Executive Summary

The Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) recently published Voice of Khorasan Issue 38 in Pashto (Khorasan Ghag) language, demonstrating a deliberate recalibration of its propaganda activity across linguistic lines.

The reintroduction of Pashto content after a significant pause, coupled with the ongoing publication of the English edition (a few days before ISKP released also Voice of Khorasan Issue 47), signifies a comprehensive media strategy aimed at domestic populations, regional rivals, and international partners.

Editorial emphasis on ideological orthodoxy, delegitimisation of competitors, and operational security themes shows sustained intent to influence audiences, legitimise violence, and target Taliban in Afghanistan and political figures in Pakistan.

Key Takeaways

1. ISKP has resumed Pashto-language propaganda to reassert influence among Afghan and Pakistani Pashto-speaking audiences following a notable publication interval.
2. Media narratives reinforce ISKP’s posture of confrontation with the Taliban, Pakistani militant groups, nationalist actors, and foreign interests.
3. The Voice of Khorasan, in both English and Pashto, has confirmed that ISKP is intensifying its propaganda efforts aimed at Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Facts

At the beginning of February 2025, ISKP issued the 38^th issue of its Pashto-language magazine Voice of Khorasan (Khorasan Ghag) after a long interruption. First launched in May 2022, the magazine initially appeared on a biweekly schedule, shifted to roughly monthly circulation in 2023, and encountered repeated delays from mid-2024, resulting in biannual publication during 2025.

This 99-page version includes discussions on religion, ideologies, and political messages. The magazine details alleged assaults by Turkish security forces, a violent attack against a hotel in Kabul with ties to China, the assassination of a cleric in Peshawar, and an event in Sydney.

Animosity towards the Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a recurring theme, coupled with the use of disparaging language aimed at Pakistani religious scholars and Pashtun nationalist political figures such as Manzoor Pashteen (Founder & Head of Pashtun Tahafuz Movement), Mohsin Dawar (Ex MNA-North Waziristan. Central Chairman National Democratic Movement) and Ali Wazir (Political figure from South Waziristan).

During the same week, ISKP’s Al-Azaim media arm released issue 47 of the English-language Voice of Khorasan. The 133-page publication focuses on jihadist ideology, religious instruction, denunciations of Deobandism and the Taliban, and retrospective narratives related to the battles of Mosul. The technology section offers advice on the careful application of AI tools, recommending that users refrain from disclosing confidential data and limit their use to translation and fundamental research. In addition to soliciting Monero donations, the publication features apocalyptic themes, designating Isfahan as the origin point for the Dajjal’s emergence (Antichrist).

The Pashto version of ISKP’s Voice of Khorasan had its last release in July 2025, preceding this most recent edition. The revived Pashto publication deliberates on the Taliban, the United States, and Bagram Airbase, since US President Donald Trump expressed Washington’s interest in taking back this military facility.

Analysis

The Voice of Khorasan in English and Pashto shows a pattern in sequencing and content, pointing to a deliberate strategy of audience segmentation.

English-language content targets foreign combatants, their international supporters, and ideologically committed individuals by reinforcing doctrine, validating historical narratives, and offering behavioural guidance. The absence of current operational reporting reduces exposure to counter-terrorism scrutiny while sustaining ideological cohesion. Including guidance on artificial intelligence reflects an awareness of digital vulnerabilities and surveillance risks, suggesting adaptive learning within ISKP’s media structures.

The resumption of Pashto edition after a long pause highlights a renewed focus on local populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pashto content focuses on delegitimising the Taliban’s religious authority, undermining rival militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and discrediting nationalist political figures who command visibility among Pashtun communities. The communication reflects ISKP’s persistent aim to weaken rival sources of authority and establish itself as the singular legitimate voice for jihadist goals in the region.

References to Bagram Airbase and alleged foreign engagement serve a narrative function rather than an evidentiary one. These narratives bolster assertions of outside interference and treachery, serving as a justification for violence directed at both internal and external adversaries. The recurrent emphasis on assaults against Chinese individuals highlights ISKP’s ongoing targeting strategy and its endeavour to leverage regional discontent associated with China’s economic and security footprint.

Indicators to Monitor

• ISKP’s exploitation of political and security friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
• Persistent threats to foreign nationals and symbolic targets, with continued emphasis on Chinese-linked interests.
• Ongoing ideological and operational rivalry with the Taliban, raising the prospect of further violent attacks against the movement’s members.
• Improved media operational security through the selective adoption of artificial intelligence tools.
• Continued recruitment and radicalisation efforts directed at Pashto-speaking youth and foreign sympathisers.

Conclusion

ISKP’s latest media productions show a consistent aim to encourage, activate, and validate violence, even while facing operational challenges and postponed releases.

Releasing the English and Pashto versions simultaneously shows a strategic approach to reaching specific audiences and managing the narrative effectively.

Given the stress on ideological rigour, sectarian alignment, and technical prudence, it appears they are gearing up for a protracted confrontation involving regional authorities and foreign interests.

Continued monitoring of ISKP’s multilingual propaganda remains critical for assessing threat intent, audience reach, and indicators of potential escalation.

Disclaimer: The images of Islamic State propaganda included in this article are used strictly as evidentiary sources to support the report’s findings. SpecialEurasia and the author do not endorse any activities, ideologies, or narratives promoted by the Islamic State.