Executive Summary
Uighur jihadism represents not only a menace for China’s internal stability but also for its reliability as a major actor in the international arena.
The posture of Beijing’s South Asian partners amplifies this existential threat: indeed, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan each facilitate, either through direct engagement or tacit tolerance, the operations and mobility of Uighur extremist networks.
Through an analysis of relevant events and research on this theme, this report underscores the grey zone in the diplomatic relations of these three countries and how a concrete joint fight against terrorism can represent a source of enhancement among those governments.
Key Points
- Uighur jihadism threatens China’s internal security and external stability.
- By allowing Uighur militants, Pakistan and Afghanistan heighten the risk, creating tension in their economic and diplomatic relationship.
- Although their strategic goals differ, Beijing, Islamabad and Kabul share some security concerns, which could be the basis for organised collaboration on counter-terrorism and regional stability.
Background Information
The relations between Pakistan and China are usually described as one of the strongest and most productive collaborations in the international arena. Simultaneously, China is enhancing its diplomatic and commercial relations with the de facto Taliban regime, with the purpose of becoming a reliable partner in the South Asian region.
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have shown a vague level of support, whether stated directly, for the Uighur jihadists, a security threat within China.
Uighur jihadists have been in Afghanistan since the Soviet Union invaded, like many other Muslims, especially those from Central Asia. The year of the withdraw of the Red Army from Afghanistan coincides with the foundation of the Islamic Turkestan Party, whose purpose is to establish an Islamic State in Xinjiang Province and to end the Chinese occupation of the region.
Analysis
The Islamic Turkestan Party, responsible for various attacks on Chinese territory, has the potential to harm China’s interests in the area, particularly because the Xinjiang region borders both Afghanistan and Pakistan, two of China’s primary regional partners, as well as Kazakhstan.
The relations between Beijing and Astana and the proximity of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to Kazakhstan are crucial for the development of the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, a pipeline that should connect Western Chinese regions to the Kazakh oil field located in Kumkol. Therefore, the stabilisation of this province may represent for China an opportunity to boost the country’s domestic oil needs.
Indirect backing from Afghanistan and Pakistan for Uighur jihadists could, however, hinder China’s economic growth in Central Asia. Though no evidence exists of Pakistan’s direct role in training jihadists for attacks in China, the presence of Uighur Islamists and their connections to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leadership are thoroughly documented.
Even though China and Pakistan are currently portraying their relationship as increasingly friendly and consistent, the Pakistani government’s failure to address Uighur militants could damage economic advantages for both countries, including Islamabad’s participation in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. If tensions between China and Pakistan escalate because of the Uighur issue, Beijing might jeopardise its strategic advantage in expanding its influence beyond Central Asia, which it currently achieves through Pakistan, and the benefits of the Gwadar port, which provides China crucial access to the Arabian Sea.
Regarding Afghanistan, after the Taliban’s rise to power in August 2021, China has been one of the first countries to hold diplomatic relations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, the most significant political obstacle the Taliban faces with the Chinese government is Kabul’s apparent backing of Uighur Islamists.
The Taliban government is at a crossroads, shifting from its role as the region’s primary Islamic authority toward becoming a political actor to avoid international isolation and sustain its foreign policy influence. This choice could also strengthen the internal divisions of the group and give credit to recent Pakistani allegations against the Taliban’s hospitality of jihadist groups within Afghanistan, which resulted in deadly clashes between the two countries.
China’s strategic choice to keep enhancing the diplomatic relations with these two countries can backfire its economic interests in the international arena, but also it can damage its role of reliable actor, relying on two countries that keeps playing an important role in the spread of terrorism in the area.
Conclusion
The relationship between China, Pakistan, and the Afghan Taliban offers potential benefits and drawbacks, and the stability of the region hinges on whether these countries collaborate on counterterrorism instead of backing Uighur militants.
Beijing’s continued engagement offers potential for expanded influence and economic integration in South Asia, but persistent security ambiguities and the Taliban’s transitional posture could undermine these gains if left unaddressed.
Concrete cooperation based on the coincidence of respective national interests and economic development can be the real asset that could direct especially Islamabad and Kabul towards security-oriented stability.
If China secures this accomplishment, it could further extend its dominance in the region, which would be a diplomatic win for the People’s Republic of China.
