a concerted offensive spanning nine districts of Balochistan, encompassing Quetta, Gwadar, and Mastung. This extensive operation, characterised by suicide attacks, the forceful entry into a heavily secured prison, and the deployment of female suicide teams, caused around200 deathsamong insurgents and civilians. The current situation arises in the aftermath of theborder conflicts between Afghanistan and PakistanduringOctober–November 2025, leading to the termination of their security cooperation.

In the Levant, the transition underPresident Ahmed al-Sharaaremains perilous. Despite anagreementin January 2026 to incorporate the Kurdish-ledSyrian Democratic Forces (SDF)into the national military, the state’s disorganised decentralisation has resulted in the reported establishment of detention facilities, which could lead to the release of numerousIslamic State fighters.

Concurrently, Russia’s official acknowledgment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan inJuly 2025and the ensuing military accord signed by Moscow and Kabul onJanuary 29, 2026, have altered the regional equilibrium, positioning Russia in opposition to theIslamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP).

Terrorism in Eurasia:
Analysis and Risk Assessment

The Middle East: The Post-Assad Transition and the “Unity of Fronts”

A “governance lag” defines the Middle Eastern theatre in 2026. The regime ofAhmed al-Sharaa(formerly known asAbu Mohammad al-Jolaniwhen he was the leader ofHayat Tahrir al-Sham –HTS) faces a fundamental paradox: he must present a moderate, state-centric face to the international community while maintaining the loyalty of his militant base. The assimilation of ex-insurgent groups into the Syrian Arab Army has precipitated a dilemma concerning divided allegiances. Local sources and analyses suggest that residualAl-Qaedaelements and ex-HTS hardliners maintain covert command structures within the official military, possibly offering a state-sanctioned haven for future extraterritorial endeavours.

TheIslamic Statehas exploited recent conflicts between pro-government militias and local ethnic factions, alongside the withdrawal of pro-Kurdish forces from certain Syrian territories, to amplify itsjihadist propagandatargeting al-Sharaa and to orchestrate violent assaults.

TheUS withdrawal from Iraq, slated for completion by the end of 2026, has created a “waiting game” for the Islamic State. The departure of US technical and aerial support, even with the Iraqi Security Forces’ progress, has generated a void that terrorist groups and Iran-aligned militias are prepared to occupy. The ongoing struggle for dominance betweenShiite proxies and a resurgent Sunni insurgencyestablishes the Levant as a critical, albeit exceptionally dangerous, arena for international recruitment.

The AfPak Theatre: The Failure of the Taliban’s “Dual-Game”

The Taliban administration is currently struggling to maintain its grip on internal security. Although they have silenced some internal opposition, their strategy of engaging in a “dual-game” with theTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)has proven counterproductive. The TTP’s 2026 organisational restructuring, which includes the establishment of an“Air Force” unitequipped with adapted commercial drones, demonstrates that the organization has transitioned from a mere border threat to a professionalised insurgent entity.

The Taliban’s persistent refusal to curb the TTP, motivated by shared ideology and apprehension over TTP fighters joining ISKP, hasbrought Pakistan to a critical point. Islamabad’s reliance on aerial strikes inside Afghan territory and its claims of Indian/Afghan complicity in Baloch separatism have increased the regional geopolitical risk. The BLA actions against theChina-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)have a two-fold aim: to damage Islamabad’s economy and to convey a message to Beijing that their investments are at risk given the current security framework.

Central Asia: The “Fortress” and the Radicalisation of the Borderlands

The Central Asian republics have responded to the Afghan threat by seeking shelter under a Russian security umbrella, organising meetings with international and regional key players, and increasing regional cooperation.

The2025Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) drillsand the reinforcement of theTajik bordershould prevent a spillover of kinetic violence. However, this militarisation is being accompanied by a crackdown on religious expression and political dissent, especially inTajikistan, whichISKP’s Al-Azaim media wingis exploiting with precision.

ISKP has moved beyond simple “battlefield videos.” In 2026, the terrorist organisation might design its disseminated information for theCentral Asian diaspora, portraying the existing local authorities and their Russian “supervisors” as oppressive colonial powers. By emphasising “purity” and safeguarding the “ummah” from Russian and Chinese expansion, ISKP has effectively attracted thousands of disaffected young people who perceive established governmental systems as both corrupt and beholden to external forces.

Russia and the North Caucasus: The Fragile Southern Flank

Russia’s 2026counter-terrorism strategyis strained by the ongoing conflict inUkraineand a low-intensity but still persistent terrorist threat in theNorth Caucasus. The reported deteriorating health ofRamzan Kadyrovinearly 2026has created a potential power vacuum in Grozny. If the “Kadyrovtsy” units disintegrate, local militias and terrorist groups or the Islamic State might surge by increasing their propaganda and activities.

The legacy of the2024 Crocus City HallandDagestanattacks remains a defining feature of Russian internal policy. The recent security crackdown onCentral Asian migrantshas had the opposite effect, creating millions of disenfranchised workers who are now prime targets for ISKP recruitment. For the Kremlin, theJanuary 29 defence deal with the Talibanmight be an attempt to outsource security; however, by aligning with the Taliban, Moscow has inadvertently validated ISKP’s narrative that Moscow is a “crusader ally” of an “apostate” Afghan regime.

The European/Western Theatre: The Strategic Utility of the “10 per cent”

In Western countries, the threat environment in 2026 is less about “mass-casualty” events and more about “societal corrosion.” Security assessments predict extremists will continue spreadingjihadist propagandaonline and in person if parts of migrant and diaspora populations lack good integration.

The strategic goal of modern jihadist groups in Europe is to provoke“Reciprocal Radicalisation.”Every lone-actor attack might:

1. Fuel Far-Right Sentiment:Triggering protests and “clash of civilisations” rhetoric.
2. Provoke Draconian Policy:Forcing governments to implement strict migration and surveillance laws that further alienate minority communities.
3. Validate the “War on Islam” Narrative:Jihadist propaganda can use this alienation as “proof” that the West is irredeemably hostile to Muslims.

In this context, the90/10 statistical splitis a deceptive metric. Ten per cent of attacks in the West carry ninety per cent of the global psychological weight. These attacks influence elections, reshape domestic policies, and effectively accomplish the terrorists’ political objectives.

Indicators to Monitor

• Technical Escalation in AfPak:Any confirmed use of “Air Force” drone units by the TTP or BLA against high-value military targets in Islamabad or Rawalpindi.
• Sino-Russian Security Posture:Beijing and Moscow’s decision to deploy private security companies (PSCs) to protect their Afghan mining interests and investments, signalling a total lack of faith in Taliban protection.
• Levantine Detention Stability:Reports of mass prison breaks or “transfers” of Islamic State high-value detainees (HVDs) from the former SDF-run camps in Eastern Syria.
• Chechen Succession Dynamics:Any sign of open conflict between rival factions in Grozny following reports of Kadyrov’s incapacitation.
• Increasing Violent Attacks or Arrests in the North Caucasus:Any counter-terrorism operations or violent attack registered in the region, especially in Dagestan and Chechnya, which can alter the local perception about security and stability.
• European Legislative Overreaction:The implementation of emergency migration “hard-locks” in major EU states following a lone-actor event, which would show the successful completion of a reciprocal radicalisation cycle.

Outlook

We can assess thegeopolitical riskassociated with terrorist activities and jihadist propaganda in Eurasia in 2026 asmedium-high.

The Eurasian threat landscape is no longer a collection of isolated insurgencies but aconnected ecosystem of hybrid threats. The Taliban’s lack of control over groups like the TTP, coupled with Russia’s stretched resources and the unstable Syrian transition, has fostered an environment where ISKP can extend its reach from Kabul all the way to Moscow and into Central Europe.

The primary strategic challenge is not military butsystemic. The cycle of violence will persist unless regional powers and Western governments confront the root causes of economic discontent and the“clash of civilisations” rhetoricthat aids extremist recruitment.

The year 2026 can mark the point at which the robust security protocols of the past ten years proved inadequate when confronted by the more adaptable, strategy-based conflicts of the current period.