Executive Summary
In the last year, Iraq has faced a terrorism problem defined by a precarious intersection of a resilient, decentralised Islamic State insurgency and the rising asymmetric dominance of Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMGs) targeting critical infrastructure and sovereign institutions.
Although mass-casualty urban bombings have decreased statistically, the evolving nature of terrorist threats, amplified by the Syrian regime’s collapse and the instability of the SDF detention system, has rendered the Iraqi-Syrian border a critical area for militant incursions and the retrieval of detainees.
Despite the Iraqi Security Forces’ operational readiness, the impending withdrawal of the Global Coalition by late 2025 and the persistent political stalemate in Baghdad are likely to foster a resurgence of Salafi-jihadist and state-sponsored non-state actors across multiple fronts.
Background Information
In late January 2026, Hamid al-Shatri, the head of Iraqi Intelligence, underscored the significant threat posed by the increasing presence of Islamic State militants in Syria to Iraq, given the organisation’s continued global unity and its aim to find opportunities to re-establish its insurgency following the Syrian regime’s security deterioration.
Analysis of security events from the past year reveals a move away from broad defensive strategies towards specialised, high-consequence operations.
Because of the Islamic State’s sustained and substantial operations within Iraqi territory, which have resulted in fatalities among security forces and civilians alike, Iraqi and Kurdish authorities, supported by US forces, started a sequence of counter-offensives beginning in January 2025. The operation on March 13, 2025, in Anbar was significant, leading to the elimination by US forces of the Islamic State’s second-in-command, Abdallah “Abu Khadijah” Makki Muslih al-Rifai. This action represented a substantial disruption to the group’s operational planning capabilities.
The incremental withdrawal of United States forces from the Ain al-Asad base, culminating in January 2026, has, however, created a vacuum that has primarily placed the onus of counter-insurgency operations upon the Iraqi Security Forces.
By January 2026, the paramount concern shifted to the escalating threat of the “Islamic State time bomb” within Syria, as Iraq had to accommodate 7,000 high-risk detainees from deteriorating prisons in northeastern Syria to avert a mass escape that would have posed a direct danger to Mosul and Anbar.
The following table is a summary of significant events related to terrorism and security operations in Iraq over the past year.
| Date | Location | Incident Description | Organisation | Fatalities/Injuries |
| January 10, 2025 | Hamrin Mountains, Diyala Province | Iraqi Air Force conducted a precision airstrike targeting an Islamic State hideout. | Iraqi Air Force vs. Islamic State | 4 dead (Islamic State) |
| January 31, 2025 | Kirkuk Province | US CENTCOM conducted precision airstrikes against Islamic State operatives. | US Forces vs. Islamic State | 5 dead (Islamic State) |
| February 10, 2025 | Kirkuk Province | US CENTCOM airstrike targeted a mobile ISIS insurgent cell. | US Forces vs. Islamic State | 2 dead (Islamic State) |
| February 12, 2025 | Rawa, Al Anbar Province | Iraqi and US forces conducted airstrikes against ISIS positions. | Iraqi & US Forces vs. Islamic State | 5 dead (Islamic State) |
| March 13, 2025 | Al Anbar Province | Precision air operation targeting Islamic State senior leadership. | US Forces vs. Islamic State | 1 HVT dead (Islamic State deputy leader) |
| March 21, 2025 | Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan Region | Iraqi CTS conducted a counterterrorism operation against Islamic State. | Iraqi CTS vs. Islamic State | 2 arrested (Islamic State) |
| April 1, 2025 | Duhok, Kurdistan Region | Islamic State militant attacked Assyrians during Babylonian-Assyrian New Year celebrations. | Islamic State | 2 injured (civilians) |
| April 12, 2025 | Riyaz Subdistrict, Kirkuk | Iraqi forces killed two Islamic State leaders, destroyed a hideout, and seized weapons. | Iraqi Security Forces vs. Islamic State | 2 dead (Islamic State) |
| April 12, 2025 | Mosul, Nineveh | Iraqi forces arrested a former Islamic State “Islamic Police” member. | Iraqi Security Forces vs. Islamic State | 1 arrested (Islamic State) |
| April 13, 2025 | Saladin Governorate | Iraqi airstrike killed two Islamic State fighters including a senior leader. | Iraqi Forces vs. Islamic State | 2 dead (Islamic State) |
| April 14, 2025 | Saladin Governorate | Iraqi raid captured four Islamic State members including the Shari’a Wali of Sulaiman Bek. | Iraqi Security Forces vs. Islamic State | 4 arrested (Islamic State) |
| May 19, 2025 | Balkana Mountains, Saladin Governorate | Intelligence-led airstrike destroyed an Islamic State hideout. | Iraqi Air Force / JOC vs. Islamic State | 2 dead (Islamic State) |
| May 20, 2025 | Saladin Governorate | Iraqi Air Force strikes targeted Islamic State logistical hideouts. | Iraqi Air Force vs. Islamic State | 11 killed (Islamic State) |
| May 21, 2025 | Balkana Mountains, Saladin | Follow-up operation confirmed Islamic State casualties from earlier strike. | Iraqi Army & Intelligence | 2 confirmed dead (Islamic State) |
| June 2025 | Northern Iraq (border areas) | Continued Iraqi operations to disrupt Islamic State desert transit routes. | Iraqi Security Forces | Disruption operations ongoing |
| July 15, 2025 | Kurdistan border region (Al-Hazima) | Islamic State sleeper cells ambushed Kurdish Asayish forces. | Islamic State vs. Asayish | 5 dead (Asayish) |
| September 2025 | Rural Diyala & Kirkuk | Iraqi forces continued clearance operations against Islamic State cells. | Iraqi Security Forces | Multiple arrests (Islamic State) |
| October 14, 2025 | Al-Sa’adiya, Diyala Province | Islamic State detonated a car bomb near a crowded market. | Islamic State | 9 dead, 15 wounded (civilians) |
| December 17, 2025 | Kirkuk, Nineveh, Baghdad | Iraqi CTS and KRI security arrested Islamic State members in coordinated raids. | Iraqi CTS & KRI Forces vs. Islamic State | 6 arrested (Islamic State) |
| December 27, 2025 | Multiple Iraqi provinces | Iraqi Military Intelligence arrested Islamic State operatives in separate operations. | Iraqi Military Intelligence vs. Islamic State | 3 arrested (Islamic State) |
| January 19, 2026 | Western Iraq border | Iraqi elite units deployed to fortify desert border against Islamic State infiltration. | Iraqi Security Forces | Strategic reinforcement |
| January 20–25, 2026 | Nineveh & Nasiriyah Prisons | Relocation of Islamic State detainees to prevent prison-break attempts. | Iraqi Govt / US CENTCOM | 7,000 detainees transferred |
Analysis
The primary determinant of elevated geopolitical risk in Iraq is the pervasive instability within the Syrian state, stemming from the downfall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the subsequent armed confrontations between the newly established government of Ahmad al-Sharaa and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.
The instability in this region has directly jeopardised the safety of detention centres and internally displaced person (IDP) camps, including Al-Hol. In Al-Hol, thousands of radicalised individuals are living in extremely poor conditions, creating an environment ripe for fostering future extremism.
Terrorism continues to pose a fundamental danger to Iraq’s security. The Islamic State has transitioned from governing territory as a “caliphate” to functioning as a dispersed and mobile insurgent organization. This new form allows them to take advantage of “security blind spots” in rural areas and disputed regions.
The transfer of 7,000 Islamic State combatants back to Iraqi prisons in January 2026, although a required preventative action against major prison breaks in Syria, creates a substantial future security problem. These battle-hardened individuals might seek to reconstitute their insurgent operations from inside Iraq’s justice and penal systems.
Beyond the Salafi-jihadist danger, the Middle East is experiencing a heightened risk from state-backed non-state groups. These groups are more frequently employing asymmetric technologies to undermine national sovereignty and economic stability.
The repeated attacks on energy facilities in Iraq, such as the drone strikes on the Khor Mor gas field in November 2025, suggest that Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMGs) are employing the “Resistance” narrative. This strategy appears to be a way for them to assert their influence, discourage foreign investment, and suppress domestic political opposition.
Operating within a grey zone, these groups are formally affiliated with the state’s security framework through the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). Their capacity to act without direct orders creates a competing power structure, which consequently undermines established institutions. With the Global Coalition ending its operations in Iraq, the lack of international security oversight could encourage these militias to intensify attacks on foreign diplomatic and military targets, especially if Iran-Israel tensions persist or with a US attack against Tehran.
The failure of the November 2025 parliamentary elections to establish a unified government that can address the socio-economic issues fuelling extremist recruitment further intensifies the country’s security risks.
The appointment of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister-designate has brought back concerns about sectarian division and excessive government power, similar to the circumstances that allowed the rise of the Islamic State in 2014.
The security landscape in the broader Middle East is undergoing a significant transformation. It is moving away from traditional wars between countries and towards intense proxy conflicts and instability fuelled by competition over resources. Iraq is central to this geopolitical shift, acting as the major battleground where the US concept of “hemispheric security” and Iran’s strategy of “deterrence through volume” clash.
A lack of coordinated regional strategies for counter-terrorism and Syrian stabilisation will likely result in Iraq becoming a persistent conduit for extremist knowledge transfer and a continuous source of regional instability.
Furthermore, a potential US military engagement with Iran, and Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory actions within the region, could exacerbate instability in Iraq and adjacent nations. This instability might create openings for extremist groups and other non-state entities to expand their influence and seize territory by exploiting power vacuums.
Indicators to Monitor
- Increased volume and sophistication of jihadist propaganda on encrypted platforms calling for the liberation of detainees in Syria and Iraq.
- Reports of renewed ethnic violence or security failures in the Syrian border provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah following integrating the SDF into the Syrian state.
- A possible US-Iran military conflict and its consequences in the Middle East.
- Public statements from high-level militia commanders threatening to target remaining international bases in Erbil in response to US-Iranian kinetic escalations
- Signs of fractured leadership within the Iraqi Security Forces or the PMF following the appointment of a controversial Prime Minister.
Outlook
The likelihood of an escalation in terrorist attacks and Islamic State operations within Iraq and its adjacent territories is substantial, owing to the persistent security deficit in northern Syria and the continuing disruption of regional power balances.
The safe return and containment of numerous dangerous combatants, along with the stabilisation of the Iraq-Syrian border, are essential requirements for averting a significant resurgence of insurgent activity in the period following the Coalition’s departure.
An inability to address the root political and socio-economic factors contributing to radicalisation may enable the Islamic State and independent militia organisations to exploit existing societal rifts, leading Baghdad into a prolonged phase of renewed conflict.
