Executive Summary
Turkey is slowly increasing its role in the international arena thanks to the president Tayyip Erdoğan’s ability and pragmatic approach. In recent years, he could extend his influence on several hotlines and on an international level that begins from the Balkans, and it arrives to South and Central Asia, passing through the African horn (especially Somalia).
Nevertheless, the convergence of Turkic heritage and Islamic affiliation might not be an helpful factor for exerting influence in Afghanistan, particularly considering Erdoğan’s personal ties with Hekmatyar and Dostum’s residence in Turkey.
Based on an assessment of recent developments, this report aims to highlight the potential risk that the current de facto Taliban government may perceive the Ankara authorities as an unreliable or inconsistent partner. In this context, the Taliban could emerge as the first actor capable of undermining Turkey’s expanding regional influence.
Key Points
- Turkey is increasingly positioning itself as an emerging power with influence spanning Europe, Asia, and Africa.
- Ankara perceives Central Asian and Afghan Turkmen communities as natural and historical members of the broader Turkic world (‘Er Turan’).
- Regarding Afghanistan, Turkey needs to maintain a strategic balance between the Taliban, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to avoid en exclusion from the country’s dynamics.
Background Information
The Republic of Turkey is steadily consolidating its role as a relevant and influential actor within the global system. Unlike established superpowers such as Russia and the United States, Turkey’s strategic posture relies predominantly on the promotion of economic cooperation and the provision of security guarantees.
Ankara pursues these objectives by mobilising two core cultural pillars: the broader Turkic identity and, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, an explicitly articulated Islamic identity rooted in the Ottoman legacy. During the Ottoman period, the Sultan embodied both supreme political authority and religious leadership.
The convergence of these two elements has led several analysts to characterise Turkey’s contemporary strategy as “neo-Ottoman”, portraying Erdoğan as a modern successor to the Ottoman Sultan. Unlike its historical predecessor, this new Turkish-Islamic projection extends beyond former imperial borders in Asia, reaching into South and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey’s role as a connective power reflects its intercontinental influence, as it facilitates multilateral engagement on shared challenges, including economic development.
Nevertheless, Turkish cultural soft power and economic credibility may prove insufficient for consolidating influence in Afghanistan. A fragile equilibrium of alliances involving the Taliban, religious factions shapes the country’s internal dynamics, and ethnically based power brokers, rendering external influence complex.
Analysis
In Central Asia, Turkish influence is institutionalised through the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), which promotes cooperation among Turkic countries to enhance economic integration and infrastructure development.
At a strategic level, Ankara’s underlying aim appears to be the exploitation of Pan-Turkic identity as a mechanism to contain Moscow’s historically dominant role in the region. More precisely, the OTS may function as a tool for limiting Russian influence across Central Asia. In this context, a Huntingtonian-style fault line between Russia and Turkey is gradually emerging, extending from Syria through to Central Asia.
Turkey’s influence ostensibly reaches Afghanistan; however, closer analysis reveals a more complex and ambiguous picture. Unlike Russia, and in alignment with its NATO partners, Ankara has not formally recognised the de facto Taliban government. Nonetheless, Ankara remains the only NATO member maintaining diplomatic engagement with the Taliban and keeping a presence on the ground. The Erdoğan administration has sought to secure control over Kabul International Airport, a move intended to reinforce Turkey’s regional leverage by exerting influence over Afghan air traffic.
Turkey’s mediation efforts between Pakistan and Afghanistan during talks in Istanbul in late October 2025 demonstrated its reliability as a diplomatic interlocutor.
Turkic nationalism has facilitated Turkish penetration into Afghan society, particularly through the diffusion of the Turkish language among Turkmen communities, notably Uzbeks. This trend is widely documented across Turkish social media platforms. The culmination of Turkey’s ethnic outreach is represented by the presence of the historical Uzbek-Afghan leader Abdul Rashid Dostum in Turkey. However, Dostum may also constitute the most significant vulnerability in Ankara’s Afghan strategy. His recent public statements against the Taliban during the Muslim celebration of Eid al-Fitr have exacerbated tensions.
From his residence in Turkey, Dostum accused the Taliban of being the principal source of instability and social hardship for the Afghan population. While Ankara has refrained from issuing any official response to these allegations, this silence risks generating latent friction between Turkey and the Taliban. In effect, Turkey’s protection of a prominent Turkic Afghan leader may undermine its broader strategic interests within Afghanistan.
A further complicating factor is the long-standing personal relationship between President Erdoğan and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of Afghanistan’s most notorious warlords and the leader of Hezb-e Islami. Despite his current political marginalisation, Hekmatyar continues to represent a symbolic link between militant Islamism and political Islam. Any perceived Turkish proximity to him risks legitimising a figure unacceptable to Afghan minorities and regional stakeholders alike, thereby transforming Ankara’s engagement from pragmatic diplomacy into ideological alignment.
Conclusion
Turkey’s posture towards Afghanistan remains structurally ambiguous. The instrumentalisation of ethnic dynamics in a country that endured a violent ethnic civil war during the 1990s is unlikely to provide a sustainable basis for a long-term Turkish presence. Consequently, Ankara’s strategy should prioritise the construction of an indirect balance of power that avoids delegitimising Taliban authority while remaining compatible with Afghanistan’s intricate tribal and social fabric.
In this regard, geoeconomic engagement represents a viable strategic alternative. Through the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), Turkish policymakers could indirectly extend economic cooperation into Afghanistan by leveraging the expanding trade relations between Central Asian states and the de facto Taliban authorities. Initiatives such as the permanent Kyrgyz trade platform established in Kabul could facilitate the development of a Turkic economic network, enhancing Turkey’s credibility while limiting political exposure.
Within this framework, Afghan Turkmen communities could operate primarily as economic intermediaries rather than political actors, functioning under Taliban regulatory oversight. By positioning itself as a key economic partner, Ankara could preserve its standing among Turkic states and within the Pashtun-dominated power structure in Kabul, while mitigating the risks associated with overt ethnic or ideological alignment.
Disclaimer: SpecialEurasia does not endorse or support the findings and conclusions presented in this report, which are solely attributed to the author. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the company.
