Executive Summary
The report analyses the 3rd Astrakhan International Forum, highlighting Russia’s strategic initiative to position Astrakhan as a regional trade and logistics hub connecting the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with emerging markets in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Africa.
It examines the Russian proposal to facilitate Afghanistan’s imports and exports through Astrakhan, strengthening Moscow’s influence in Central and South Asia, enhancing economic security, and expanding Eurasian connectivity while countering rival powers’ regional initiatives.
Background Information
The 3rd Astrakhan International Forum, titled “North–South ITC – New Horizons. Rapid Access to Premium Markets of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, East Africa, and India,” was held in Astrakhan in November 2025.
On the margins of the forum, the authorities of Astrakhan Region met with the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to the Russian Federation, Mawlavi Hassan Gul Hassan. During the meeting, the Astrakhan authorities proposed positioning the region as a transport and logistics hub for Afghan exports and imports.
The parties also discussed the possibility of transit supplies to Afghanistan not only from Russia but also from Belarus; such supply chains are already operational for several Asian and Persian Gulf countries. Russian representatives assessed that the agro-industrial sector of Astrakhan Region could contribute to Afghanistan’s food security.
Mawlavi Hassan Gul Hassan expressed Afghanistan’s interest in joining the INSTC and in establishing cooperation with partners along the route. He also highlighted Afghanistan’s interest in attracting foreign investment and developing joint projects with Russian companies.
The forum’s broader focus was on expanding trade and cargo turnover with markets in the Middle East, East Africa, and India that are considered new or underdeveloped for Russian trade.
The event gathered more than 400 entrepreneurs, government officials, and experts, participating both in person and online, from Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Turkey, Tanzania, Qatar, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and other countries. As part of the program, delegations visited more than five operational ports and terminals in the Astrakhan Region.
Astrakhan and the Expansion of Sanctions-Resilient Trade Corridors
By presidential decree, Russia has set the objective of increasing freight volumes along international transport corridors by at least 1.5 times by 2030 compared to 2021 levels, through enhanced global competitiveness. Astrakhan has historically functioned as Russia’s primary eastern trade gateway and hosts a strategically critical trans-regional segment of the INSTC.
The local shipbuilding sector contributes to fleet modernization, including newly developed capabilities in the construction of transport and dredging vessels, while shipyards also provide repair services for Russian operators and companies from the wider Caspian region. These combined activities are expanding the regional cargo base. A central role in this process is played by the Caspian Cluster, which integrates industrial and port special economic zones.
Of particular strategic importance is the Volga–Caspian Shipping Canal, which links the Volga River to Caspian Sea ports and provides onward access to the Black Sea and Baltic Sea basins. As a result of port infrastructure modernisation and the formation of the Caspian Cluster, seaport cargo turnover doubled in 2023–2024, exceeding 6 million tons.
Within the Caspian basin, the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently one of the region’s principal partners. Russia can capitalise on its successful partnerships with Iranian companies, which have transformed the Russian Caspian ports into productive trade hubs, and replicate this model with Afghanistan. Dmitry Birichevsky, Director of the Department of Economic Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has identified the INSTC as a key instrument for economic security, noting that its route across friendly states reduces exposure to geopolitical risks.
Development of the corridor is assessed as the primary driver of economic growth for the broader Caspian region in the coming years, with total cargo volumes potentially reaching 46 million tons by 2030.
Owing to its geography, Afghanistan constitutes a critical transit node connecting Central Asia with South Asian ports and enabling expanded maritime access via Pakistan and Iran. Following the recent escalation with Pakistan, Kabul is reorienting its economic and logistical focus toward Iran and aligning its connectivity with the emerging Eurasian trade architecture led by China and Russia. The so-called Kabul Corridor intersects with developing routes such as the INSTC and Beijing’s China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, potentially enabling Russia to bypass Western-controlled trade routes currently constrained by sanctions.
Geopolitical Scenario
August 2021 marked the beginning of a new geopolitical game in Afghanistan and across Eurasia, involving both regional and extra-regional powers, notably Russia, China, the United States, and Turkey.
Unlike Russia, and in line with its NATO partners, Turkey has not formally recognised the de facto Taliban government. Nevertheless, Ankara remains the only NATO member maintaining diplomatic engagement with the Taliban and retaining a presence on the ground.
The Erdoğan administration has sought to secure control over Kabul International Airport, while navigating a fragile balance between the Taliban, its relationship with Uzbek-Afghan leader Abdul Rashid Dostum—who has accused the Taliban of being the primary source of instability and social hardship for the Afghan population—and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of Afghanistan’s most prominent warlords and the leader of Hezb-e Islami. While Turkey’s involvement retains a strong ideological dimension, Russia’s approach is more pragmatic and investment-driven.
Following Russia’s official recognition of the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in July 2025, several Central Asian states entered the competition by establishing relations with the Kabul authorities; Kyrgyzstan, for instance, opened a trade house in the Afghan capital.
More recently, Russian and Afghan media reported that a US Air Force C-17A transport aircraft landed at Bagram Air Base for the first time since the 2021 withdrawal, allegedly carrying senior Central Intelligence Agency personnel. Although this information remains speculative, reports of a potential reactivation of a US intelligence presence coincided with Donald Trump’s repeated calls for the United States to regain control of Bagram Air Base and with shifts in Afghanistan’s political and economic landscape.
Concerned by a possible renewed US presence, China invited Mullah Yaqoub Mujahid, the Taliban’s Defence Minister, to Beijing to discuss enhancing cooperation.
Within this complex environment, the Kremlin is expanding its footprint primarily through an economic agenda. Despite publicly expressing concerns over security and stability under Taliban rule—assessing that Afghanistan still hosts approximately 23,000 international terrorists affiliated with various groups, including Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP)—Moscow is increasing the presence of Russian corporations in the Afghan economy.
The Taliban have recently invited Russian companies to invest in the national mining sector, a move that could inject much-needed capital into an economy severely constrained by sanctions. This development indicates Moscow’s capacity to challenge both US and Chinese interests in Afghanistan, particularly given China’s prior involvement in the mining sector.
Economically, persistent insecurity continues to deter investment and obstruct trade, as businesses are unlikely to operate in Afghanistan without assurances against terrorist attacks. Terrorism functions for Russia both as a justification for deeper engagement and as a limiting factor on its ambitions.
Moscow argues that Western sanctions hinder Kabul’s ability to combat militant groups, while simultaneously citing the terrorist threat to legitimise closer security cooperation. Central Asian states remain divided: some fear that Russian engagement with the Taliban could embolden militancy along their borders, while others are capitalising on the current momentum by expanding logistical and trade cooperation with the Taliban authorities.
Strategic Assessment
Within the current Eurasian geopolitical environment, the proposal to position Astrakhan as a transport and logistics hub for Afghanistan acquires strategic relevance well beyond its immediate economic dimension. It aligns with Russia’s broader effort to consolidate influence across Eurasian connectivity architectures while mitigating geopolitical, security, and sanctions-related constraints.
First, the Astrakhan initiative fits squarely within Moscow’s long-term objective of reorienting trade and transit flows away from Western-controlled corridors toward alternative, politically reliable routes. As a critical node on the INSTC, Astrakhan offers Russia a controlled entry point into markets spanning Iran, South Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa, while reinforcing Russia’s role as a central organiser of Eurasian trade flows.
The emphasis on food security and transit logistics is particularly significant, as it allows Russia to project influence through ostensibly non-military, stabilising mechanisms, reducing reputational and political costs while increasing dependency relationships.
Astrakhan’s role as a logistics hub enables Russia to capitalise on Afghanistan’s geographic position without assuming full responsibility for its internal instability. Afghanistan functions as a transit multiplier, positions Moscow as a systemic enabler rather than a single-sector actor, enhancing its bargaining power vis-à-vis Kabul and regional stakeholders while avoiding direct security entanglement.
Moreover, the proposal strengthens the Kremlin’s leadership role in the Caspian region. By anchoring Afghan transit to Astrakhan, Moscow reinforces the Caspian Cluster as an indispensable platform for Eurasian connectivity. This has secondary effects: it consolidates cooperation with Iran, incentivises Central Asian participation, and increases the economic relevance of the Volga–Caspian axis, thereby binding regional actors more closely to Russian-managed infrastructure.
Finally, from a strategic signalling perspective, the Astrakhan initiative demonstrates Russia’s capacity to convert geopolitical disruption into structural advantage. At a time when Western sanctions, regional instability, and contested influence in Afghanistan create uncertainty, Moscow is presenting a coherent, infrastructure-based solution that integrates trade, security, and diplomacy. This enhances Russia’s credibility as a long-term Eurasian power broker capable of shaping outcomes through connectivity rather than coercion.
Conclusion
The Kremlin’s engagement with the Taliban shows a shift in its post-Ukraine foreign policy, aimed at acquiring a strategic advantage in non-Western regions.
Participation of Russian businesses in Afghanistan’s economy, especially within significant industrial areas, may assist Moscow’s foreign policy objectives in the region while enabling the Taliban to broaden its economic base and secure financial backing to mitigate the repercussions of global sanctions.
The importance of the Astrakhan proposal lies not in its immediate commercial output, but in its function as a strategic node within Russia’s wider Eurasian architecture. It enables Moscow to deepen its influence in Afghanistan indirectly, reinforce the INSTC as a sanctions-resilient corridor, counter rival powers’ initiatives, and consolidate its role as a central organiser of Eurasian economic space, thereby also serving as a buffer for sanctioned states such as Iran, while containing China’s expansion.
*Cover image: The Ambassador of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to the Russian Federation, Mawlavi Hassan Gul Hassan, during the Astrakhan International Forum.
